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ABSTRACT 
 
This work engages the film The Five Obstructions (2003) as a configuration for 
multimodal composition. It explores a theory of general composition as a matter of 
confronting obstructions or creative constraints as a process of collaborative revision and 
pedagogy. Writing in this context constitutes ethical responses to the shifting constraints 
of communication and signification. The obstructions performed by the film as a series of 
revisions offer sources of proliferating rhetorical invention and play grounded on 
negotiated fields of operations.  
The first two chapters explore the relations between image and ethics in a 
pedagogy of revision, while the third considers the position of creative freedom as its 
own compositional obstruction. The fourth chapter looks to psychoanalysis as a model 
for an interruptive or hesitant relationship that accounts for an ethical exchange between 
teacher and student. The final chapter proposes configurations for how obstructions and 
revision function as a compositional approach, and offers a general lens in which to 
attend to assignments. All five chapters are written alongside the five obstructions from 
the film and embody the ethical practice of composition discussed in the project. 
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1Introduction
In November of 2000 noted Danish film director Lars von Trier asked his 
onetime teacher and mentor Jørgen Leth to collaborate with him on a new film. The 
film would not be one film, but a series of remakes of an older film Leth had made 
earlier in his career titled The Perfect Human (Det perfekte menneske, 1967). In the 
introduction to an edited volume on the film The Five Obstructions (2003) Mette 
Hjort recounts an email exchange in which von Trier lays out the initial rules of the 
collaboration:
Dear Jørgen,
The challenge/The Film you are supposed to solve/make is called: The 
five obstructions.
As a starting point I would like you to show me a 10-minute 
film, you have made—The Perfect Human.
We will watch the movie together and talk about it—then I 
will set up limitations, commands, or prohibitions, which means you 
have to do the film all over again. This we will do five times—of this 
the title. I would find it natural if our conversations became part of the 
final movie—with the six small films, of course.
I hope you’re happy with the assignment. Maybe the subject for 
the first movie should be something we came to an agreement about? 
Of course we would have the most fun if the subject is of a character 
that gives us as big a difference as possible between film one and six?
Let me know how you feel about this. Please write.
2Best regards,
Lars (Dekalog, xv)
Von Trier explains the film in terms of an assignment of revision, one in which Leth 
is required to respond to a series of restrictions by recreating the old film under five 
new circumstances. The obstruction is solved when Leth can successfully navigate 
the limitations. Leth eagerly accepts the challenge:
Dear Lars,
I find the assignment tempting. I can see an interesting development 
between film and six, the route around the obstacles, the 
conversations, I’m sure we’ll get a lot out of this. It is exciting. I look 
forward to your obstructions.
I really like the idea of having to change, adjust, and reduce 
according to given conditions in the process.
Best regards,
Jørgen (Dekalog, xv-xvi)
What begins as an experiment in collaborative filmmaking between student 
and mentor develops into a complex performance of vision and revision of the 
perfect human as projected through the composition of the cinematic image. The 
obstructions serve as the framing device for each film as a strategy to regulate 
the roles of collaboration and determine procedure. In his response Leth cited 
his interest in having to change his filmmaking practices in order to find a “route 
around the obstacles” that will allow him to successfully resolve the obstruction. 
3For his part, von Trier perceives the obstructions less as adjustments and more as 
commands or limiting factors put into place to move Leth toward a climactic sixth 
film.  While each obstruction will be defined through discussions between von 
Trier and Leth, the final decision is von Trier’s. Through his films, however, Leth 
is able to respond by conforming or transgressing the obstructions, reframing the 
issues, or even by indifference to their authority. What we can see in the project’s 
infancy is that although there is agreement about the procedure of revision, there 
is a disjuncture in the purpose of the experiment. Von Trier sees it as a chance to 
force Leth to explore unfamiliar filmmaking territory; for Leth it is a chance to hone 
his filmmaking chops. Both of them believe that the obstructions will facilitate their 
goals and resolve the project.
The disjuncture between what von Trier and Leth believe to be the central 
issue of The Five Obstructions is part of an ethical focus that the film engages through 
the difficult collaboration between teacher and student. Each new film projects the 
tension of this relationship through the various revisions of The Perfect Human as 
a question of ethos; von Trier discloses his ethos through the obstructions, while 
Leth’s is revealed through his responses to each obstruction. As each new film 
must constantly reframe the images of the perfect human through revision, so the 
competing goals of teacher and student must undergo ethical reframing. The film 
The Five Obstructions is not simply a series of creative remakes through a process of 
collaboration, but a complex performance of rhetorical invention and compositional 
revision through the creative constraints of obstructions. 
The obstructions channel the ethical uncertainty of the perfect human as a 
central figure to the project. As a result of the relationship between the restrictions 
of the obstructions and the constant revision of images, the film demonstrates a 
4process of collaborative multimodal composition as an ethical practice of theory, 
pedagogy, and production. Obstructions engage ethics not on the level of systems 
of principles, but through the tension of competing collaboration and the constant 
revision of images.
Von Trier and Leth’s efforts in The Five Obstructions challenge this investment 
in a fixed notion of the image. For von Tier and Leth, composing in the form of 
obstruction and image is a continuous process of re-thinking, rewriting, and 
reworking. We encounter the ethical in a broad process of composition. It is not just 
that Leth must re-make his film five times in order to discover hidden ethical issues, 
but that the actual movement of negotiating obstacles for Leth to overcome reveals 
a pedagogical ethic between student and teacher that cannot be discerned within 
a hermeneutic or semiotic reading of the images as texts or final products. Each 
film moves toward von Trier’s goal of “teaching” his teacher how to fail, or finding 
success in imperfection. So, each film cannot be considered as either a closed unit in 
itself, nor a fragment of an overall unified whole, but of an ethical movement found 
within the pedagogical challenges.
This film puts multimodal composition at stake by opening up the question 
of the image, or at least questions the grounds of those fields that are invested 
in an understanding of cinematic images as fixed within a regime of mimesis 
(aesthetically, politically, historically determined). This is not just to identify 
“practices of looking” as culturally and socially constructed, but to see how these 
practices themselves stabilize the making and reception of images, as well as 
interrogate the grounds of receiving and making images.
5The Problem of Reading Images
When we are discussing multimodal composition what is it that is being 
discussed? What is the object of study and how do we know when we have achieved 
it? There is great concern that scholars and students now learn to think and write in 
many modes, as if it has not always been necessary or even possible. In one survey 
funded by a grant from the Conference on College Composition and Communication 
(CCCC) teachers in the field of composition were asked what they understood by 
multimodal composition. The researchers found that even if they understood a 
broad and inclusive definition of multimodal writing, teaching was still relegated to 
static images (Anderson et al. 78-9). The authors of the survey insist that these gaps 
between theory and practice reflect an understanding of multimodal composition 
that “may still be emerging” (79). Moving images and sound, it would seem, have 
their own place, and it is not with writing.
 What the survey seems to whisper is a hesitation by instructors in general 
to fully disengage the boundaries of their discipline. Gunther Kress and Theo Van 
Leeuwen propose that the strong focus on visual images is the fact that writing 
itself is visual and other modes can be seen as a threat to writing (17). The practice 
of “reading images” would then be a logical step in order to embrace other modes 
of communication. Reading images, however, would be to regard the visual as text, 
rather than vice versa. The problem of the object remains top priority: if it is like text 
then we can figure out a way to read it.
 So far, so good. The disconnect does not seem to be on the level of theory, 
or even of practice, as the concept of thinking and working in multiple modes has 
become a significant part of academic life in general, reaching across disciplines and 
stretching into new fields of study to enrich and inspire our own research. Even so, 
6the scary thing about multimodal composition is not that it could potentially erase 
writing, but its apparent boundlessness. We try to “read” images because it is a safe 
way to think about them, a direct way to teach them, and a good strategy of quality 
control for what is produced. What if we don’t have a good grasp on multimodal 
composition because, like reading an image, there is no way to account for all the 
possible modes and media in which we communicate? If the text is a “galaxy of 
signifiers” instead of an object of study, then it is the galaxy part that makes it visual; 
as Roland Barthes says, “it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by 
several entrances” (S/Z 5). We can see the danger that such an understanding poses 
to the orderly phrasing of writerly practices.
I will argue in and through this dissertation that the film The Five 
Obstructions performs a theory of multimodal composition that engages an ethical 
questionability about image revision through collaborative obstructions. It is 
significant to this thesis that von Trier chose Leth and his film The Perfect Human 
as the subjects of the experiment. The film pursues this ethical questionability 
of its images by revisioning “the perfect human” as both cinematic image and 
idealized concept. I am taking on a challenge of sorts in this project. It is not an 
insurmountable feat, nor is it especially unique. Many hopeful scholars have 
similar concerns and desires for the expansion of the possibilities of writing and 
communication. Rather than follow the thread of those scholars from a theory of 
multimodal composition to a practice thereof, implying that the issue is one of linear 
hierarchies and flow charts, I prefer to wrestle with multimodal composition by 
thinking it as a galaxy of production. 
My entrance into this galaxy comes to me directly via The Five Obstructions 
as including many modes of composition, the most significant being the relationship 
7of ethos between the force of von Trier’s obstructions and the performance of Leth’s 
responses. It is both a lesson in composition (as process and as product) and in the 
creativity born of restriction. The obstructions are the rules of the game; they offer 
a restrictive field of operation as a source of proliferating rhetorical invention and 
play.  
Moving from the Perfect to the Human
Lars von Trier: A little gem that we are now going to ruin. That’s the 
way it’s got to be.
Jørgen Leth: A good perversion to cultivate. (The Five Obstructions)
The Perfect Human is the film that provides the catalyst for the experiment of The Five Obstructions, but it is also the configuration that determines the concept 
of obstructions. Leth had shot The Perfect Human as an ethnographic film on what it 
means to be the perfect human through a series of prosaic and ordinary descriptions 
of body and thoughts that speak through space and movement. Voice-over narration 
asks questions as to what the perfect human could be thinking as female/male 
subject go about their daily activities, demonstrating the spectacle of the mundane. 
It is an examination of the human being as measure of perfection in ordinariness.
The above exchange takes place early in the film after von Trier and Leth 
have watched The Perfect Human together and are discussing how to proceed 
with the first obstruction. It is clear that both directors believe that the process 
of reproducing new versions of a film in which they both have heavy investment 
8will fundamentally change the original. They see revision as a way to “ruin” the 
perfection of the original and the site of a creative “perversion.” The scandal of the 
project is that Leth and von Trier are able to construct a new cinematic discourse 
or genre by disfiguring the original. The status of the originary text is a product of 
indifference toward its authority. What develops is the image of the perfect human 
as a visual contradiction: perfection cannot be human and the human cannot 
be perfect. This is an ethical revelation that impacts the emerging discussion of 
multimodal composition by a radical inclusion of media and modes. Reading images 
is only one mode of visual rhetoric, and not even an ideal method as it still relies 
on a discourse of exclusion (image = text). While the idea of obstructions is to limit 
the modes of practice on a particular film, the exchange of responses between 
obstruction and film could conceivably continue indefinitely.
The ethical movement of the collaboration proceeds out of the creative 
constraints of the obstructions. Von Trier confesses to Leth that his goal is to “move 
from the perfect to the human” by moving further and further away from the 
authority of the urtext. The obstructions allow Leth both the pleasure and anxiety 
of a release from the certainty of the first film. The series of imperfect revisions 
coalesce around Leth as the image of the perfect human: an image of the body 
removed from the grounding of a particular ethical discourse. In his study of film in 
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter Friedrich Kittler recognized a relationship between 
cinematic practices and the psychoanalytic notion of the imaginary through the 
analogy of the imperfect body in Jacques Lacan’s mirror event: 
The imaginary, however, comes about as the mirror image of a body 
that appears to be, in terms of motor control, more perfect than the 
9infant’s own body, for in the real everything begins with coldness, 
dizziness, and shortness of breath. Thus, the imaginary implements 
precisely those optical illusions that were being researched in the 
early days of cinema. A dismembered or (in the case of film) cut-up 
body is faced with the illusionary continuity of movements in the 
mirror or on screen. (15)
He goes on to note that Lacan used film technology to document the responses of 
infants to their images in the mirror (15). The cut-up body of the film occurs at the 
level of editing as well as the composition of the scene. The dismembered body does 
not belong to a frame, the camera or otherwise; images exceed the frames and are 
complicit in the illusion of continuity bound into frames.
 By moving from the perfect to the human Leth and von Trier cultivate 
a perversion of modes that decompose and recompose the perfect human in 
various configurations. Although they feign indifference to the final product of the 
experiment, both Leth and von Trier have problematic and sometimes competing 
motives behind their participation. Von Trier claims to want to “banalize” Leth and 
punish his obsession for perfection. Hector Rodriguez identifies an antagonism in 
the process of collaboration as “essentially conflict-ridden” which reveals an ethos 
of play and suffering (“Constraint” 50). Leth and von Trier believe suffering to be in 
service to their creative play. The film explores these themes through the revision of 
image and the question of ethics. 
The only goal they can agree on is the desire that the final film be as different 
as possible from the first. Whether or not they succeed in evaluating the difference 
between the two, the effort is on an ethical practice of composition in modes of 
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collaboration and rupture. The chapters of this dissertation will follow a similar 
configuration of obstructions and revisions with the purpose of exploring possible 
differences that each chapter provides.
The first chapter will come out of the rules von Trier prescribes for the first 
obstruction. Whereas the original “perfect human” was a slow moving body/film 
composed of long deliberate takes, Leth must conjure the same introspection with 
frenetic cutting. His success or failure hinges on the instability of the abbreviated 
scenes. In this chapter I will examine the de-centering that von Trier imposes on 
Leth, not only in terms of generating new films, but in Leth’s own cinematic ideology 
shifting from a distanced naturalism to montage dynamism. I will introduce the 
concept of “image” as a particular kind of cinematic expression excluded from the 
survey of multimodal composition mentioned before. I will discuss the submission 
of image to a discourse of representation and the possibility of disrupting the 
authority of the master text. The cinematic image can be seen in terms of the 
imaginary not just because it is cut-up and dismembered but because there is only a 
perception of fragmentation; image exceeds the frame of the scene. I argue that this 
excess escape the collective grasp of semiotic approaches to film. Instead I propose 
that images are the indeterminate results of a collaborative context.
 The collaborative context of images proceeds from a dialectic between an 
ethos of suffering and the project as a game of rhetorical play. I will argue that to 
perceive the excess of images, to continue to reframe the decomposed body, engages 
ethos as a question of ethics. In the second obstruction von Trier moves away from 
challenging Leth’s technical abilities and confronts Leth with a dilemma of un/
framing. That is, how can Leth engage both what is in the frame and what is excluded 
from the frame; the obstructions set the boundaries for an ethical framework. This 
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chapter will spend time tracing the question of ethics involved in composing images 
through Charles Scott’s notion of recoil as well as John Rajchman’s study of Michel 
Foucault and Lacan and the role of eros in pursuing the question of truth. Central to 
my discussion is Leth’s decision to break the rules of the obstruction by building his 
own frame within the scene and von Trier’s response to punish the offense. I will 
question Leth’s response that only be showing the inhuman can we interrogate our 
notions of the human. It is the obstructions, however, that create the conditions for 
Leth’s transgression so that there is an ethical relationship between obstruction and 
image (von Trier and Leth).
The third obstruction is imposed on Leth as a punishment for his refusal to 
obey the rules in the second obstruction. Leth is castigated for a fault of framing 
and his punishment, interestingly, is a choice: either return and fix the problem 
of the second film (which he refuses), or make a “free-style” film in which Leth 
is free to remake the film in any way he chooses. Leth struggles with the open 
possibilities, suddenly free of obstruction from von Trier, however, he is never free 
from his own prescriptions. Leth faces the abyss of possibilities as the impossible 
task of retranslating his own work. This chapter will look at his responsibility 
of creating something free of von Trier’s guidance. The collaborative context is 
artificially removed and for one moment Leth is allowed to return to his old frames 
of reference. Again this is an issue of ethos and the composition of the perfect human 
in the absence of restriction. The idea of a “free-style” is an impossible film, given 
the context of the project, which can only claim to be free from the constraints of 
obstruction. There is no freedom from style just as there is none from the weight of 
obstructions.
As the fourth obstruction Leth must confront making an animated film while 
12
confessing that he has yet to see one that he likes. For Leth animation is abject, an 
undesirable genre, but must find a way to bring it back into the realm of possibility. 
His strategy is to take the old footage from the other three films and recycle it. The 
result is a composition that makes the old new again. It also serves to defamiliarize 
Leth with his own organic project, suddenly revealing the materiality of the 
mechanical process of rotoscope animation. Cinematic practices become strange to 
Leth as he finds that he must make peace with the abject nature of the obstruction. 
This chapter will discuss the ethics of obstruction in image composition as a 
pedagogical context. I will draw on Avital Ronell’s discussion of Freud’s practices of 
analysis that configure the patient/doctor relationship as constantly shifting power 
structures that emphasize symptoms as detective work. In this way, the teacher/
student relationship can be reconsidered as one determined less by transference of 
knowledge and more by negotiation and response.
The final chapter will follow the recoiling movement of the final obstruction 
as a way to question what has come before in terms of multimodal composition. 
Leth is required to read a narration that von Trier has written to accompany the 
last film. This film uses footage shot during the process of the last four films, and 
the obstruction is to completely lose control of the project. Leth does as he is asked 
and the result is that both teacher/student and student/teacher are revealed as 
perfect humans—perfect in their imperfections. Here I will bring to conclusion the 
discussion of the ethics of obstruction to the conclusion that there can be no such 
conclusive understanding of modes. Here I will have defined the modes and media 
of “multimodality” as alternatively, transformatively, un/frames, limitations and 
restrictions, ways of composing, styles of life, of and related to ethos, ethics, and 
eros, as well as pedagogy. Mostly I will refer to modes as obstructions. I will offer 
13
some ways to think about obstructions in terms of assignments, and assignments 
in terms of assignation or composition itself as intimate relations between media, 
modes, and roles.
 Just as The Five Obstructions represents another final version of the perfect 
human, this dissertation will represent another version beside that one, with each 
chapter speaking across to one another and always in dialogue with the films. I 
began the introduction with the question of what it is that we are discussing when 
we discuss multimodal composition. The difficulty that I hope to express throughout 
is that we are already in the collaborative context that we do not stop revising our 
thoughts on the matter.
14
Chapter One
Image and Obstruction
15
An Exposition
As a way into the current project I want 
to offer the following story. During the summer 
of 2002 I traveled to Guatemala to perform 
research for an ethnographic video I planned 
to shoot on the cultural significance of maíz to 
the community of the small highland village 
of Nahualá. The idea was to allow the people 
of the village to tell their own stories about 
maíz as food and as their connection to the land 
that was slowly depleting due to population growth and a variety of other factors. I found 
that I was able to perform on camera interviews with only a few of the residents of the 
community. This was primarily due to two factors: the primary language of the community 
was Quiché and not Spanish; and they were (rightly) suspicious of white males holding 
cameras. The result was that only a very small self-selected ring of confidants with whom I 
was able to nurture friendships were able to tell their stories in an interview context.
Before performing one such interview I approached my friend’s house and was 
greeted by his wife who, working hard weaving at her small loom next to the house, 
informed me he had left but was expected soon. 
As I waited patiently for his return she sat back 
down on the ground and resumed her project, 
her hands deftly moving the material almost 
unconsciously without thought to the visitor 
staring on in amazement at her handiwork. 
When my friend arrived I started the work of 
composing the shot for the interview. He sat 
16
in front of a doorway while I framed the lens around his house with him as the focal point, 
the doorway offering a secondary frame around his body. This was the perfect shot, framing 
out anything extraneous or exterior to the subject. As I commenced the interview I became 
aware of the faint noises of the woman at the loom 
who continued her own work a few feet away 
from the shot during my intrusion. The sounds of 
her weaving were too faint for the microphone to 
pick up, and yet loud enough to prick my own ears 
and remind me that she had been framed out. Her 
presence beside the frame had forced me to alter 
the shot enough to effect the shot; the sound of 
the loom signaling what had been cut out of the composition, and yet would always be there 
weighing heavily on the limits of the frame. 
Later I would gain the confidence of one female who lived with the family I was 
staying with. With her permission I was able to record her and a group of friends while they 
made a traditional celebratory meal with corn tamales. They did not narrate their work, 
speaking only in Quiché, but their actions provided a new perspective on the stories told in 
the interview context by actually showing what it is that they do with maíz. Their actions 
would stand beside the words of their male counterparts as a revision of those narrated 
words into the images of the cooking scene. 
While showing the finished video 
at a conference in Chicago for the American 
Anthropological Association (AAA) I was 
criticized for not interviewing any female 
participants and suppressing their voice. I 
responded by pointing to the obstacles 
to gaining access to such interviews. In 
17
retrospect I can see that it was true that in the midst of those obstructions I had lost their 
voices in terms of interview as one mode of that communication. In its place I discovered 
an entirely different way of experiencing maíz as a cultural artifact, an experience for which 
words could not be enough. The same obstructions that prevented me from interviewing 
these female residents afforded an opportunity to explore and compose their experience 
through different modes of communication which included performance, sounds, gestures, 
and ritual. In short, these women provided me the images of their experience.
This exposition reveals the main threads that will run throughout the sections 
that follow. The main idea is to explore the notion of “multimodal composition,” which has 
been receiving more and more attention with the continued advancement and accessibility 
of communication technologies. Mostly this kind of approach has been in reaction to the 
dominance of writing through print cultures that Pamela Takayoshi and Cynthia Selfe 
argue has produced 150 years of composition assignments that “consist primarily of 
words on a page arranged into paragraphs . . . occassionally interrupted by titles, headings, 
diagrams, or footnotes” (1). They point out that there are only two modes represented by 
this model: words and visual elements that supplement the words and are distributed as 
text. A multimodal approach would then acknowledge all the other possible models and 
media that could be used to create and distribute the ideas that have been relegated strictly 
to print cultures and its emphasis on text. Takayoshi and Selfe admit that most notions of 
multimodality still emphasize the text and its ability to “exceed the alphabetic and may 
include still and moving images, animations, color, words, music and sound” (1). In other 
words, multimodal composition is still though in terms of supplementing the text. If this is 
true then how do those who are so heavily invested in writing and print cultures confront 
these other modes of writing and communication without forcing them back into old 
models of writing? My answer is reverse the question and rebegin the work of multimodal 
composition not in terms of the advancing technology that now forces us to consider the 
capabilities of multimedia based writing, but in terms of returning to these other modes that 
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have never really left us.In Reading Images Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen trace the movement away 
from textual writing to the mass presses toward the end of the nineteenth century. The 
dense printed page became more entrenched within institutions of higher learning as a 
form of “high culture” (185). Dense textual writing was valued by institutions of education 
as a way to differentiate research from entertainment, the modes of the masses from those 
of the learned. There is a political subtext to applying the word “text” to all media forms 
in scholarly contexts. The dominance of alphabetic writing had the effect of suppressing 
the performance of what Andrea Lunsford calls the “embodied delivery” behind printed 
writing (170). For Lunsford this includes voice and body and the physical interaction 
that occurs within language that is somewhat lost on the page. She mentions Walter Ong 
and his formulation of “secondary orality” as the term for the modes that drive electronic 
technologies and posits her own term “secondary literacy” as a way to consider “literacy 
that is both highly inflected by oral forms, structures, and rhythms and highly aware of itself 
as writing, understood as variously organized and mediated systems of signification” (170). 
The idea of the self-awareness of literacy and the status of writing as a created and creative 
system goes well beyond thinking about multimodal writing as simply the integration of 
visual and technological effects. 
Lunsford cites Kenneth Burke’s notion of the human being as the “symbol-using, 
symbol-misusing animal” as a way to think about the uncertain exchange of modes of 
communication (170). Embodied delivery embraces critical thinking about the physical 
interaction of language, as well as the display of performance as images. This return to 
multimodal composition, or the return of modes that had been lost on the page, is not to 
simply supplement the already existing text (e.g. PowerPoint slideshows), or replace words 
with some notion of pure image, but to reconsider that which is human as an essential part 
of the writing process. This is a physical interaction with human performance that Vivian 
Sobchack is trying to identify in her essay “What My Fingers Knew: The Cinesthetic Subject, 
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or Vision in the Flesh,” in which she describes her experience with the film The Piano:
The film not only ‘filled me up’ and often ‘suffocated’ me with 
feelings that resonated in and constricted my chest and stomach, but is also 
“sensitized” the very surfaces of my skin—as well as its own—to touch. 
Throughout The Piano, my whole being was intensely concentrated and, rapt 
as I was in what was there on the screen, I was also wrapped in a body that, 
here, was achingly aware of itself as a sensuous, sensitized, sensible material 
capacity (99). 
This physical awareness is multimodal, but also multi-directional and even multi-
interactional. Instead of defining a set of multi-terms, however, Sobchack offers a list of 
sensorial descriptions that grasp at a way to recapture what the images had given to her. The 
play of the title of the essay, “What My Fingers Knew,” suggests that there are experiences 
with the images of the film (“vision in the flesh”) that elude discourses of knowledge and 
literacy and place this experience in no certain terms; there are no terms that are proper to 
it, or belong to it as a discourse.
In utilizing multiple terminologies for experiences of writing and composition I am 
essentially writing or composing  in no certain terms, because, ethically speaking, there are 
no terms that are proper to it. Just as the logic of film editing is to create new significance 
by severing meaning (a practice of non-sense), the ethic of obstructions is to create new 
responses by restricting the possibilities (a practice of contradiction). In the following 
chapters this kind of writing will become many not only because there are many ways to 
write but because writing is a transversal practice. It cuts broadly across all manner of 
knowledge and media as much as it cuts deeply into our own bodies as subjects of “the 
perfect human.”
I am describing a very humanist notion of writing and inscription. But this is not 
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humanist in the sense of the image of the perfect human, but rather in the sense that 
it begins with the human who inherits a past. This is a heritage that Bernard Stiegler 
discusses in Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus and inherits from Martin Heidegger 
as Dasein’s “throwness” and is composed of “an accumulation of faults and forgettings, 
as legacy and transmission” (206). According to Stiegler, the history of writing and 
technologies of writing is marked by an archive of hesitation as a politics of memory. The 
notion of the human is already part of this context in which Dasein is thrown en media res. 
Writing becomes one modality of heritage seeking to compose the human as an ethical 
endeavor: writing as both the obstacle and the continuation of the heritage of fault and 
forgetting. Within this project I will discuss this ethical situation that begins with the idea 
that composition is not just writing, but an activity that intervenes in the transmission of a 
heritage of “faults and forgettings” by reconstituting its principles within the limitations of 
the given context. 
I am calling these compositional restrictions “obstructions” following the 2003 film 
The Five Obstructions, co-created by Danish directors Lars von Trier and Jørgen Leth, which 
experiments with remaking Leth’s 1967 short film The Perfect Human through five specific 
sets of restrictive criteria, or what they refer to as “obstructions.” Although I will present 
and analyze many aspects of both films in both textual and visual descriptions, I encourage 
the reader to go and watch the film(s) before, alongside, or even after as a way to reread 
my project as an extension of what began with The Five Obstructions. This is necessary not 
only for the sake of better comprehension, but also to perhaps continue the challenge of 
obstructions to recreate the concept of the “perfect human” within new contexts that remain 
outside the scope of this limited document. The concept of multimodal writing advocated 
here arrives via a deep concern for the creation of moving images, as well an interest in 
how visuality is transferred into conetxts of writing and composition, especially through 
rhetorical strategies of multimedia and literacies.
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Performing the Experiment: A Configuration
           OBSTRUCTION #1
For the time being I will explain the exigency that comes directly out of my viewings of The Five Obstructions. In the film von Trier freely admits his admiration for Leth’s films, 
though there is little resemblance of visual and narrative style between the two. Leth is 
the more deliberate director, whose minimal sets expose the humanity of his subjects, 
while hiding his firm control of the composition. Von Trier likewise values the human if 
only to push it to its radical limits.2 These differences produce particular teacher/student 
relationships between the two filmmakers that von Trier exploits when he approaches 
Leth about his concept for the film. The tension of ethos, style and expression, allows a 
collaborative context to emerge that forces a recoiling or reflexive examination of their own 
status as director.
The idea is to recreate or re-invent The Perfect Human five times under five different 
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sets of “obstructions” or 
technical and formal limitations. 
They sit down and discuss the 
possible sets of rules before 
deciding on them and allowing 
Leth to venture forth and 
bring back the completed film. 
There is no predetermined 
agenda for each obstruction; 
they are decided based on previous experiences and in collaboration. The first set of rules, 
for example, makes several demands including making no shot more than 12 frames, not 
using a set, shooting in Cuba, and finally answering the questions that Leth had asked as 
part of the narration in The Perfect Human. Leth comments in the film that the process is “a 
good perversion to cultivate.” From the outset the game is explicitly perverse by violating 
cinematic protocol and, even more importantly, by confounding the easy attribution of 
authorship. By extension this challenges the priority of the original film. What sweetens the 
deal is that von Trier’s ethos of international auteur plays on the fact that Leth is somewhat 
of a mentor figure to von Trier. In challenging the instructor to remake his own film, they are 
flipping the pedagogical script. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly clear that von Trier’s 
motive is to prove to the old master his own fallibility and weakness that lies within an 
As a real treat,
I have a Havana.
Good to have a cigar like this.
Because it is . . .
. . . it keeps you occupied.
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obsessive desire for aesthetic perfection. Leth and von Trier become two sides of the same 
coin. 
By assigning a challenge to continually invent and re-invent obstructions and 
images, Leth and von Trier enact various scenes of ethical questioning that underlie the 
framing of cinematic compositions. The challenge of The Five Obstructions is to turn Leth’s 
paradoxical filmmaking philosophy into a pedagogical practice of rethinking, reworking, 
and rewriting that is dependent on the ethical force of obstructions. As Leth makes his move 
from decision to action in the creation of a film the ethical field of choice itself is changed, 
delimited, and ultimately destabilized. The assertion of von Trier’s obstructions, the 
dialogue that results from their collaboration, and the difficulties each faces within constant 
role reversal and value exchange have the effect of opening up the horizons of compositional 
invention. 
The way that obstructions open up possibilities is through what Jean-Luc Nancy calls 
“dis-enclosure”—an ethical reopening of the world to that which is outside the frame (Dis-
I’d prefer to build a room there.
Or we could use a screen.
Really? I’d better not tell you
what I am going to do then.
-You’ve said it.
-No set . . .
Don’t say anymore, Jørgen.
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Enclosure 6). According to Nancy the idea of dis-enclosure is that thought has the capacity to 
open up the world as living outside or beside of the concept of world as an “opening of the 
world into inaccessible alterity” (10). Obstructions provide a frame and engage a structure 
of separation and difference, but in so doing the obstructions dismantle themselves as 
the limit of the frame. If dis-enclosure is the opening of thought to the unthought, then 
obstructions open the frame to what has been excluded from it; the unframed provides a 
space for revising the frame as future configurations or what I will continually refer to as re-
vision. By performing the five challenges through five new modes of obstructions, Leth and 
von Trier uncover or dis-enclose new configurations for investigating the perfect human.
In the first set of obstructions von Trier requires Leth to shoot the film using no 
shots longer than 12 frames. For the slow and deliberate Leth this obstacle will be a formal 
shift in his cinematic practice. The second part requires Leth to answer the questions that 
were asked as part of the narration of The Perfect Human. Von Trier is looking for Leth to 
solve the question of the perfect human which the narrator seems content to leave open. 
Von Trier then chooses to send Leth to Cuba to shoot the film as a completely unfamiliar 
location, a place Leth admits he has never visited. After reminding Leth that the choice is 
his whether or not he actually accepts the terms of the obstruction Leth lets slip that he 
plans on using a built set. Von Trier immediately prohibits the use of sets. The initial goal 
is to make Leth uncomfortable and respond to the specific demands of the assignment. 
Future obstructions will raise the stakes of the game by asking both Leth and von Trier to 
continually challenge one another with each passing obstruction.
- That’s the first one, then.
- Yes. Bon voyage, Jørgen
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Begin with an Obstruction: 
The Five Obstructions demonstrates the invention of a figure or performance that 
engages image not as representation, mimesis, or presence and absence, but as event, 
practice, choice, and action. An image is not only constituted from particular conceptual/
sensual contexts, but becomes those contexts through obstructions and responses. I argue, 
Here is the human. Here is the perfect human.
We will see the perfect 
human functioning.
What kind of thing is it?
We will look into that. We will investigate that.
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therefore, that multimodality is not just a buzz word for using visual media in composition 
contexts, but an ethical encounter with excluded and emerging modes of communication 
and signification that have yet to find a discursive home (ethos). What I will present 
are theories and pedagogies that will develop out of a practice of composition that is 
demonstrated by The Five Obstructions. Again, the keyword here is “obstruction” which will 
provide a configuration for the ethical questions involved with the teaching and creation of 
compositions of communication that utilize various modes of expression, including visual 
and aural. The theory and practice of obstructions in multimodal composition are related to 
the three kinds of knowledge that Aristotle discusses in the Nicomachean Ethics—knowing, 
doing, and making—and have arisen directly out of my viewings of this particular film.1 
What I will argue, and continue to revisit, is how the film The Five Obstructions 
utilizes obstructions as a restrictive source of proliferating rhetorical invention and, thereby, 
how the concepts of obstruction and revision can be utilized within an ethical framework 
for compositional, oppositional, possibilities. The gap between the demands of composition 
and the response to those demands is a space where knowledge can be negotiated and 
produced or even performed. Through the process of revision images take on increasing 
demands for signification; the image is pregnant with meaning for which it can no longer 
account. 
The idea behind multimodality is that human communication can successfully or 
usefully integrate multiple platforms of production and delivery. In the case of The Five 
Obstructions, however, the constant revaluation of images demands a discourse of failure 
and the emergence of new meanings. What I mean by the failure of images is related to the 
same paradox that von Trier perceives in The Five Obstructions as the idea of the “perfect 
human”: Leth’s insistence on his own technical perfection while he critiques the notion of 
a human ideal. This is the way that Roland Barthes discusses the violence of photography 
when he writes in Camera Lucida, “Not only is the Photograph never, in essence, a memory 
. . .  but it actually blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory” (91). By bearing 
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the weight of representation, images, as in writing, suggest any number of these counter-
memories, or oppositional significations. 
The difficulty of writing about images, especially when advocating writing in various modes, is the possibility of a performative contradiction. To confront this problem I will 
make two tentative proposals: one, to refrain from discussing image in any certain terms; 
and two, that with that uncertainty I transform this document into an image, or a series of 
images, or maybe even a quasi-film. With the first I am embracing a broad interpretation 
of what can be considered an image. This means that I understand that this document is 
not a film, but that I am writing about one. In the process of writing I am creating another 
image using both the film and text. The reason for the second is to be able to expand the 
model of The Five Obstructions so that my own project becomes a sixth, seventh, eighth, etc., 
obstruction, or revision of the paradigm. I take my uncertain lead about images from WJT 
Mitchell who, in What Is an Image?, defers to Wittgenstein’s “language games” to examine 
the different ways in which we play with images (504). Mitchell even conjures up the image 
of theater to describe his grasp of image discourse: 
Images are not just a particular kind of sign, but something like an actor on 
the historical stage, a presence or character endowed with legendary status, 
a history that parallels and participates in the stories we tell ourselves 
about our own evolution from creatures ‘made in the image’ of a creator to 
creatures who make themselves and their world in their own image. (504)
By putting forth these proposals I am confessing my own hesitation in excavating 
the genealogy of image and will agree with Mitchell’s assertion that “images ‘proper’ are 
not stable, static, or permanent in any metaphysical sense; they are not perceived in the 
same way by viewers any more than are dream images” (507). I will follow Barthes one 
step further and argue that the instability of images make it such that there are no images 
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“proper” in the sense that they can take place “properly” or as some kind of sovereign entity. 
How we proceed with the instability, or uncertainty, of images is a question of ethos and 
ethical inquiry. By limiting the universe of choices, obstructions force our hand to accept 
certain sets of constraints or principles as contingent. The ethics of obstruction allow for the 
continual revising of both principles and constraints. 
Appearance is a particular discourse of vision, or a transition from a general figure 
of vision to seeing as a discursive experience. This reading of figure and discourse comes 
from Jean-François Lyotard’s essay “Taking the Side of the Figural,” in which he writes, 
the position of art is a refutation of the position of discourse [and] . . . 
indicates a function of figure, which is not signified, and this functions both 
at the edge of and within discourse. It indicates that the transcendence of 
the symbol is the figure, that is, a spatial manifestation that linguistic space 
cannot incorporate without being shaken, an exteriority that cannot be interiorised as signification. (37)
Lyotard describes the passing of vision to seeing as passing from “the world” to “fantasy,” 
or a shifting of the world as figure into a frame of discourse. This an integral event between 
figure and discourse that Lyotard registers in a transition of the status of the figure: “the 
figure is displaced: no longer is it only the image of presence or of representation, but the 
form of the staging, the form of discourse itself, and more profoundly still, a phantasmic 
matrix” (43). In Lyotard: Writing the Event Geoffrey Bennington explains that Lyotard’s aim 
is not just to embrace figure over discourse, but to demonstrate “an originary complication 
of discourse and figure” (88). As part of the first set of obstructions, Leth must confront 
his own “originary complication” and answer the questions that he posed in the original 
voice-over narration of The Perfect Human. The questions had originally functioned as 
descriptions about the images—they did not require responses or were indifferent to the 
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responses. The challenge becomes one of editing, of the cut, and the ultimate framing of the 
subject. In order for Leth to succeed he must fail by undercutting the deliberate duration 
of shots and ambiguity of the original film. This obstruction forces Leth to dis-integrate the 
film in terms of both discourse and figure.
How to Make the Perfect Image
 Both of these statements were written by Jørgen Leth. Their significance lies in 
their apparent contradiction: the image as both arbitrary and essential; it constitutes the 
fundamental feature of cinematic arts while requiring no fundamental structure. And 
yet, Leth asserts a central importance to establishing sets of rules that will, in his words, 
delimit his technical abilities. But why limit the possibilities when the final result could be 
assembled blindfolded? Why a regulated image? What is the connection between image 
and invention within the event of the cinema? And, equally important, why Jørgen Leth? 
Many filmmakers have discussed their own film image orthodoxy, but what makes these 
statements stand out from the crowd?
Rules provide an important working 
principle for me. I invent rules. A new 
set for each film – most often with the 
purpose of delimitating my technical 
possibilities.
Film is a series of images put together. Not a se-
quence, not a story, but a series of images, nothing 
more. The order of the images is less important 
than the single image. The final consequence of that 
assertion is that the images may be put together 
blindfolded. (Danish Film Institute 3)
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 Leth has the perfect answer for these questions. Or rather, his paradoxical style 
is the context for the kind of perfection which The Five Obstructions practices as a kind 
of image-making. Leth directed his short film The Perfect Human composed as a quasi-
ethnographic study into the anatomy and habitus of the human being, complete with 
documentary style “voice of god” narration.  What is so fascinating about Leth’s film is not 
just his use of the paradoxical regulations based style, but the conversation that this style 
has with the film’s title. It does not matter how much chance Leth believes is involved in the 
creation of the cinematic image, in the end he has filled the scene with his own delimiting 
factors. This is the quintessential film auteur move, leaving your signature all over the 
screen that was created within a system meant to erase such fingerprints. There is no 
question that this is a Leth film—he is the author of the rules and he has set the meanings 
by defining the procedure and form. Leth is himself, so to speak, the perfect human. 
 This constantly shifting field of ethical choice and act is at the heart of how Leth can 
speak about a discursive “perfect human” within the figural plane of the cinematic image. 
But the assignment implied by Leth’s aesthetic and technical paradox is not to identify and 
overcome the ethical difficulties of cinematic image-making, but to expose filmmaking itself 
to what Charles Scott has discussed as “the question of ethics”; a discursive recoiling action 
that turns concepts and logics on themselves to “rethink, rework, rewrite” (8). The recoiling 
question of ethics does not seek to find a new ethics but to expose the limits of knowledge 
and question established values. In other words, Leth’s paradox of the cinematic image 
demands a recoiling of the primary questions. The recoiling movement is a questioning that 
turns back on itself and places the practice and its author into question. For now I want 
to focus the question of ethics on the image of perfection. The Five Obstructions engages a 
peripheral process that undercuts the investments in authorship and hermeneutics and 
admits that there is no “perfect” universal code or fixed expression. The film illustrates what 
I will be calling a peripheral process as the re-vision of multimodal composition, by not only 
demonstrating the experience of peripheral process but by performing the experiment. 
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The Peripheral Process of Obstruction
Let me ask a few questions that will enter into a discussion that will resituate 
film studies in a general cross-cutting of all visual fields. What exactly is at stake when we 
create cinematic images or images in general? What do I mean when I say that The Five 
Obstructions puts filmmaking at stake? What is the crisis or issue involved in the notion 
of obstruction in the image making process? What is the obstruction or difficulty that has 
created a concept like film studies within institutions of higher learning? How can we recoil 
at the concepts in order to reconsider these issues/difficulties as virtues? 
I want to make clear that I am discussing this film in various ways; I am making 
distinctions that are not so clean cut within the film itself. There are issues with the 
multiple films involved, as well as the relationship between von Trier and Leth. These are 
in no way the only ones, nor can they be completely unlaced from each other. The various 
reproductions of Leth’s original The Perfect Human can only be understood as completely 
contextual, that is tied up within the specific obstructions that von Trier prescribes. 
Each reproduction, however, takes on a life of its own through the prescription of each 
obstruction. In other words, it is the obstruction that gives life to each film. The composition 
of each new film is absolutely dependent on the tension that develops in the relationship 
between von Trier and Leth. 
The issue for both directors is Leth’s film The Perfect Human as both cinematic 
expression (the film titled The Perfect Human) and as humanist concept born from similar 
cinematic concerns that are revealed differently within each filmmaker’s style. Leth’s 
quintessential moment in The Perfect Human is watching his perfect human dance on screen 
as the voice-of-god narration suggests that the perfect human moves “in a room with no 
limits.” Contrast this with von Trier’s own Breaking the Waves (1996) in which the female 
main character is transformed into a kind of sacrificial lamb while subjected to all kinds 
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of sadistic experiences. There is a crisis of authorship, of style, of demand and expectation 
marked on the surface of von Trier’s obstructions. If, as Eisenstein suggested, cinema is 
conflict, then, the relationship between these two filmmakers is cinema at its most basic 
level.
The task of the film (which is multiple) is to consider the perfect human as both 
humanist concept (that of the relationship that generates human expression) and cinematic 
concept (that of the fixed object of desire). The imperfection of humanity through the 
invention and use of technologies is one line that Stiegler traces in Technics and Time: The 
Fault of Epimetheus. In Stiegler’s narrative, imperfection is embodied within the figures of 
Prometheus as provision and punishment and Epimetheus as fault and forgetting. Stiegler 
argues that the Prometheus “makes no sense by itself. It is only consistent through its 
doubling by Epimetheus who in turn doubles up on himself—first, in committing the fault 
of forgetting . . . [and] second, in reflecting upon it, in a re-turn which is always too late” 
(186). Prometheus represents presence and Epimetheus is absence, but it is by the failure 
of the latter to provide humanity with survival qualities that humans acquire an intimate 
relationship with technology. In The Five Obstructions von Trier and Leth take on the figures of Prometheus and 
Epimetheus respectively. By giving out each assignment, von Trier has taken on the role of 
naming the obstacles that Leth must confront, while Leth is given the opportunity to return 
to his original film and re-turn and revise the particular images that he chose to compose 
“the perfect human.” On the one hand there is an issue of representation; who or what is the 
“perfect human,” directly answered by Leth’s original film (“watch the perfect human dance,” 
“here is the perfect human’s ear,” “watch the perfect human eat”). On the other hand, there 
is the error of representation: as long as there is representation there is no perfect human 
present. Von Trier obsessively seeks to reveal this absence through the obstructions, while 
Leth holds on to his belief that his presence will overcome the lack of perfection.
The film confronts these errors through revision, or a recoiling movement between 
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the obstructions that von Trier produces and Leth’s responses in the form of short films. 
Interactions are structured in such a way that the dialogue is always open-ended allowing 
for invention to occur in 
the midst of waiting for the 
response. These discussions are, 
however, always highly mediated 
between human and machine, 
whether through the apparatus 
of the camera or the screen. The 
set of devices and practices that 
produce cinematic images have 
a unique capacity for engaging 
compositional invention. 
Moving image 
technology began with the desire for faithful reproduction of life experiences, rather than 
the representation of narrative and aesthetic forms. In an essay titled “The Machine,” A.R. 
Fulton reminds us that “motion pictures did not originate as art but as a machine. They 
were invented. That is, the machinery that makes the pictures, and that makes them motion 
pictures, was invented. The term motion pictures means the device as well as the art” (27). 
The tension between art and machine confronts the problems that André Bazin perceived 
in the first volume of What Is Cinema? as part of the primacy of the image. The central role 
of the image was a result of what he called the “myth of total cinema” or the idea that the 
cinematic screen somehow provides a window on the world, a reality that is more real than 
real, a horizon that obstructions come to (dis)figure (21). The myth of total cinema also 
posits that the accumulation of image technology necessarily serves a mimetic function—to 
get as close to nature as possible—that erases the boundaries between its technological 
origins and its artistic aspirations. As a result, the art of cinematic images obscure their 
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history of invention.3
The obscuring of technology for the benefit of reality that Bazin references is 
a paradox of mechanical reproduction. Walter Benjamin uses the phrase “equipment 
free aspect of reality” in his seminal essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction,” to describe what he sees as “the height of artifice” and that “the sight of 
immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology” (233). D.N. Rodowick 
explains in Reading the Figural that in these phrases Benjamin saw cinema as the perfect 
vehicle for erasing the distinctions of mediated experience because it “not only produced 
mechanical images whose illusion was to appear to be free of technological artifice; it also 
inspired the utopian longing for reality free of technological mediation” (39). 
For both Bazin and Benjamin the cinematic is structured by its particular modes 
of reproduction, repeating the fault of Epimetheus by increasing the transparency of the 
image through enhancing its artifice and demanding that the technology be forgotten. 
The gift of presence can be celebrated by forgetting the lack which the proliferation of 
technology signifies. Epimetheus is not, however, a lack or even forgetting, but a surplus 
for Prometheus’ gift. According to Stiegler, the consequence of the failure of Epimetheus 
is that humanity now possesses “[d]iscovery, insight, invention, imagination” as flaws that 
force us to “invent, realize, produce qualities” (The Fault of Epimetheus 193). If we take 
the title of Leth’s film literally, then the perfect human would be the one without flaws, the 
naked human, and the one who is not capable of invention and creation—the being of pure 
survival. The imperfect human, the human that suffers from his own lack, is also the human 
of surplus technē, of the excess of fiction and who looks toward the future of invention. 
Stiegler views pros-thesis as “what is placed in front, that is, what is outside” and that it 
is this outside pros-thesis that “constitutes the very being of what it lies outside of, then 
this being is outside itself” (The Fault of Epimetheus 193). As artifacts of this technological 
imperfection, cinematic images inherit the same peripheral perspective of the human pros-
thesis. 
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Sense, Absence and Absense: A Re-turn of Representation
 This is a chance to freeze the frame, so to speak, to now question the status of 
image as representation and to argue for revision as a way to consider the inventive sense 
of obstructions. Framing is the pros-thesis of obstructions. There is a literal framing that 
sets the boundary of the image and determines the scene. Obstructions function as a set of 
limitations that frame the conditions of the assignment and the possibilities of the response. 
In the case of representation, the framing of the image determines the discursive reference 
of the scene. The typical use of the term representation is to emphasize the simulated 
function of the image as a presence which points to an absence. The image as representation 
acts as the matrix of relationships between subject and object. It is not inappropriate 
to discuss images—paintings, photographs, films, etc.—in terms of media; images as 
representation do indeed “mediate” the subject’s experiences with objects. This would be 
Aristotle’s sense of imitation or reflection that gives pleasure based on its status as imitation (Poetics, 1448b5). In his description of the proper role of representation Aristotle closely 
tethers pleasure and learning (“gathering the meaning of things”) even in the presence of 
painful objects (“lowest animals” or “dead bodies”). By asserting this connection, Aristotle 
allows for a pleasurable response to the execution or the artistic delivery of a particular 
representation. He locates the pleasure derived from representation within its rhetorical 
qualities. Representation is the word for a continual “[re]gathering the meaning” of things 
through a deployment of rhetorical and artistic invention. 
Although Aristotle’s emphasis seems to be on the empirical significance of 
imitation, the rhetorical implications allude not to a status of imitation, but of execution. 
This would mean that representation can not only serve as signifier, a presence pointing 
toward an absence, but as it is its own presence. In The Ground of the Image Jean-Luc 
Nancy interrogates the empirical value of representation by arguing that “[t]he re- of the 
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word representation is not repetitive but intensive” and, consequently, emphasizes an 
accentuation (“frequentative”) rather than an empirical value (35). Nancy returns to the 
Latin word repraesentatio as a translation from the Greek word hypotyposis was employed 
for manifestations or production of the figural: [hypotyposis] designates a sketch, a scheme, 
the presentation of lines of a figure in the largest possible sense“ (Ground 36). The value 
of representation is in its suggestion of revelatory performance; responses to particular 
assignments cannot be completely regulated by obstructions. The performance of invention 
occurs between the demands of the obstructions and the emergence of the response.
THE FRAME OF THE IMAGE
Written in response to
Jean-Luc Nancy and Roland Barthes
FADE IN:               
INT. COLLABORATIVE CONTEXT - DAY 
An empty room. No boundaries. Two humans dance in a room with no 
boundaries. One is named ABSENCE, the other ABSENSE. Their dances 
constantly intersect. 
JEAN-LUC NANCY enters and smiles wryly at the sight. He is joined 
quickly by ROLAND BARTHES. They silently greet one another and 
return to watching the dance.
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NANCY
  
He turns his gaze toward ABSENSE. In ABSENSE the image would make 
present that which the represented object cannot show of itself. 
There is something always hidden away or concealed among things 
(“beings”?) within their everyday situations. This is the sense 
of EXCESS within the pregnant image. 
FADE OUT
Nancy does not employ the word “absense” to exterminate absence or 
representation. In fact, he is clear that the one “intersects” with the other; absense (rather 
than lack) and absence are two sides of representation. It is only when re-presentation is 
considered within a framework of intensity, rather than repetition, can absense be disclosed. 
Absense is ultimately that which is suppressed in order to maintain healthy subjectivity 
and to stabilize representation. At the same time this sacrifices the political implications of 
the conditions of subjectivity through aesthetics of representation. But just as absence and 
absense intersect one another, there is always a residue, a trace, of the image on the other 
side. 
 Nancy suggests that the residue of absence does intersect this other “knowing” 
which he terms absense. It is important to remember that it is not just that images contain 
this residue or trace that is a key to unlocking their true meaning. This is the discovery that 
Barthes writes about in “The Third [Sense]”4  when he interrogates a film still from Sergei 
Representation not only presents 
something that . . . is simply pres-
ent: in truth, it presents what is 
absent from presence pure and simple, 
its being as such or even its sense 
or truth. . . . 
[T]he absence of the thing . . . in-
tersects with what I have already 
called absense, or sense insomuch as 
it is precisely not a thing. (Ground 
37)
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Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible Part I (1944).  What Barthes is attempting to expose is a sense 
that emanates from the still image that slips through the hermeneutics of representation 
and signification. Barthes demonstrates how meaning would be part of the naming of the 
signifier, while a third or “obtuse” sense resists this naming and instead approaches the 
spectator from the side of fascination or pleasure.5
FADE IN
BARTHES interrupts the scene of representation. The OLD 
WOMAN’S expression is beyond description: unnatural, obtuse. 
She seems on the verge of SPEECH. There is no SOUND.
One frame later she is CRYING. It is gone. 
FADE OUT 
 
 
BARTHES
A question forced itself 
upon me: what is it in this 
tearful old woman that poses 
for me the question of the 
signifier? (Third 56)
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 Barthes performs his discovery as an interruption at the informational and symbolic 
levels of which he has just finished assessing and then acts surprised at his own fascination: 
“Is that all? No, for I am still held by the image. I read, I receive (and probably even first and 
foremost) a third meaning—evident, erratic, obstinate” (53). So surprised is Barthes, in fact, 
that he makes the mistake of saying that he reads the third meaning, before adding receive. 
The move is quite subtle, but by allowing both words to remain it problematizes Barthes’ 
role as spectator. Is he an active reader or passive receiver of meaning? Is there an active 
receiving that must take place to perceive this obtuse meaning? How could we understand 
this active receiving, or what would an active receiving look like? 
Each one of Leth’s films actively receives von Trier’s obstructions in very 
contextually specific responses, suspended between obstruction and image. Therefore, 
these films cannot be separated from their pedagogical placement within the context of the 
collaborative effort. The react-and-respond structure becomes a game testing the ethical 
autonomy of the other and its implications for how images are created. For each response 
both obstruction and response are required to explore the image of The Perfect Human as 
an inventive logic of composition that involves framing and reframing the shot, composing 
the images and the mise-en-scene, animation as cinematic image, facilitating the figural 
event that Lyotard for the form of discourse and dismissing notions of image as purely 
representational.
The collaborative context of the film between von Trier and Leth is a negotiation of 
pedagogical roles and the criteria that define them. Their interaction puts into question the 
stability of the teacher/student relationship not simply by reversing the binary but by doing 
away with the binary itself. By engaging in such intervention, a recoiling pedagogy emerges 
that directly effects the surface of the cinematic image. With The Five Obstructions, von Trier 
and Leth have reintroduced us to the image as a pursuit of the “perfect” image, or the image 
as always placing perfection into question. This is an image that is never done with itself as 
illusion or representation, but as the libidinal image of “photographic ecstasy” that Barthes 
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mentions at the end of Camera Lucida (119). The Five Obstructions (or the five obstructions 
as separate but linked responses) constitute rhetorical vessels that reveal questions of 
ethics within the cinematic image.
Buried Stories: Inter-diction 
and the Split Subject
In the first page of Genesis, 
Michel Serres recounts “A Short Tall Tale” in which the narrator finds himself sailing amidst 
the tranquility of the Saragosa Sea. He notices “thousands of tiny sparks” which turned out 
to be empty bottles also floating in the sea which the narrator describes as “countless little 
vessels, and each one no doubt bore its message.” Later, in danger of shipwreck, he collects 
some of the bottles together as part of a makeshift raft. The narrator does not discount the 
individual messages from each individual bottle (“each carried its hope and its despair”). 
These other meanings are subsumed, however briefly, for the sole purpose of survival. 
However, the thousands of gleaming messages of hope and despair remain, intact but 
shifting within the currents of the sea. It is no wonder that Serres sees unity as “dazzling.”
Lars von Trier called making The Five Obstructions a search “for something fictional, 
not factual. If one discovers or seeks a story, to say nothing of a point that communicates, 
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then one suppresses it” (Danish Film Institute 31). What von Trier is getting at is that there 
is never just one story. There is no totality of story, no being entirely at home (as either a 
technē or poiesis), and certainly no way of taking all story into account in a semiotic sense 
(language or logos). Story does not make sense; on the contrary, story makes too much 
sense. Much like the gleaming bottles that floating in the Saragosa Sea, there remain stories 
buried beneath stories, each one carrying the message of its hopes and despairs (1). 
Here is where the water gets a little rocky. I will return to the Saragosa Sea and the 
discovery that by gathering those disparate parts floating in the sea together under one 
structure that survivability was possible. What I mean here by survivability is a concept 
of the reality principle in which something must die in order to sustain life—the pleasure 
principle must be renounced consciously and death must be simultaneously confronted and 
repressed to maintain an order in life. Story reveals a loss introduced by a cut; this is what 
Barthes referred to as a “perforated discourse” or an obtuseness that tears at the heart of 
meaning and significance having always moved between affirming and renouncing desire (Pleasure 8). 
In his own confession of pleasure, that is, The Pleasure of the Text, Barthes takes 
from Jacques Lacan an opposition between pleasure as the ability to express one’s desire in 
words (this would be found within a story), and bliss as an inexpressible counterpart that 
is, as he says, “inter-dicted” (stories buried beneath the story) (21). He is careful to note 
that pleasure and bliss are parallel forces that cannot meet and rendered incommunicable 
in which bliss is not simply a higher order pleasure as bliss arises out of the text “like a 
scandal” and is somehow  “always the trace of a cut” (20). Finally Barthes asserts that 
the subject, caught between the articulation of pleasure and the inexpressibility of bliss, 
becomes a “split subject, who simultaneously enjoys, through the text, the inconsistency of 
his selfhood and its collapse, its fall” (21). 
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“This is how the perfect human falls.” 
The scandal of The Five Obstructions is that it places 
the image into a “perforated discourse” extracting it from the 
narrativity or the survivability of story in which the pleasure of 
interdiction trumps the assurance of unity. Von Trier and Leth 
are dismantling the life boat and setting the bottles adrift upon 
the Saragosa Sea. They do this not just 
through collaborating or negotiation but 
through confrontation of the obstructions. 
By reproducing Leth’s The Perfect Human 
in five different ways the obstructions 
serve not only as a revaluation of the film 
but as a way for Leth and von Trier to 
embody a split subject within perforated 
discourse that cannot be repaired. 
It must ultimately end with the collapse of the subject as the fall of the perfect 
human, only to rebegin with the intrusion of what Barthes calls “an eccentric, extraordinary 
term” 6 that re-places all terms into question—a trace of a cut (Pleasure 55). Story, in a 
compositional sense, frames the meaning as a matrix of forces, in the same way that Derrida 
sees structure as “always taken from a history of meaning [sens]” which is, as he remarks, 
a way “to conceive of structure on the basis of a full presence which is beyond play” 
(“Structure” 353). The rupture or absence of a central discourse allows for sens(e) alongside 
or within meaning and image is no longer grounded merely in representation. What I mean 
by discussing the image in terms of a trace of the cut is that it introduces a universe of 
significance that cannot be accounted for through signifiers.
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Technics in All Its Appearances
Let me pause here to review where we have been so far. The film The Five 
Obstructions provides a model for understanding multimodal composition as ethical re-
vision. The obstructions that von Trier gives Leth sets the limits for Leth’s visual responses, 
and in turn adjusts the possibilities for the next obstruction. Re-vision is an ethical method 
of performative invention that contests the authority of the urtext as an ideal expression. 
New significance emerges from within the “perforated discourse” of composition (the 
“composed” subject). Rather than dividing the duties of theory and practice, thinking and 
making, this method of re-vision foregrounds the dynamic role of poiesis in providing an 
ecology of invention for the technē of doing and making. Alterity is a symptom of ecstasis: 
the dis-ease of misrecognition and metamorphosis as something else is “brought forth” out 
of the process.  To ignore alterity, or anomaly, is to repress poiesis and the possibilities of 
ecstasis that performance allows.
In his book The Avant-Garde Meets Andy Hardy Robert Ray advocates for invention 
as a way to inform technē. Ray demonstrates the value of various avant-garde techniques as 
recalcitrant pedagogical methods that can create the conditions for ecstasis. Ray is looking 
mostly at surrealism and how practitioners translated it to cinematic expressions. He takes 
their methods and turns them into teaching tools, or ways of generating knowledge through 
image making. Ray discovers, like Barthes, that there is significance outside of meaning 
that eludes meaning; this significance is lost to discourse. While Barthes struggles to write 
about the obtuse sense on the surface of the still image, Ray embraces this sense as a 
sublime moment of escape for the figural. Ray is able to identify ways to extend significance 
and sense toward pregnant expressions. Meaning is hardly lost; in fact, there is too much 
meaning to take into account. This is the para-logic of multi-modality that obstructions 
invite as the prospect of their own ethical questionability.
What is most valuable is how Ray suggests this as a way to teach through a model 
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of invention rather than of dissemination/insemination. By doing so he not only unfixes 
the object of study, but also destabilizes the roles between teacher and student. It is neither 
complete annihilation nor negative deconstruction (simplistic reversal) of the pedagogical 
roles, but a somewhat recoiling sense of how knowledge is created and shared. This is the 
affirmative deconstruction, the spiraling and rebounding question, that Victor Vitanza 
calls for as “Saying Yes twice” to the privileged and the supplementary reading (126). We 
cannot be satisfied with a simple reversal of binaries; multimodal composition encounters 
ethics when it is concerned with the tensions in the binary model. As for von Trier and Leth, 
they pose tensions within the film on a visceral and openly polemical level. As their roles 
move back and forth between mentors and students, friends and rivals, they never share a 
common goal for the project: von Trier has a distinct desire to force Leth to fail, while Leth 
is trying to find every conceivable way to get around the obstructions. What does intercede 
between them is that the obstructions dictate a horizon of ethical action. 
The triangulation is as follows:                                                                                            
with the obstructions as the middle 
term, or the eccentric term that 
places the triangle into question. The 
obstructions that Leth faces in the 
first scene are meant to test the formal demands of his ethos; von Trier forces 
Leth to leave his habitus and confront the wild potential of the perfect human. It is from 
this ethical shift that Leth and von Trier must work through their own ideas of the perfect 
human. In the final obstruction/film that von Trier composes himself, the prescripts of the 
obstruction restrict Leth to providing only the voiceover narration which von Trier has pre-
written. It also reuses some of the old documentary footage that is part of the film we have 
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already been watching, leading to the questionability of the limits of the obstructions: where 
and when do they begin and end? It is unclear whether von Trier has come to terms with his 
failure to make his teacher experience and embrace failure, but within the cinematic frame 
of this final obstruction the goals of perfection and failure cross paths. 
This seems to me to be the stakes in composing in a multimodal context. Realizing 
the struggles and conflicts that occur in choice and action on the procedural plane is 
an issue of two things: how to make images that are not pre-determined by theoretical 
frameworks and how to teach this without reverting to those same kinds of frameworks. 
These kinds of pedagogical issues deal with both technical aspects of visual composition 
and how theoretical/cultural difficulties affect the technical/physical image-making 
process (rather than just an ideological or historical argument). This affects art, writing, 
communication, and anything that deals with “being” and being human, as well as technics 
in all its appearances. In this crisis there is a distinct post-hermeneutic resistance to 
producing meaning and a concern for the costs of representation. Like Barthes we must 
not be so quick to pass over that obtuse image or reject the “perforated discourse” not only 
because it may hold a potential for understanding but because those are the traces of the 
fault of Epimetheus, the very expression of the perfect human.
The Challenge of Obstruction
The collaboration between Leth and von Trier is libidinal in the sense that they 
each have an unspoken desire to push their individual agendas. Each obstruction emerges 
from this pedagogical relationship as a generative resource. In this pedagogical context the 
perfect human is an image that is not made but rather unmade/revisioned out of the failure 
of representation. Cinematic images are themselves caught within a position of continual 
coiling and recoiling; a recoiling that Barthes seemed to discern when he could interrupt 
the movement, or expose it to infinite delay to summon its content back from the past—
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distorted, indifferent, obtuse. This delay does not relate so much to its affect as much as its 
freedom of movement and against a static representation that Barthes saw as “the final state 
of reality, its intractability . . . what cannot be transcended, withdrawn” (Pleasure 45). Not 
only can obstruction be withdrawn, it demands to be withdrawn and re-drawn in order to 
delay this final state of representation. 
Disorientation is the title Bernard Stiegler used for his second volume of Technics 
and Time, a contemporary disorientation he links to technologies of speed and the 
industrialization of memory.7 Stiegler captures the idea of delayed action in images as part 
of the mechanical and chemical process of photo development: 
 The photographic vision is a re-
vision. Its delay is originary. The past returns 
completely as the present that it was, without 
loss and yet only as a remainder: a spirit, a 
phantom. Returns as a past present for me 
even though it can never be a question of 
my past: it can only be a question of a past 
that I have not lived. Astral, emerging from a 
night of an infinitely distanced past, a photo-
graphed light links my present to a past I 
have not known, yet is familiar as a temporal 
maternity. (Disorientation 15)
Images record a familiar yet disoriented past. It is a past that was never lived; it is a framed 
past, or a phantom past that neither represents an experience from the front of the camera 
nor from behind. It is a developed and continually developing and changing past either 
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by virtue of the silver nitrates flammability or the instability of digital code. The delay of 
cinematic images is not just a matter of suspending movement, but of the resistance to 
a final state. Cinematic re-vision is a possibility of delay by re-drawing the frames of the 
image.
I am addressing cinematic re-vision by using the idea of obstruction to see how 
composing images is not just a matter of ideological difficulty, but as difficulty and 
obstruction—choice/action (leading of course to the ethical and how this connects to 
theories of images). This fundamentally changes how we could teach materials that involve 
any kind of writing or image making. We must first be willing to acknowledge the absence 
of the perfect human, or at least perfection as the fixed notion of an unchanging object. 
The constraints of obstruction allow for the emergence of a constantly changing object, or 
as the object of constant change. The question will be how to identify the difficulties, the 
restrictions, and the conflicts that students must face that will delimit their possibilities 
not as negation but as an affirmative deconstruction. This must be connected to the notion 
of continual vision and revisioning, working and reworking. The work becomes a “body 
without organs” that is distinguished not by its similarity but by its radical difference within 
its protean forms. 
How does this connect to the idea of the “perfect human” as an ethical and practical 
concept? The Five Obstructions revolves around the use of obstructions coupled with Leth’s 
film The Perfect Human in order to create new valuations of the perfect human (or the 
cinematic image in our case). The films are a paired example that parallels the tensions of 
the relationship between Leth and von Trier, and is expressed through obstructions and 
visual responses. The concern from a semiotics perspective is the transforming being in the 
movement of meaning toward an ultimate purpose, as opposed to the being as the split-
subject who never steps in the same river twice—an ethos of the perfect human relating not to telos (progress, destiny) but to bios (sensation, affect). If we must understand the ethical 
situation of the human as always in movement rather than the stasis of perfection, then the 
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emphasis would be on the possibility for change not structured by negation and would make 
perfection or stasis impossible. 
We need notions of representation, of image-making, and composition that would 
recognize this multimodal situation as a decidedly ethical one. But how do we acknowledge 
the semiotic meaning making machine that film studies has inherited without reverting to 
hermeneutic approaches? This would seem to me to be the difficulty or obstruction that 
faces the teaching of a multimodal composition that allows students to go out with cameras 
in order to perform the experiment. Without obstructions, or a theory of composition that 
considers the ethics of obstruction, there will be a tendency to rely on old worn patterns 
and representations. If there is an eros involved in the pleasure of the experiential and 
experimental image, then there is an equally compelling death drive that survives on the 
promise of the fixed image. The coupling of obstructions with the constant changing of re-
vision can have the added benefit of reintroducing desire and pleasure to the assignment.
“The Distribution of the Sensible”
In The Future of the Image Jacques Ranciére sees this very undecidability in 
Barthes’s work as a belonging to a trope of reversibility “between the silence of images and 
what they say” (11). Obtuse meanings are  produced within economies of silence. While the 
inheritance of semiotics is to insist on discourse—that is, the hermeneutic demand that 
the silence speak—the obtuse sense remains indifferent to a response. Either way Ranciére 
points out that both are translations of image that “conceive the image as speech which 
holds its tongue” (11). The cut, break, or seam is the site of the loss of meaning, which 
explains why the film still is so important to revealing the obtuse sense. The film still is the 
image of hesitation, always on the verge of the next image, always on the edge of the cut. The 
cut is negative space insofar as it remains open to creative revision—a space that Barthes 
engages with his own revision of his own semiotic methods. 
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I return here to Barthes because he provides the possibility of questionability or 
undecidability of images as pure presencing, yet continually slip back into the depths of 
concealment. In Ranciére’s formulation, Barthes’ project is spectral because it is caught 
within the silence of the figure of the image; it is silenced within the very term “image” as a 
certain product of forces that determine particular forms of “imageness.” The hesitation of 
Barthes’ thought is a reaction to the rhetorical narrowness that constitutes the boundaries 
of image discourse. The tension that Ranciére perceives in Barthes’ work is the “scandal” 
of finding pleasure in this disturbance of atopos, or the condition of being in between 
(interdiction). Barthes writes that spatially, temporally, textually “we are all caught up in 
the truth of languages,” a spatialized truth which refers to a proper place which offer the 
conditions for subjectivization, a topos which any kind of adjacency threatens.8 He quotes 
Friedrich Nietzsche who also understands the spatialization of the conditions of truth as “a 
heaven of mathematically distributed concepts” from which truth is pulled as “conceptual 
god[s]” (Pleasure 28). What is interesting about the spatialization of truth is that for both 
Barthes and Nietzsche it requires conditions for the distribution of concepts to establish 
what can be considered truth. In What is Metaphysics? Heidegger formulated metaphysics as 
“inquiry beyond or over beings, which aims to recover them as such and as a whole for our 
grasp” (106).9 The process of recovery is tied to the spatial metaphor by an assembling of 
truth concepts, a territorializing of poiēsis by technē that lacks the deterritorializing rupture 
introduced by the openness of adjacency or ec-stasis.10
In the case of images the use of spatial terms can be problematic. We can speak of 
photographic or cinematic space that continues the application of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s use of “geological movements” from their collaborative effort in A Thousand 
Plateaus. Deterritorialization is the releasing of the “lines of articulation or segmentarity, 
strata, and territories” through an oscillation of rupturing movements. They describe the 
process as continually collapsing and reassembling conceptual relays that explode concepts 
like representation. Images perform these “lines of flight” not as a function of absence as 
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containers for meaning, but as excessive significance (4). As with Barthes’s explanation of 
pleasure and bliss, the two processes of territorialization/deterritorialization cannot be 
separated, are two sides of the same coin (code), and cannot be contained nor sustained by 
the code:
The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; 
but a wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless 
deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive apparatus. 
But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, 
as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. (11)
Of course, Deleuze and Guattari’s model of the rhizome breaks down the spatial imagery 
and calculation which characterizes the recovery and distribution within the spheres of 
Nietzsche’s “conceptual gods” as explained by Barthes (Pleasure 28) They do not wish 
to be caught in the middle of the undecidability of the decision between the two sides. It 
avoids asking the question as to why Barthes must freeze the cinematic image in order 
to pervert the image, why freezing the image is a perversion at all. There is no repression 
in the rhizomatic image, just as desire does not lack, it is pure excess.11 If the image is an 
assemblage, a body without organs, than it cannot be completely defined by a particular 
frame. The paradox of obstructions is that the regulation that they prescribe provides the 
opportunity to continually dismantle the regulating structure of the frame, or the revision of 
truth concepts as conceptual gods.  
 Ranciére responds to the distribution of truth concepts by arguing that the only 
reason that we have any concept of image or imageness is because it has already been 
established as a political possibility beforehand, which for him is always on the level of 
community. This is what he refers directly as a “distribution of the sensible” or a “system 
of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of 
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something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions 
within it. A distribution of the sensible, therefore, establishes at one and the same time 
something in common that is shared and exclusive parts” (Politics 12). The distribution of 
the sensible makes aesthetics into aesthetics qua politics which is itself regulated by “what 
is seen and what can be said about it” (13). Aesthetics is not a mode of representation, but a 
regime of processes and methods that establish “modes of articulation between doing and 
making, their corresponding forms of visibility, and possible ways of thinking about their 
relationships” (10). 
Ranciére makes certain not to confuse aesthetics as a political act, but as the 
surfacing of what determines the possibility of presence and absence in the alterity of 
the image. Accordingly, we can only discuss the image as image because of this ordered 
deployment of relations. This is how Ranciére can declare that “mimesis is not resemblance 
but a certain regime of resemblance” (Future 73). The ethical sense of this expression is that 
the limiting effect that these distributions have is not one of constraint or negation but one 
that makes images and the creation of images possible. 
By thinking of images as products of a distribution of ordered meanings not only 
do the images themselves become radically contingent but the interpretative authority of 
criticism is itself in a position of questionability. To speak of “aesthetics” or “images” is thus 
to always already be peering through a distorted lens, and methods come to us as the blind 
men touching different parts of the elephant. This should not be taken as criticism towards 
inventive methods of questioning and discovery, but an attempt to engage the hesitation 
and contingency of multimodality that haunts both poiēsis and technē: the interdiction of 
imag(e)inative presence.
Enfram(ed)ing Bodies: Film/Skin
 As mentioned before, to conceive of images as composed through a distribution 
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of systems of doing and making is not necessarily an act of negation. Indeed, Ranciére is 
of the opinion that it is through the territorializing function of these seemingly discrete 
regimes that certain inventive opportunities become visible. Ranciére says that mimesis 
is not a straightforward understanding of resemblance, but a system of understanding a 
certain kind of resemblance: “[m]imesis is not an external constraint that weighed on the 
arts and imprisoned them in resemblance. It is the fold in the order of ways of making and 
social occupations that rendered them visible and thinkable, the disjunction that made 
them exist as such.” This is how the imitation of art can be distinguished from the criteria 
of resemblance that other functions demanded in terms of the religious, the ethical, and the 
social (Future 73). So, mimesis was actually a system of differentiation, or folding of ordered 
criteria, that allowed images to exist as projections of art that could be made visible within a 
realm of artistic space—to come out from the background of mimetic order.
 What this means for images is that they become visible insofar as they exist within 
a perforated discourse of interdiction; they are fundamentally obtuse because they are not 
inherently visible, and only surfacing through a tear or cut in the discourse of resemblance. 
It is within this tear that Barthes locates the unspeakable jouissance of bliss and desire in 
between the ordered expressions of resemblance. He argues that pleasure can only really 
come from distortion or perversion. When Lyotard refers to Libidinal Economy as his 
“evil”12 book he is performing the scandal of the distorted, libidinal, text. Lyotard urges his 
implied audience to read (or see) the text spatially, as an image, configured around sites of 
perversions, “libidinal intensities,” as well as his own figure of the “Great Ephemeral Skin” 
constituting the political body, the politically charged representation of reality, or a kind of 
perceived and already distorted reality.13 When he dissects this body and flattens it out into 
a skin (a film?), the perforated discourse disappears, interdiction itself disappears, on the 
surface of the Moebius strip: 
  There is no need to begin with transgression, we must go immediately to the 
very limits of cruelty, perform the dissection of polymorphous perversion, spread out the 
immense membrane of the libidinal ‘body’ which is quite different to a frame. 
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The Perfect Human
It is made from the most heterogeneous textures, bone, epithelium, sheets to write on, 
charged atmospheres, swords, glass cases, peoples, grasses, canvasses to paint. All these 
zones are joined end to end in a band which has no back to it, a Moebius band which 
interests us not because it is closed, but because
The Perfect Human: Cuba
it is one-sided, a Moebian skin which, rather than being smooth, is on the contrary (is this 
topologically possible?) covered with roughness, corners, creases, cavities which when it 
passes on the ‘first’ turn will be cavities, but perhaps on the ‘second’, lumps.
The Perfect Human: Revision 
But as for what turn the band is on, no-one knows nor will know, in the eternal turn. 
(Libidinal 2-3)
 Lyotard’s autopsy revels in the unfolding of the dis-figured body; the perverse 
dissection of the framed/enframing body(ies), ranging from the organic to the textual, 
produces the turning or the revision of the open Moebius skin. Lyotard asks as an aside 
if this skin is even “topologically possible,” as if to question his own enframing of the skin 
within spatial binaries of inside/outside. The body, or scene, of image is composed of both 
inside and outside, what is framed and what is excluded by the frame, the obstruction that 
prescribes the scene as well as the failure or success of the response.
 Image as body or as the reproduction (refuse, waste) from bodies apprehends this 
paradox of the embodied experience of the cinematic image as both framing (mise-en-scéne) 
and topologically impossible (libidinal investments). There is a cruelty to this figure, as 
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Lyotard suggests, in the violence that he must do to these heterogeneous bodies in order to 
create the libidinal skin. It is Lyotard’s translator, however, that confronts the politics of this 
cruelty when he makes the decision to translate the author’s word pellicule as “skin” rather 
than “film” which is also implied in a more technical context. He justifies his use of “skin” 
rather than more technical “film” in the above quote, admitting, “I have chosen, in keeping 
with the imagery here, to take slight liberties” (Libidinal 1). Cinematic images constitute a 
libidinal band at once turning as both technical and organic “skin.” The choice need not be 
made between skin/film; both inhabit pellicule and give it tension. The choice need not be 
made, except in an ethical sense. The translation of the French word is part of an ethical 
contract between the translator, author, and reader, in which the translator must make a 
decision based on a criterion of justification. 
 The effect of replacing pellicule with “skin” is not just that the technical context of 
the word is relinquished, but that the relations between the words “skin” and “film” become 
even more intimate in their substitution. These words denote analog modes of composition 
and production, whether it is found as an organic sensation, a photographic impulse, or 
cinematic movement. It is no accident that Barthes does not discuss a meaning at all, but 
a “sense” which is lost to the senses.13 Whereas Barthes must freeze the movement to 
analyze the cinematic in terms of the still, the cinematic for Deleuze is made up of systems 
of movement images and time images. In both cases it is the image that acts as the nexus 
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of ontological and epistemological concerns. In Cinema I, Deleuze sees movement as the 
agent of change for the image: “Through movement the whole is divided up into objects, and 
objects are re-united in the whole, and indeed between the two ‘the whole’ changes” (11-12) 
He uses the “image” of sugar dissolving in water, the sugar interrupting the “closed” system 
of the water, radically opening it without respective parts or whole. 
A semiotics approach would substitute the cinematic for the textual to overlay a 
language code that reads the image through a hermeneutic lens, forfeiting the hesitation 
of the frozen image and the dissolving sugar. There is always a choice that constitutes the 
hermeneutic impulse, based upon some foregrounded ethical principle. The image comes 
before that choice, before the foregrounding of a principle. Images and ethics are always 
already folded together into the skin/film of the cinematic, and therefore are already lost to 
the senses insofar as they exceed the senses. 
Brian Massumi makes a case that the “superiority of the analog” over the digital is 
in the realization that the digital consists of analogical relays that include sensation and 
perception, not just the empiricism of the digital. But for Massumi even the analogical is 
composed of what he calls the “virtual,” which, by definition, “is inaccessible to the senses. 
This does not, however, preclude figuring it, in the sense of constructing images of it. To the 
contrary, it requires a multiplication of images. The virtual that cannot be felt also cannot 
but be felt, in its effects” (132). The image, as skin/film, must not be thought in terms of 
categories of images (i.e. cinematic images) but rethought as an ethical encounter of the 
virtual. In other terms from Massumi, a multimodal composition must be reimagined as a 
“topological figure” under “constant transformation of one geometrical figure into another” 
(134). Multimodal would not just refer to the deployment of various media, or utilizing 
multiple modes of delivery (oral, print, digital); as a topological figure multimodality could 
be thought in different and contradictory ways, forming a relay of responses, a continual 
feedback loop, or even a skin. 
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An Ars Vitae
Traditional notions of ethics 
rely on a discourse of moral codes 
or virtues. The question of ethics 
acts as an obstruction to discourse, 
foregrounding the question and 
restating it as discourses of difficulties 
and desire (or difficulties in desire). 
Regarding discourse, Maurice 
Blanchot wrote that “there are not two 
discourses: there is discourse—and 
then there would be dis-course, 
were it not that of it we ‘know’ practically nothing. We ‘know’ that it escapes systems, 
order, possibility, including the possibility of language, and that writing, perhaps—writing, 
where totality has let itself be exceeded—puts it in play” (134). If we now return to the 
first obstruction as it is re-presented in the film we can see that while it would be easy to 
perceive the relationship between von Trier and Leth in terms of a range across Aristotle’s 
measurements of virtue, we can also see that Leth and von Trier absolutely need each other 
in the course of the obstructions. There are not two discourses between the two: Leth 
looks to von Trier for his responsibilities, while von Trier needs Leth to finish the cycle 
of obstructions. Von Trier’s purpose is to show Leth that he can be less than perfect, that 
there is no perfect human. Leth desires anything but failure, he breaks the rules (the golden 
mean) for the sake of aesthetics. Desire forces them both beyond into obscene excesses and 
deficiencies and to face the prospect that the flawed human is the perfect human.
Lyotard expressed the hazard in pronouncing the virtues (or lack thereof) of 
being what he calls a “libidinal economist” by recognizing the dangers of “building a new 
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morality.” To avoid such pitfalls, what is needed “is not an ethics, this or another. . . . Perhaps 
we need an ars vitae, young man, but then one in which we would be the artists and not 
the propagators, the adventurers and not the theoreticians, the hypothesizers and not the 
censors” (Libidinal 11). Perhaps what I have been advocating here is not an ethics at all, 
but an ars vitae: an understanding of composition as ethical because it is always already 
implicated in life as bios that erupts from the distorted passions and desires of that life, 
rather than across communities as a drive, or telos. What I am advocating is not an ethics, 
but a film—and not this film or that film, but a film or a skin as retention, a restriction, a 
difficulty, that obscures as much as it reveals through obstruction. 
58
Chapter Two
The Ethics of Obstruction
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Opening the Wound
We finished the last chapter by discussing images in terms of an enframed and 
enframing skin/film, at once organic and mechanical, sensorial and sensible. The limiting 
force that obstructions place on images does not resolve these contradictions, but instead 
enables their emergence from a discourse of repression. Obstructions set aside “the 
available means of persuasion”1 to explore that which previously was not available, or 
available only as part of a mode of excess, waste, or leftover—obstructions engage that 
which remains unthought in the discourse of composition. Rather than ensuring particular 
outcomes and meanings, restricting the means of persuasion through obstructions allows 
for the revelation of the gap between the intended vision of the one giving the obstruction 
and the result of the one accepting the challenge. This gap can never be completely 
overcome; in fact it, resists completion entirely. The constant failure of each composition to 
live up to the original intent of the challenge inevitably leads to another set of obstructions. 
In this exchange, failure is not negative but acts as the dis-enclosure for the next obstruction 
and, consequently, to the next project. 
As a Spectator I was interested 
in Photography only for 
‘sentimental’ reasons; I wanted 
to explore it not as a question (a 
theme) but as a wound: I see, I 
feel, hence I notice, I observe, I 
think. (Barthes, Camera Lucida 
21)
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The exchange of obstruction and composition is as much ethical in its performance 
as it is aesthetic in its result. Obstructions make demands of the ethos of those involved in 
the exchange by leaving the question of intent and completion uncertain and unresolved. 
The ethical boundaries enacted in The Five Obstructions reflect more of an ars vitae with 
which I concluded the first chapter rather than any particular ethical principle or obligation. 
In moving from the first obstruction to the second Lars von Trier remains unsatisfied by 
Jørgen Leth’s efforts to maintain control of the medium. He shifts from the formal values 
of the first obstruction to a more personal assault on moral and ethical grounds. As far as 
von Trier’s purpose is concerned, the moral and ethical issues were always at stake in the 
proceedings of the obstructions, but he realizes that he must push the boundaries of the 
project further in this regard in order to achieve his teacher’s failure. To do so von Trier 
makes the pain of the challenge more prominent; he must open Leth’s perfect human 
to make it bleed. It is no longer just a question of the image as a possibility of sense as 
the unthought—the image must be the cause of dis-ease, and the questioning not just 
of composing the figural but the self in relation to composition. If, for von Trier, the only 
success is accepting one’s own imperfection, than the only truly ethical experience would be 
that of confronting the possibility of failure.  
  Von Trier’s disappointment with Leth’s success in the first obstruction provokes 
von Trier to disregard the technical abilities of his teacher and confronts him with obstacles 
involved in framing/reframing the cinematic image as an object of ethical inquiry; that 
is, how can Leth engage both what is in the frame and what is excluded from the frame. 
Having failed to achieve the imperfect film through purely formal means, von Trier now 
challenges Leth’s ethical sensitivity through what he is willing to show and not show on 
screen. This chapter will spend time tracing the ethical issues involved in composing the 
image in the midst of realities that lay beyond the frame. Already we can discern that von 
Trier is succeeding in his failure on both accounts as he struggles to use the obstructions to 
force Leth’s hand toward self-revelation. In response Leth proposes that only in showing the 
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inhuman can we interrogate our notions of the human. 
Having spent so much time exploring the possibilities of cinematic images in order 
to release the intractability of representation, I must now acknowledge my own problematic 
usage of the word image. 
The problem is related to the 
current ethical inquiry and 
how the hesitant condition 
of images can be thought in terms of ethos and even 
subjectivity. Giorgio Agamben 
proposes in his essay “Notes 
on Gesture” that cinema is 
made up of gestures and not 
images; the movement of film 
records and preserves these 
gestures for a society that 
has lost them. What makes 
Agamben’s view unique is 
that he is willing to connect 
the cinema to ethics through 
ethos by preserving the 
gestural qualities of images: 
“What characterizes gesture 
is that in it nothing is being 
produced or acted, but rather 
something is being endured and supported. The gesture, in other words, opens the sphere of ethos as the more proper sphere of that which is human” (57).2 Agamben raises the point 
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that in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle opposes poiesis and praxis as terms for means in 
which the ends are external and internal. Gesture, on the other hand, is pure means in that 
it “is the exhibition of mediality: it is the process of making a means visible as such,” and he 
continues by writing that, as a display of mediality, gesture “allows the emergence of the 
being-in-the-medium of human beings and thus it opens the ethical dimension for them” 
(58). Mediality, the intermediate and indeterminate quality of modalities of expression, is 
the ethical manifestation of moving images made possible by a rupture between means and 
ends. 
I concluded the first chapter by discussing cinematic images in terms of skin/film or pellicule to emphasize the relationship between sense and senselessness3 in a context 
of multimodal composition. In this chapter I will go one step further by now breaking the 
representational consistency and stability of the skin/film through the ethical rupture 
introduced by the mediality of images. I will argue that, much like Agamben’s gestures, 
obstructions provoke an ethical instability by asserting an “exhibition of mediality.” In this 
way obstructions in a context of compositional modality neither prescribe to ends nor 
means, product nor procedure, but the “being-in-the-medium” that associates the concept of 
the perfect human to the collaborative relationship of von Trier and Leth.
I will be discussing representation as a consequence of the break between sense 
and thought introduced by multimodal discourse, rather than a more traditional view 
of coherence and stability in which the image is recognized as a self-sustaining object. 
Functioning on the level of mediality, cinematic images feel no need to mark their territory 
but instead open a wound that Antonin Artaud called in the preface to The Theater and 
Its Double “culture-in-action,” or a marked “rupture between things and words, between 
things and the ideas and signs that are their representation” (7). In terms of the project of 
obstructions, the concept of “the perfect human” is culture-in-action, an ethical bleeding 
out of the rupture of representation of the skin/film. Obstructions provide a wound which 
opens the body up to the outside, the out-of-field as the rupture of the frame opening up the 
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“perfect human” as a contradiction in terms, as well as the most proper sphere of that which 
is ethical.
The Recoil and the Question of Ethics 
Ethics is a difficult term, or a term of difficulty. It refers to a kind of securing of 
subjectivity through a stable notion of ethos, related to an expression of identity. In this 
equation ethics is a governing system of values that determines what can be considered 
the right or wrong way of living by asserting the limits of correct conduct. One may be 
considered ethical by adhering to the principles that establish a particular value system. 
Through sets of negotiated principles, ethics facilitates subjectivity by fixing individuals 
within a culture; we can understand our culture and regulate our place within it by aligning 
individual and communal values.4 In place of a unified concept of ethics Charles Scott asserts 
“the question of ethics,” or ethics as a question of the insufficiencies of assumed values and 
the failure of ethos as a coherent concept: “The ‘question of ethics’ indicates an interruption 
in an ethos, an interruption in which the definitive values that govern thought and everyday 
action lose their power and authority to provide immediate certainty in their functions” (4). 
This does not terminate their presence to the individual, but instead suspends their force to 
define the individual. 
Scott believes that the interruption of ethos arouses a sense of anxiety that betrays 
ethical thinking as the roots of a suffering of subjectivity. By destabilizing the assumed 
systems of values the question of ethics presupposes a subject caught in a movement 
between “autonomy and subjection” and “self-realization and self-deconstruction” (5). 
According to Scott, questionability allows for “turning these concepts and logics on 
themselves, a turning that we shall generally call self-overcoming recoil,” a performative 
movement that continually turns and releases in both critique and application (5). If we 
can think about recoil as creating the conditions for re-vision without the demands of 
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completion or resolution, then Leth’s drive for perfection and von Trier’s fascination with 
his failure is an obstruction that recoils into a transformative collaboration. Scott interprets 
Nietzsche’s concept of “eternal return” as a movement of affirmation without completion: 
Returning returns. It is a recoil that ceaselessly unsettles the thought of 
both eternity and sameness. 
No identity controls the 
process. Identity control is itself 
transvalued in the recoiling 
return. And the discourse is 
free for its multiple, struggling 
orders. No meaning rules over 
them in the recoil of eternity 
as return. There are surging 
powers in a quality of energy 
that affirms them all in their countervailing lives. (31)
The recoil is self-overcoming because it overcomes even its own desire to extinguish the 
anxiety of excess or to resolve the questionability of the ethical subject. Obstructions display 
this self-overcoming recoiling movement within a structure that both determines and 
questions the authority of their limitations. 
 The ethics of obstruction is necessarily a contradiction of terms because the 
restrictions introduced by particular frames of reference also contain the means for 
overcoming their own limiting demands. Although his intentions are clearly to enact certain 
changes in his old mentor, von Trier’s obstructions demand nothing more than a response 
from Leth, whose films subsequently require von Trier to rethink his strategies. The original 
exigency behind The Five Obstructions was to push the concept of the perfect human to its 
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compositional limits, but the practice of responding through obstructions expresses the 
modes of re-vision in collaborative terms. Multimodal composition engages re-vision by first 
entering the rhetorical situation and responding to an exigency. The ethical landscape of this 
situation is one of collaboration, a gift exchange model that allows the collaboration itself 
to perform the exigency of the project. The self-overcoming recoil of the obstructions turns 
each response back onto itself and requires its continuation. 
The response to obstructions, much like Scott’s question of ethics, arises from 
within the obstructions themselves and not from outside. What this means is that the 
question of ethics does not lead to a new ethics, i.e., a new moral code, and the question or 
questionability of obstruction does not lead to a new method of composition. There is no way 
to identify an obtuse image; it escapes the discourse of identification and representation. To 
approach multimodal composition in terms of the ethics of re-vision is an obtuse gesture, 
a kind of subversive habitus, or mode of living, that Scott perceives as a politics of “rethink, 
rework, rewrite” (8). Multimodal composition thought and performed as a recoiling 
movement reveals an ethos of collaboration as a requisite for changing the frame of the 
relationship.
In the recoiling movement of ethical questioning concepts and logics continually 
turn on themselves allowing even for the affirmation of contradictory structures. When 
discussing the second obstruction von Trier discloses that his intent is to “move from 
the perfect to the human” by forcing Leth to overcome the creative restrictions of the 
obstructions by succumbing to their limiting powers. While the first obstruction pushed the 
limits of Leth’s aesthetic philosophy and asked him to reevaluate the image of perfection, 
the exchange to determine the rules of the second obstruction threatens Leth’s ethical 
foundations:
My plan is to move from the 
perfect to the human, right? 
That’s my agenda.
66
- Actually I want to “banalize” 
you. But how the hell do we 
do that?
- I don’t know.
No, you don’t. But that’s what I want you to help me to do. 
We may be able to do so by finding things that hurt. Like the 12 frames.
- I can’t identify my soft spots in advance.
- The 12 frames were a soft spot?
- Absolutely.
- Not at all. But I’d like to put 
your ethics to the test.
- The highly affected distance 
you maintain to the things you 
describe . . .
That’s what I want to get rid 
of  in my next obstruction. 
- It’s not merely a pose?
That might be interesting. We 
talk so much about the ethics of  
the observer. The observer is my 
role of  course.
It’s my instinct.
I want to move you on from 
there. To make you empathize. 
I’d like to send you to the most 
miserable place on earth. That 
won’t cause you any prob-
lems. You’re good at going to 
the most miserable places.As long as there is a hotel.
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- I can’t identify my soft spots in advance.
- The 12 frames were a soft spot?
- Absolutely.
- I can’t say. It’s up to 
you to define the most 
miserable place. Can 
you think of  any places, 
any themes one cannot 
exploit? No.
- No, not off  hand. But 
I’m not that uncivilized. 
I might say there are no 
limits. But there might be 
situations…
-There is a degree of  perversity in . . .
- In maintaining a distance?
and add the words 
from The Perfect Human?
- In the way you do things.
How far are you prepared to 
go if  you’re not describing 
something? It’d be worth a 
laboratory experiment. Would 
anything rub off? I want you 
to go close to a few really 
harrowing things. Dramas 
from real life that you refrain 
from filming. You’ve done so 
before.
How close can you get? And when you come 
back – you play Claus Nissen. The meal will 
be there but not the woman. It’ll be rather 
Pinter-like not having her there. But the meal 
will be there. Have you thought it over? Yes, I think I have.
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A Violation of Ethos
In the first challenge Leth must recreate the same introspection with a film featuring 
frenetic cutting. Whereas Jorgen Leth’s original The Perfect Human was a slow moving film 
composed of long deliberate takes, his success in the first obstruction hinges on what he 
can make out of nothing, or next to nothing (12 frames to be exact). Von Trier imposed a 
technical de-centering on Leth that shifted the concept of the film from a quasi-documentary 
style to the more mechanised rhythm montage dynamism. This shift challenged Leth on 
technical grounds in terms of generating new films, as well as personal and ethical in terms 
of testing Leth cinematic ethos. 
What we have to keep in mind is that the challenge to keep each shot to no longer 
than 12 frames is not only an attempt to formally deconstruct The Perfect Human as a model 
of mid-century European art-film, but also to make Leth a stranger to his own image-objects. 
For von Trier’s part, the obstruction fails as Leth succeeds in navigating the rules while 
actually enjoying the experience. Von Trier can only succeed with nothing less than Leth’s 
failure. The ethics involved here are not only questionable but in some ways impossible. 
What becomes clear by the second obstruction is that as long as Leth can actually respond 
to Von Trier’s obstructions with a film of his own he has succeeded. The only response that 
could possibly succeed as a kind of failure would be for Leth to refuse to make a film. For 
In writing about such things, and also in 
thinking them, a different world begins 
to form whose distance means not only 
a sacrifice of the thing written about, but 
a new (or slightly new) order, certainly 
fragile and filled with discord and 
ambiguity, but order nonetheless. (Scott. 
The Question of Ethics 211)
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Leth to refuse the obstruction would not just be a breach of the rules of the game, but a 
violation of his own ethos. By responding in particular ways, Leth attempts to stay true to his 
ethos, at the cost of the possibility of failure. By continuing to force the issue of failure, von 
Trier mistakes his own desire as the truth of failure. 
What I am trying to accomplish here is a movement, which can only be described 
as a recoiling, between the demands of a context of collaboration and the corresponding 
but resisting desires of these demands generate within the individual. This movement can 
ultimately be traced back to images which have traditionally been given the normative 
weight of arbitrary transcendent signification. In these terms images dwell within particular 
regimes of meaning, while questioning the authority of those regimes. I will take Jacques 
Ranciére’s idea of “the distribution of the sensible” one step further and propose that not 
only do images lie within particular regimes that make them sensible, they also question 
the terms of authority of those regimes. The Five Obstructions performs this movement as 
a continuation of the questioning of image that it began with the initial challenge. This is 
a movement that the film engages, most notably in the second obstruction segment, and 
which is the basis for thinking about the mediality of images as meaningful and questionable 
compositions. My attempt here is not to empty images of their meaning, but to push the 
limits of significance by suspending the authority of Aristotle’s “man of practical wisdom” 
who would determine the mean(ing)s and allow the unethical or irrational excessive 
meanings to emerge. In The Five Obstructions the relationship between obstruction and ethics is 
embodied in the figures of Leth and von Trier as an ethos that relates closely to the difficulty 
of their collaboration in the shadow of eros, or their personal desires and interests for the 
outcomes of the project. Although they have a mutual understanding about the general 
course of the project, they each have completely different expectations of its outcomes. I 
have already discussed somewhat the circumstances of their friendship and what initiated 
this particular project. Near the end of the film von Trier unabashedly declares that he is “an 
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expert on Leth” not simply in terms of knowledge of his films, but also in how the images 
of those films flow out from Leth’s own body into a visual manifestation of internal erotic 
power. The Perfect Human cannot be reduced to a representation of autobiographical work; 
there is something physical which Leth has sacrificed for the virtual image. The resulting 
images are traces of that desire which drove Leth to create them in the first place. In an 
essay that explores how ethics is addressed in The Five Obstructions, Susan Dwyer explains 
that von Trier now raises the Brechtian stakes by displacing Leth from behind the camera: 
“It is not just that he (von Trier) makes Leth strange to himself, he has Leth create the very 
vehicles that manifest that strangeness” (7). By having Leth now star in the leading role, von 
Trier introduces the second obstruction to force Leth to take on the body of his own desire. 
Forcing Leth in front of the camera pronounces further the pedagogical role reversal 
in the partnership. The student now removes the mediation that the actor represents to the 
director by forcing his mentor to be the physical manifestation of this work. His presence 
as image forfeits the guarantee of representation by erasing the absence of his body. The 
teacher is turned to object in terms of the rules of the game as a kind of regulated play; roles 
are not just reversed, but turned over to uncertainty. In other words, the child is toying with 
the father.
 The difficulty for Leth is only partly in overcoming a particular rule. Writing 
specifically about the factors of play, Hector Rodriguez reminds us that although The Five 
Obstructions is a game of composing obstructions and images, “people do not always find 
playing pleasurable. . . . There is such a thing as resistance to playing” (48). This seems 
particularly true for Leth in the second obstruction in which he must visit what he deems 
“the most miserable place.” By choosing to respond in a way that bends the rules of 
the obstruction, Leth resists the constraints placed on him by von Trier’s drive for self-
revelation. This resistance is a possibility built into the role constraints of the game. In fact 
only by resisting the constraints of the obstruction can Leth question the intentions of the 
obstructions that will also place von Trier within the same ethical uncertainty.
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The Dis-ease of Meaning or This Is How the Perfect Man Suffers
In Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric Victor Vitanza retells a story in 
which Lacan expresses regret “that when psychoanalysis came into being (because of female 
and male hysterics), it was unfortunately ‘discovered’ by a medical doctor [Sigmund Freud] 
whose predisposition or ‘trained capacity,’ was to cure (once and forever) the disorder” 
(330). What I want to point out here is Vitanza’s crucial use of Kenneth Burke’s notion of 
“trained incapacities”5 as one explanation for Freud’s placing square pegs into round holes. 
But there is something else here that surfaces out of the cure and disorder—the reliance on 
a hermeneutical reading, the search for a universal meaning, that becomes a disorder. 
There is a tendency in the discourses of ethics to look for sickness; where there 
is a symptom; dis-ease can be diagnosed. I want to suggest that the question of ethics, 
or ethics as an interrogative field, is a dis-ease or condition of unsettled unsettling that 
begins as a moment of crisis of subjectivity. The recoiling that is integral to the assertion 
of a collaborative context imposes obstructions to the assurance of subjectivity. Freud’s 
trained incapacities introduced the conditions for the discovery of psychoanalysis, which 
seeks to explore the unconscious, while at the same time preventing Dr. Freud access to the 
resolution that the medical model demanded, the visual/textual proof: the witness. There 
is a suffering that must go along with any dis-ease, but the search to provide this witness 
offers a particular sort of suffering that occurs as a result of the absence of interpretation. 
Suffering is at the heart of the necessity for the witness. Nietzsche points out in On 
Jørgen! You’re looking 
great. 
That’s not good.
You ought to look battered. People who have been 
tripped up look
 battered.
1 2 3
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the Genealogy of Morals that the suffering man, having found himself devoid of meaning, 
turns the problem from himself back onto the suffering itself as the source of significance, 
however, “his problem was not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying 
question, ‘why do I suffer’” (598). This turn allowed ethical man to cease as a figure of 
senselessness5 and offered him a will that could only be expressed by a “hatred of the human 
. . . the horror of the senses, of reason itself” (598-9). Nietzsche knew a thing or two about 
the suffering of senselessness when near blindness caused him to purchase a typewriter as 
a solution to his dis-ease of writing. 
In his analysis of this Nietzsche’s typewriter, Friedrich Kittler suggests that 
Nietzsche’s venture into mechanical writing marked a transition from the individual 
voice of the human to the white noise of information channels. This was the noise of 
modernity’s impending loss of sense—the human voice suffers the dis-ease not of the loss 
of information, but of its excess: “Within the realm of all sounds and words, all organisms, 
white noise appears, the incessant and ineradicable background of information. For the 
very channels through which information must pass emit noise” (183). In his desperation 
Nietzsche replaced the vision of the pen with the touch of the typewriter, and shifting the 
ethical expression of writing from an experience of subjectivity to the recoiling of mediality. 
Kittler explains, “Whereas handwriting is subject to the eye, a sense that works across 
distance, the typewriter uses a blind, tactile power” (195). 
Like I should’ve been 
walking on crutches.
I can’t wait to show you, 
I must say.
- I’m already skeptical.
-Of course you are.
4 5 6
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The human scratch of the pen transforms into the inhuman taps of keys as the 
background noise of modern media is brought to bear on the clear meanings of human 
sense. Noise does not eradicate sense completely; it introduces a multitude of channels and 
the silent record of the individual was no longer silent—was never silent in the first place.
So why even discuss ethics in terms of noise rather than understanding how 
obstructions function within certain 
principles? How is it that obstructions 
engage the ancient question of achieving 
the “good life” by embracing ethical dis-ease 
introduced by the inhuman background 
noise?  In his defense of virtue ethics, 
Alsadair McIntyre opposes what he calls 
Nietzsche’s “moral philosophy” to the 
Aristotelian version of ethics. McIntyre 
claims that “the defensibility of the 
Nietzschean position turns in the end on 
the answer to the question: was it right 
in the first place to reject Aristotle? For if 
Aristotle’s position in ethics and politics—or 
something very like it—could be sustained, 
the whole Nietzschean enterprise would 
- I can’t see how you . . .
- No, you can’t.
You can’t imagine how 
we worked round things.
One always feel furious 
when it turns out that 
there are solutions.
7 8 9
the human scratch
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be pointless” (117). In other words, Nietzsche obstructs our participation in true ethical 
inquiry. Such an understanding of ethics grasps at the consistency of idealized concepts and 
ignores the transition of discourse networks that Kittler describes as marked by the noise of 
modern information channels.  
Robert Louden criticizes MacIntyre by reminding him that our world has changed 
substantially since the days of Aristotle, and that it “lacks the sort of moral cohesiveness 
and value unity which traditional virtue theorists saw as prerequisites of a viable moral 
community” (235).  Accordingly, MacIntyre abuses Aristotle in presupposing a consensus 
for responding to what we could call the dis-order of ethics; the potential questionability 
of ethics is lost to particular modes of discourse.  These questions presuppose the criteria 
for response and the question of ethics becomes a hermeneutics one that ends before it 
begins. The noble questions of the good life result from the suffering of meaninglessness 
that even Nietzsche was forced to confront by purchasing a typewriter. In other words, 
the choice between Aristotle and Nietzsche is a false one; the dissonance of Nietzsche’s 
typewriter demonstrates the difficulty of defining the principles of virtue. When ethics is 
equated only with ethical conduct its relationship to the instability of ethos is covered over 
and substituted with identity and representation. This is how ethics can come to be defined 
through simple issues of credibility and validation. In The Differend, François Lyotard calls the demands for making something present 
or naming the object as testimony, and he makes it clear that “Negation is at the heart of 
testimony” (54). Images expose the impossible consensus that anchors ethical inquiry 
because they signify both absence and presence, and so cannot provide validation of either. 
In Lyotard’s terms, the question of ethics is very much a differend as there exists no rule or 
judgment with the capacity for resolution. Lyotard illustrates the stakes of differends when 
he contrasts the figures of the intellectual and the philosopher: while the philosopher is 
entrusted with “finding the (impossible) idiom” or the creation of concepts, the intellectual 
“helps forget differends, by advocating a given genre . . . for the sake of political hegemony” 
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(142). Covering over the differend is the result of arguing for particular modes of resolution. 
Creating images dissolves ethical inquiry by placing testimony back into question. 
There is also a political imperative for dissolving demands made by particular 
modes of ethical inquiry, to which Lyotard attests. We must respond not through a 
hermeneutic approach that would be a will to resolve the issue, but by placing the field 
of ethics back into question. Scott explains that by retaining ethics in its indeterminancy, 
“questioning can occur in a manner that puts in question the body of values that led to the 
questioning. The reader will find that the question of ethics arises out of ethical concern 
as well as out of conflicts within structures of value, that ethical concern and suspicion 
of ethics qualify one another” (1). Ethical concerns are always questions of ethics or a 
questioning of human (inter)action, but most of all it is a recognition that thought itself is 
in conflict in that it originates from within these value structures. The work that von Trier 
and Leth create in the film recoils around particular image structures organized around the 
rules for each obstruction. The obstructions thus function as a field of questioning for the 
deployment of images as fixed meanings and values. A consideration of the ethics of images 
in this sense is to open truth to the possibility of eros, rather than simply of moral obligation 
and static representation. 
Questionable Ethics? 
In the Coming Community, Giorgio Agamben suggests that the stasis point for 
the discussion of ethics “is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, 
no biological destiny that humans must enact or realize. This is the only reason why 
something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this 
or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience would be possible—there 
would only be tasks to be done” (43). According to Agamben, ethics is not equated with 
actions, but on decisions—not that humans act in a vacuum, but that they must choose to 
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act in the presence of difficulties.  Agamben’s claim is that there is no essence of ethics, 
or anything essential to it. The existence of ethics is predicated on its suspension, its 
status of questionability that does not presume an answer. The ethics of obstruction is an 
examination of ethics as it has been conceived as a “question of ethics”: prescriptions of 
thought and action rather than descriptions of moral virtues. 
Central to this examination is John Rajchman’s assertion that the question of 
ethics in the work of Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault is actually a response to “the 
ancient question of truth and eros; each of them in different ways re-eroticized the activity 
of philosophical or critical thought for our times” (1). Rajchman takes from Lacan and 
Foucault a relationship of “difficulty” between truth and desire/eros that manifests as a 
recoiling around their central concerns. Rather than begin with Aristotle’s “golden mean,” 
obstructions begin, as Lacan suggests, at the moment of eros and desire. This would be an 
ethical experience that emerges out of The Five Obstructions in the form of constraining 
obstructions that engender passions and style of as multimodal thought.  
The telling and re-telling of Jorgen Leth’s The Perfect Human is a demonstration of eros which emerges from ethical indeterminancy: how far can the student (who is now 
the teacher) push the teacher (who is now the student) in order to reveal some kind of 
truth of identity? The headstrong and spontaneous von Trier sees some inverse image of 
his messiness in the cool and collected and impossible “perfection” of Leth. Susan Dwyer 
sees this interaction as a relationship in which “there are no wholly self-made selves. Any 
human self . . . is not and cannot be a solipsistic construction. Crucially, we need others to 
understand ourselves” (13). This is the difficulty around which the decisions and passions 
of the film coalesce. Ultimately, the film is about both Leth and von Trier and the restrictive 
obstructions that define their interactions (Dwyer 3). But this still doesn’t explain why 
there is a question of ethics related to this collaborative context. What is needed, as Lyotard 
proposed, is not that this questioning ends in any particular ethical form, but the opening for an ars vitae—the film presents the possibility of an aesthetics of life, a way to cultivate 
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the self as an ethos that surfaces through our relations with others. 
The Translucent Screen: Ergon/Parergon 
The Five Obstructions enters the realm of ethics by insisting that processes of 
composition, and images that are ultimately produced, are part of ethos, not simply in terms 
of individual principles, but as a way in which creation is, according to Michel Foucault, 
“the care of the self.” This phrase identifies a crisis of how the individual forms himself as 
an ethical subject and what is sacrificed in this formation (The History of Sexuality 95). The 
subject, in other words, is not without difficulties, which continue as part of that formation 
from the outside: ethos would in this sense be the negation of the 
ethical subject. Lacan perceived something similar in ethics as a 
way to speak truly of oneself only insofar as it stands in opposition to 
desire and pleasure (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 39). What Foucault 
and Lacan see, and what Rajchman expands on in his book Truth and 
Eros, is that ethics is an economy of self-constitution which disregards desire or eros, but which is nonetheless absolutely penetrated 
by it. What I have been proposing here is that The Five Obstructions 
offers a view of ethos arising from the process of making images as 
the possibility of the unthought or inexpressible presence; that which 
ethical subject cannot tolerate (Rajchman 11). The obstructions become a heuristic for 
asserting the difficulty of ethos, the impossibility of speaking truly of oneself, and the eros of 
failure or withdrawal from resolution.
In the second film The Perfect Human, Bombay Leth is put at ethical dis-ease with his 
image objects, including, according to the rules of the obstruction, he himself as the perfect 
man. Von Trier requires him to travel to the “most miserable place in the world” to make 
his film without showing the surrounding people or realities they live in. Leth faces the 
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difficulty of shooting what is the most decadent scene of his original film, a banquet scene 
in which the perfect man dines on the perfect meal while pondering existential questions. 
To top it off Leth himself is required to play the part of the “perfect man” amidst the 
desperation of a city slum, while facing the ethical obstruction of not being able to show the 
poverty on screen during the banquet. This is a perfect man whose perfection is sustained 
by the ugliness around him which in turn has been bracketed by the obstruction. Leth’s 
solution is to bend the rules and construct a translucent “window” frame within the frame of 
the camera that will reveal the silhouettes of the crowd against which his feasting acquires a 
literal irony. 
 The requirements of the obstruction as well as Leth’s own ethically ambiguous 
solution generate an immense tension between the center/margins, point/supplement, 
or what Jacques Derrida calls ergon/parergon; these relationships, which parallel the von 
Trier-Leth relationship, create the conditions for all subsequent obstructions. In The Truth 
in Painting Derrida describes ergon as the logic of aesthetics—the work itself or fact of 
the work—while, parergon is the supplement, the excluded, or that which “comes against, 
beside, and in addition to the ergon stands outside or beside the frame.” He continues by 
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indicating that this is not an absolute exclusion as parergon “touches and cooperates within 
the operation, from a certain outside. Neither simply inside nor simply outside” (54). In this 
case, representation is not enough for Leth; the banquet that Leth must re-vision is only the 
ergon of the scene, its object. What infuses the frame with its ethical/political power is what 
resonates externally from outside the frame always as an internal force. 
Ergon is the representation of the image, what is intrinsic, that which belongs to the 
image. “What is represented in the representation” Derrida contends, “would be the naked 
and natural body; the representative essence of the statue would be related to this, and the 
only beautiful thing in the statue would be that representation; it alone would be essentially, 
purely, and intrinsically beautiful, ‘the proper object of a pure judgment of taste” (57). If we 
think of representation as the ergon of the image, then we must be prepared to examine the 
parergon and ask, as Derrida does, “Where does a parergon begin and end [?]” (57).
The translucent frame generates an ecstatic scene which stands beside and against 
itself. In French mise en scène means to “put into the scene” and the phrase resists the agent 
of the action: who is it that “puts” into the scene? The answer is uncertain. Herein lays the 
political difficulty of representation: the problem of control. As a certain regime of cinematic 
representation, the notion of mise-en-scene is a sanctioning practice of authorizing ways of 
seeing and imaging, which goes against theories of cinematic authorship. The distribution 
of the sensible ties the knot between aesthetics and politics and makes framing a political 
act by defining the compositional space. Reframing would then be the corrective as a 
outside/beside/against resonates externally naked/natural body
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(re)appropriation and (re)presentation, of resistant, anomalous, or recalcitrant images. 
Reframing is a kind of imposed invention within the ethical domain of choice and act. 
But can reframing really be thought of in terms of corrective? 
Placing in the Scene (In)Correctly: Reframing and “the Out-of-Field”
The literal translation of mise en scène appears innocuous—that a director of a 
film would “put in the scene” the artistic elements necessary to communicate his vision is 
at the very center of director-centric auteur theories since the critics of Cahiers du cinéma 
articulated such notions for film theory.6 The term mise en scène, however, resists the agent 
of the action; who is it that “puts” into the scene? Herein lies the difficulty of representation: 
the problem of control. Walter Benjamin called the cameraman in the cinematic context as 
a “surgeon” who disregards the natural distance of the painter and “penetrates deeply into 
[the] web” of reality (233). The mechanical process of penetrating into a matrix of reality is 
the re-presentation of a reality free from mechanical intervention (234). The edges of the 
frame can only attempt to impose limitations on a scene that constantly extends beyond 
itself. There is no completely closed frame with which the surgeon can operate successfully.
In his famous essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” 
Benjamin is concerned with the close relationship between technology and violence 
evidenced in the art of the Futurists at the time. Benjamin has the cameraman of the cinema 
open a wound within the scene that necessarily turns the framed composition of the mise en 
scène into the object of surgery. He compares these surgical hands of the camera operator 
to the more ritualistic hands of the painter, rooted in tradition and mysticism. The “laying-
on-of-hands” of the painter maintains a surface effect on the body that eludes the violence 
of penetration. In both cases, however, there are particular requirements of belief and 
understanding from the recipient in order for effective treatment to take place. Both sets 
of hands serve to frame the operation of affect which demand specific requirements of the 
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recipient (taking the role of believer or patient). The operative hands are then themselves 
transformed by this political context; they derive their power from the will of the actors to 
sustain their parts. 
For composed images in a cinematic context the camera is just the initiator of a 
frame, it can only acknowledge that which lies within the frame of the scene. But as the 
surgical hands of the camera extend into the body of the mise en scène through the open 
wound, the frame of multimodal composition is affected (or become infected?) by the 
collapse of the surrounding body into the wound/scene. It is this collapse of the frame that 
will ultimately shatter the illusion of either the surgeon or the healer. What we can take 
away from Benjamin’s analysis in the context of The Five Obstructions is that rather than 
embrace the ethical difficulty that the collapsing frame affords, cinematic images tend to 
dig deeper into the surgical event in an effort to maintain the framing distinction: image 
and audience; doctor and patient. Anomalies must be eliminated in order to preserve the 
political power of these roles, just as the unethical possibility of the ethical principle is 
forgotten. The irony is that the deeper the camera must penetrate to maintain the framing of 
the scene the more the frame becomes one with the body of the image.
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Reframing would then be the corrective in terms of the re-appropriation and re-
vision of resistant or anomalous images. In a passage entitled “The Moment Comes” Jørgen 
Leth writes about the difficulty of the work of the filmmaker who must apprehend images as 
objects and present them within a prescribed mise en scène:
In our work, we are armed with our instinct, our eyes and our ears. 
We concentrate on empty space as well as occupied space. We observe 
silence and noise. We trust in chance’s limitless gifts and yet the place in 
which we find ourselves isn’t necessarily a product of chance. The moment 
suddenly comes when we are no longer astonished by its appearance. There 
we are. We are ready to capture it, to come to terms with it. We don’t know 
where it will lead us. We follow the flow, we see where it wants to go and 
what it wants to do with us. We watch it take form and come together but we 
must ground it while it is still flowing and not too defined. We are in love. A 
feeling has hit us, we try to perceive it during its superficial passage yet are 
afraid of losing it again by understanding it too well. (Danish Film Institute 
31)
In framing an image, the mise en scène becomes an epistemological apparatus for the 
distribution of ways of seeing and knowing. Framing is capturing the flow, a way of 
domesticating (ethos) the wildness (ethea) that is the pleasure of the image (jouissance). 
Leth’s response to von Trier’s demand in the second obstruction to not to show the 
terrible conditions around his film set is to reframe the challenge by inserting a new frame. 
Von Trier tells Leth that he must travel to “the most miserable place in the world” to shoot 
his next film, but he is prohibited from actually filming any of the misery. They decide on 
traveling to the red light district of Mumbai, India (Bombay in the film), a place that has 
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particular significance for Leth. Von Trier’s goal is to see if the despair around him will 
affect the scene without it actually appearing within the frame of the film. Leth expresses 
his concern for ignoring his environment and, rather than completely following the rules, 
he decides he cannot totally avoid showing the poverty of the neighborhood and constructs 
a giant translucent frame through which the surrounding conditions can be viewed in the 
background of the mise en scène. Leth has composed the cinematic event around two frames 
allowing the outside of the scene to have a very real visual force on the scene.  
This violation of the rules stokes von Trier’s ire; the reframing act is treated as a 
technical transgression of the obstruction rather than a question of the ethics of the scene. 
As his punishment von Trier offers Leth a choice between returning to India to remake the 
same film or make a new film without any restrictions from von Trier, or what he calls a 
“free-style” film. Leth refuses to return to the scene of the crime, so to speak, in order to 
atone for his breach of contract because he cannot face the scene that he had deemed to be 
“the most miserable place.”  The rule not to show the surroundings of the scene creates an 
ethical frame: the obstruction must be accepted to successfully accomplish the task, but it 
must also be violated in order to be true to the scene. In other words, this is a false choice 
that assumes that Leth can choose correctly. 
Leth constructs the translucent screen as a response to what he sees as an abuse of 
the prescribed directives. He accuses von Trier of having “romantic notions” that by simply 
shooting the film in the midst of a “social drama” that the film will be affected in ways that 
Leth cannot control. The criteria for judgment had been given by von Trier, so the decision 
to reframe the obstruction through the screen as a way to foreground the social drama was 
a violation of the agreed ethical principles of the challenge. The collaborative context of this 
particular obstruction demonstrates Geoffrey Galt Harpham’s thesis that an ethical choice is 
always unethical because it “is always a choice between ethics” and that the act of choosing 
a set of ethical principles must of itself violate some other set of criteria. To base ethics 
exclusively on the choice of how one should live is to create an exclusionary system in which 
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“includes within its internal structure a ‘nonethical’ element” (27-28). For Harpham the so-
called active “choice” involved in practical ethics is actually a forced choice because we are 
always subscribing to particular directives while violating, or repressing, others.
The repression of these other systems does not make them disappear, but leaves 
open the possibility for their return. In Cinema 1 Deleuze makes the observation that early 
film images were a function of a cinematic system that reproduces movement through 
the use of “privileged instants” (5). Framing is the action of producing these privileged 
instants to compose a mise en scène; the images that we see in a film have been divided and 
separated off from every other possible image for particular aesthetic or narrative affect.  
From this description it seems that framing is a fundamentally negative act of exclusion. 
Deleuze, however, explains that by framing and focusing on particular images the mise 
en scène (that which is put into the scene) also creates an “out-of-field” (that which has 
been excluded from the scene), and that “all framing determines an out-of-field” (17). 
The significance of the position of the out-of-field is that there is a symbiotic relationship 
between the inside and the outside because, while the frame determines the boundaries 
of the image, “every closed system also communicates” with what lies outside the frame.7 
According to Deleuze, “The out-of-field refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is 
nevertheless perfectly present” (17). The image is a phenomenon of the perfect presence of 
its outside weighing down on the originating frame, a force that threatens to overwhelm the 
frame. 
The threat of the “out-of-field” is part of the anxiety of “the perfect human”: how can 
one become complete without setting limits? Re-framing or re-vision would not answer the 
question of perfection nor does it represent a corrective. It does, however, acknowledge the 
constant movement of the frame as a place to begin to explore the “out-of-field,” or what 
lies beyond the frame and yet impacts the scene. What we have seen with these first two 
obstructions is a transvaluation of the pedagogical work of mentor and student through 
the unraveling of the ichnographic reel of the project. Upon evaluating the second film, von 
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Trier attacks Leth within the paradigm of his technical ability, testing whether or not he 
can transgress the limits of his own cinematic ethos. Leth’s adaptability causes von Trier to 
challenge that ethos on the basis of the process of creating images rather than the product. 
In an important pedagogical move, the obstructions now begin to come as much 
from Leth as they do von Trier. By establishing an ethical domain which requires particular 
modes of practice and results, obstructions also produce the conditions for the violation and 
questioning of those principles. The questioning of the image frame as the domain of ethics 
not only questions images as constructions of form and content, but also as the basis for 
such thought. Images reflect certain investments which go unquestioned and hide the active 
choosing of those investments to assemble representation. 
The Intolerable: The Costs of Doing Business with Subjectivity
The inclusion of the parergon or the frame forms an essential part of the mise en 
scène. Leth’s decision to physically represent that frame through the translucent screen 
offers a glimpse into India’s miserable economic conditions juxtaposed against Leth’s 
recreation of the elegant banquet from The Perfect Human. The clouded screen, however, 
can only offer a distorted perspective of that scene; we are not allowed a clear view of the 
faces in the crowd and perspective itself becomes an unresolved obstruction. In his attempt 
to reclaim his ethical identity, Leth exchanged one obstruction (von Trier’s directives) for 
another (his own blurred perspective). Rather than accept von Trier’s challenge to see 
what kind of difference his surroundings would have without showing them on screen, he 
forces a resolution of the question of ethics: the screen is the parergon of truth encroaching 
on the illusion of the scene. The question is upheld, however, when juxtaposed against 
his unnerving exchange with a woman who approaches his car asking for rupees. The 
ethical wound is reopened and the screen becomes the cost of returning to his “most 
miserable place.” The aesthetic inclusion of the screen is less an ethical statement on class 
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relations and more an act of individual redemption: it would be an intolerable possibility of 
the obstruction not to physically include the residents of the red light district.
Within the work of both Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan, John Rajchman 
perceived that each were similarly facing the question of ethics, and each finding, in the 
absence of resolution, new ways to conceive of its possibilities. In Truth and Eros Rajchman demonstrates how the question of ethics for Foucault became the “question of the subject,” 
questions that were inseparable for him from the questions he had already posed regarding 
truth and power. The surfacing of the question of the subject resulted from the “abrupt 
‘refusal’ of his earlier style [marking] a shift in the basic questions of his historical research” 
(4). According to Rajchman this shift came from the difficulty that Foucault discovered in 
his own work: “What does it cost for reason to tell the truth?” (11). These costs coalesce 
around a discourse of the “intolerable” in response to the aporia of his earlier work. In the 
context of obstructions, the “intolerable” is that which is excluded from the frame within the 
restrictions of the rules, and yet affects the scene in its absence.
The difficulty for Lacan rose out of a different sphere, that of the seminar. Lacan 
saw teaching as an important discursive site for the transmission of shared knowledge.  He 
saw that our conceptions of the Good and Ideal as being at odds with our actual desires. 
According to Rajchman, Lacan’s ethic would be a “teaching of the difficulties we have with 
what is ideal in us, and with what we suppose is our Good, and thus with our passionate 
relations with ourselves and one another” (17). For Lacan, as with von Trier, the ideal 
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notions of Good we impose upon ourselves, the ethic of the good, is a misrecognition of 
our true selves, the impossibility of a “perfect human,” and potentially violent (or perverse, 
obscene). As Rajchman says, this “requires another sort of passion than the one that 
follows from the supposition of a Good or an Ideal, and the relations of rivalry, mastery and 
identification such a supposition would carry with it” (17). Lacan’s difficulty was to connect 
the content of intellectual transmission to its manner of transmission—to wed style and 
content within the eros of the seminar. This was a difficulty of style that addressed “what it 
is to acquire and to impart knowledge of the unconscious” (16). 
For Foucault, as well as Lacan (and ultimately von Trier), the question of ethics 
comes down to a question of the costs of our decisions and how we experience these costs 
as an exclusionary discourse. This is what Blanchot meant in terms of discerning both a 
discourse and dis-course in which the discourse sets the conditions for what is outside of it, 
or what slips through its grasp of understanding. David Wellbury makes a similar argument 
when he says that Kittler’s discourse analysis, following Foucault’s lead, was not a matter 
of the content of discourse, but of the violence of exclusion that discourse itself introduces: 
“The object of study is not what is said or written but the fact—the brute and often brutal 
fact—that it is said, that this and not rather something else is inscribed” (Kittler, Discourse 
Networks xii). In the case of what is “intolerable” these costs would be measured in what 
cannot be attained through the deployment of forms of reason. Rajchman sees both Foucault 
and Lacan asking about ethics in terms of an economy of individual, social, and historical 
acceptability: “What are the ‘forms of rationality’ that secure our identity and delimit our 
possibilities [and] ‘how much does it cost Reason to tell the truth?’” (11). In other words, 
what does it cost us to act one way, and not another, or to inscribe one thing in the place of 
another? What is excluded by the losses and gains of these decisions?  
In connecting the ethical work of Foucault and Lacan, Rajchman tells us how 
Foucault once remarked that “[Lacan] tried to pose the question, which is historically a 
‘spiritual’ question: that of the cost the subject has to pay in order to say the true, and that of 
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the effect on the subject of the fact that he can say the true about himself” (14). This truth is 
what Charles Scott calls “games of truth” and “games of power” as catalysts for the uttering 
of phrases and subjects in dispute. The question of ethics is a question of costs and damages 
in the economy of “the new idiom.”8 I want to extend Rajchman’s analysis of the unique 
work of Foucault and Lacan as aesthetic expressions of a passion or eros of thought, which 
Rajchman links to the question of ethics, to the ethics of obstruction and the composition of 
the perfect human (Truth 4). Both Foucault and Lacan displayed a similar concern for self-
constitution within the framework of ethical inquiry. Although they did not collaborate in 
the same way as von Trier and Leth, their distinctive work does respond to the composition 
of the perfect human. Foucault and Lacan, von Trier and Leth, all express particular 
collaborative styles that respond to the uncertainty of identity by recoiling the question 
of ethics back into an expression of eros. These multivalent approaches to critical thought 
interweave form and content, figure and discourse, in a way that engages ethics as the frame 
for the event of creating obstructions. 
“Styles of Life”: Ethics and the Aesthetic Connection 
Foucault provides a bridge between the aesthetic matrix of written and visual 
composition and ethics as a kind of relay between image and viewer or community to 
which it extends. The movement in his later work away from his earlier writing methods 
is a shift that Deleuze perceives as a change in the aesthetic quality of Foucault’s style. 
Foucault himself does not discuss the aesthetics of his own work, yet his work does become 
immersed in rhetorics of living—what Deleuze calls “ways of existing” that form a link 
between ethics and aesthetics. This is a way of recovering the whole range of possible 
qualities from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics which amounts to what Foucault calls “styles 
of life” or ways in which we negotiate our subjectivity.9 Deleuze particularly perceived the 
aesthetic/ethical connection of Foucault’s projects as a way that Foucault performed his 
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own experiment. In an interview published in the book Negotiations Deleuze argues that, 
while moral codes put intentional constraints in order to judge based on certain values, 
Foucault’s project suggests,
ethics is a set of optional rules that assess what we do, what we say, in 
relation to the ways of existing involved. We say this, do that: what way of 
existing does it involve? There are things one can only do or say through 
a mean-spiritedness, a life based on hatred, or bitterness toward life. 
Sometimes it takes just one gesture or word. It’s the styles of life involved in 
everything that make us this or that. . . . What are we ‘capable’ of seeing, and 
saying (in the sense of uttering)? (100)
Here again we have the “uttering,” the new idiom or the background noise created not 
through resolution, but rather in the midst of difficulty and change. Deleuze claims 
that Foucault’s notion of subjectivization is not an issue of morality which “partakes in 
knowledge and power,” but is ethical and aesthetic in that it generates its own constraints 
based upon our individual capabilities (Negotiations 114). It is important to note that while 
for Deleuze ethics involve establishing constraints or parameters for living in particular 
ways, the optional rules of ethics differ from a morality in the judgment of value. Morality 
must look to the transcendent values of metaphysics in order to establish meaning. Ethics, 
on the other hand, understood as “styles of life” are attunements toward the contingencies 
of the subject which create particular relations to the self and community.
In a series of lectures at the Collége de France in 1981-1982 Foucault argues for 
a break in ethical thought from more ancient ways of subjective composition. In what he 
calls the “Cartesian moment” Foucault notes that there is a shift from the requirement for 
a mediating transformation to have access to truth to the subject itself as the immediate 
source of truth (the “know yourself” Socratic influence) (Hermeneutics 14). In other words, 
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access to truth moves away from fundamental transformation of the subject and toward an 
act of knowledge (15). For the purposes of obstruction and multimodal composition, the 
ethical shift of the “Cartesian moment” displaces the transformative possibilities of parergon 
and places an emphasis on the discourse of the mise en scène. The notion of “styles of life” is 
a way to requalify the transformation, or re-vision, in the place of the effects of knowledge. 
In the light of “styles of life” the idea of the perfect human retains its obstructive status of 
ethical inquiry. 
Foucault titled his third volume of The History of Sexuality “Care of the Self” as a 
hearkening back to Plato to reclaim the ancient Greek notion of chresis as an ethical and 
aesthetic notion of sexuality based on proper uses of pleasures. Caring for oneself stands in 
opposition to the Cartesian regime, and Foucault reintroduces desire as an essential and life-
affirming power as a way to take “care of the self” before one can “know oneself” (43). Care 
of the self (a spiritual attunement) replaced by epistemic grasp of knowledge allows direct 
access to objects. In the visual composition of a cinematic scene, mise en scène descended 
from a Cartesian understanding of epistemic objects. This is how Foucault can argue 
repeatedly for a “style of life” which is not epistemic in the Cartesian sense and emphasizes 
rather ethics related to the ethos of “cultivation of the self” or the establishment of an ethos 
in relation to the self first and subsequently extending out toward the community (89). The 
connection between ethics and style or aesthetics is important in learning to care for the 
self. Arnold Davidson points out that “when Foucault says that the problem of an ethics is 
the problem of ‘a form [style] to be given to one’s conduct and one’s life,’ he does in fact link 
the notions of ethics and style of life in a conceptually intimate way.” (125) Care and desire 
are clearings inextricably linked in ethical “styles of life”; something that was not lost on 
Lacan in his own ethics of transmissions and pedagogical eros.
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Lacan’s Difficulty: The Sinthome and the Seminar
In Lacan’s work, desire is opposed to the very moral prescriptions of notions of Good 
and Ideal, in that we act counter to our desires and in so acting are not saved from feelings 
of guilt, anxiety, or internal neuroses. In his Ethics of Psychoanalysis Lacan reveals how these 
repressed desires form “an unconscious theme, the very articulation of that which roots 
us in a particular destiny, and that destiny demands insistently that the debt be paid, and 
desire keeps coming back, keeps returning, and situates us once again in a given track, the 
track of something is specifically our business” (392-3). Desire is the hidden meaning of our 
repeated actions that analysis seeks to reveal to itself; it offers itself as a destiny not in the 
way of telos, but in that we find ourselves unable to evade—we cannot not act, “forced” to 
decide.
 The term “act” in Lacan’s nomenclature cannot be equated with the mere “tasks to 
be done” that Agamben sees in the wake of determining substance and destiny. It is a shift in 
obligation—to act implies a choice of actions within a set of alternatives. As an interpreter 
of Lacan, Slavoj Žižek identifies this shift in obligation in the difference between must and 
ought, in which we understand that which we must do after deliberation and conscious 
decision “while remaining uncertain about it, and still very clearly seeing the powerful 
merits of alternative courses” (Parallax 49). According to Žižek then, to act is a realization 
of our limits and an acknowledgment that we must act because we “cannot do anything but 
this”; the individual is ultimately responsible, by placing themselves within the restrictive 
positions, for the destiny of the act (49). We act on desire and then desire acts upon us, and 
we cannot but respond. This is because of the polymorphous character of desire and its 
radical tendency toward excess. 
 Lacan’s difficulty came in the form of the pedagogical transmission of knowledge 
of the unconscious—the seminar as a discursive site for the unconscious. He rejected 
any recourse to moral codes based on universal concepts of the Good and the Ideal. 
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These disavow the role of desire in coming to ethical decisions. Additionally there are 
costs involved in repressing desire, in physical and mental neuroses as well as missed 
opportunities and possibilities. In one particular passage of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
Lacan performs his difficulty as an examination of this question of ethics:
Opposed to the pole of desire is traditional 
ethics—not completely, of course, for nothing 
is new, or everything is new, in human thought. 
That’s something I wanted to make you feel 
by choosing the example of the antithesis 
of the tragic hero in a tragedy, an antithesis 
who nevertheless embodies a certain heroic 
quality, and that is Creon. With reference to this 
example, I spoke to you of the service of goods 
that is the position of traditional ethics. The 
cleaning up of desire, modesty, temperateness, 
that is to say the middle path we see articulated 
so remarkably in Aristotle; we need to know 
what it takes the measure of and whether its 
measure is founded on something. (386)
 He makes reference to Aristotle’s “golden mean” and its utility to direct action and 
questions its grounding, its fundamental premise as a measurable object. But Lacan is also 
attempting to find a new “utterances” to convey not just an idea, but a feeling. This is an idea 
that Lacan wishes to make his students “feel” through the ethos of the tragic hero; how does 
one communicate the idea of desire, which itself resists communication? Desire deploys an 
excess of communication, and Lacan responds through appeals through various “styles.” 
Desire
Ethics
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 This response is an ethical act for Lacan, inasmuch as he acknowledges the difficulty 
of transmission and follows his desire: he declares, “I wanted to make you feel.” Feeling 
here is an appeal to pathos, to emotion, but also to bios, to the body and the flow of physical 
desires of the body. Žižek sees this appeal to the uncertainty of desire as a demonstration of 
Lacan’s notion of the sinthome: “in contrast to symptom which is a cipher of some repressed 
meaning, sinthome has no determinant meaning; it just gives body, in its repetitive pattern, 
to some elementary matrix of jouissance, of excessive enjoyment. Although sinthomes 
do not have sense, they do radiate jouis-sense, enjoy-meant” (Enjoy Your Symptom! 226). 
Sinthome is a radically excessive patterning of pleasure; it is a “sense” without possessing 
sense or hermeneutic meaning, except in its meant-to-be-enjoyed, or an excess accepted in 
the place of repression or negation. 
Lacan uses his seminar to retain an ironic sense of the term “ethics” as a way of 
revealing the problems of ethics, and opposing an expression of ethics to Aristotle’s “good” 
as a “Sovereign Good,” as a kind of fictional justification that can give substance to an 
experience of subjectivity. The image of the ideal subject, a subject firmly positioned within 
an order of truth, must inevitably fall under the weight of such demands.9 I mention “fall” 
here to echo Leth’s image of the perfect man who falls at the end of the film, but also fall as 
the action of failing and which must project the illusion of success in order to continue its 
own hallucination, that of the pleasure principle. We are back to the notion that satisfactions 
here are a kind of obstruction to reaching that self-actualized sovereign subject, an ideal 
formed from negation and which is itself the very structure of obstruction.10 Obstructions 
then take the character of discrete and bounded terms of a general discursive enframing.
The frame as obstruction, or dis-enclosure, cannot be separated from the image 
as the absolute limit to representation. Lacan frames ethics in the image of the exposed 
king defined by the absence of clothes he nonetheless believes to be present: “If the king 
is, in fact, naked, it is only insofar as he is so beneath a certain number of clothes—no 
doubt fictitious but nevertheless essential to his nudity” (17). Here we are treading lightly 
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around the negative, so to speak, as an obstruction to perceiving that space of nothing, the 
excluded place of the Real as constituting the generative gap of obstructions that von Trier 
and Leth find themselves composing around. Lacan suggest, “the question of ethics is to be 
articulated from the point of view of the location of man in relation to the real” (14). In other 
words, to be concerned with the frame, the human relations which situate perspective and 
valuation, is to enter the domain of the ethical, not only in terms of representation but as a 
cultivation of the self as a return to ethos.
The Dis-Enclosure of the Frame
With the second obstruction von Trier raises the stakes of the game by introducing 
an ethical dilemma. No longer is Leth required to simply transgress his formal tendencies 
and experiment with different visual styles. Von Trier goes for the throat by setting up a 
false ethical choice: shoot the next film in what Leth deems “the most miserable place,” but 
not be able to show it. For von Trier the issue at hand is the possibility of the absent milieu 
to leave a trace on what is present within the images of the film. He is looking for nothing 
less than an acknowledgement from Leth of the impossibility of the request, and for the 
master’s ultimate submission to the student. For Leth the obstruction is a personal torture, 
a test of sorts, of his cinematic abilities. What discourages Leth is that the game of skill that 
he had entered was now suddenly something else that he could not control. His response 
to von Trier is to reassert his formal prowess by creating a formal solution to the ethical 
dilemma.
When Leth and von Trier use the word “obstruction” they are not speaking of the 
same thing. There is, in a sense, a lack of stasis between understandings of obstruction 
insofar as it becomes a strategy for productive collaboration within the film. While Leth 
accepts the obstructions as challenges to overcome it becomes increasingly clear that von 
Trier will settle for nothing less than Leth’s absolute and total failure. Both of these views 
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hinge on a misinterpretation of the project and its relation to Leth’s original film The Perfect 
Human. For Leth’s film human perfection is attained only insofar as it can be estranged 
from itself within a knowledge economy, that perfection is given over from knowledge 
about what it means to be perfect and how those qualities correspond to the human being. 
Humanity and perfection face each other from different sides of the coin of finitude. Von 
Trier’s constant drive toward failure rejects the premise of perfection from the outset to 
force a moment of transformation. The obstructions for Von Trier are not an entrance into a 
dialogue about human finitude, but a fiery furnace of challenges to prepare the conditions to 
reveal that finitude within this discourse of perfection. 
The first chapter accepted the challenge The Five Obstructions makes toward 
cinematic images by considering images in their cinematic possibilities. Rather than trying 
to consider images outside of the cinematic, or vice versa, as a strictly ontological move, 
what I have discussed in terms of the cinematic cut is the opening of the enclosure of the 
self-referentiality of film images. In “the distribution of the sensible” Ranciére identifies 
a structure from which images appear vis á vis established ways of knowing and making. 
Ranciére is particularly concerned for the political and social aspects as distributions of the 
sensible are community built strategies for articulating meaning or significance (Politics 13). 
Through these strategies meaning and mode have already been determined beforehand as a 
The Perfect Human
The Perfect Human: Bombay
The Perfect Human: Revision
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social construct. Even the so-called avant-garde emerges as an aesthetic possibility because 
the ability for the violation of certain rules and restrictions surface as a condition of the 
sensible: sense creates the conditions for nonsense. 
What about the creation of sense itself? This would mean that communities develop 
these strategies in response to purely interior forces as a continuum of self-referentiality, 
and that these strategies are themselves only constitutive from within the enclosure of 
their own system. Surely these communities must respond to exterior forces outside of 
the sensible in order to sustain the sensible. These responses prompt shifts in regimes and 
indicate a destabilization of the accepted notions (disagreement?) of discursive practices 
and suggests that what used to be regarded as sense (sensation, sensible) is now the 
nonsense from which a new sense will emerge.11 The nexus of sense and nonsense reveals a 
crisis that I will argue speaks to a crisis of ethos and its relationship to practice. leaving open 
the question of how should one live within the enclosures of particular ways of being. What 
are the possible lines of flight in-scribed and de-scribed within the ethical realm of images?  
If the obstructions or the concept of obstructions as related through von Trier and Leth’s 
film lead us to consider such questions it is because the image that develops from them is 
not only aesthetic or political, it is acutely ethical as well.
I have attempted to think obstruction as it emerges from the film as the exterior 
force upon a particular regime which demands a response from the community. Indeed, 
not all challenges to the sensible result in a complete shift of meanings and values. Yet 
the implication of such obstructions or restrictions on the current regime is that systems 
of representation must function as a totality of referentiality. This is how Jean-Luc Nancy 
defines “closure” as a completion of the totalizing task of the metaphysical regime (Dis-
enclosure 6). What Nancy discovers is that these systems lay the groundwork for their own 
self-overcoming, or dis-enclosure, by including in their totalizing models what the system 
must exclude, that is the exterior forces that shape the accepted strategies from which 
regimes emerge. For Nancy, this is possible because  
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 the movement of thought, insofar as it cannot think the maximum of the   
  being is to able to think, but thinks also in excess to that maximum, since   
  thought is capable of thinking even that there is something that exceeds its   
  power to think. In other words, thinking . . . can think—indeed, cannot  
  not think—that it thinks something in excess over itself. It penetrates the 
 impenetrable, or rather is penetrated by it (11). 
By thinking in terms of closure or the limits of thought we also think the excess of that limit, 
that there is something beyond the frame which escapes the closure of thought. 
What I am arguing here in terms of cinematic images and multimodal composition is that the mise-en-scéne is not enclosed because its construction relies on the frame. The 
edges of the image, the screen, and the shot imply the excess of the image, the frame as 
what defines the composition of images but which itself is positioned beyond its own frame 
of reference. There are, of course, ethical implications to how images are composed. It is 
a matter of aesthetic and political judgment what is allowed within the frame and what 
remains on the outside, which speaks to the virtue of the space of composition. 
One’s Own: Ethos and Collaboration
My concern in this chapter has been to explore the possibilities of obstructions to 
provide multimodal composition with the conditions for ethical inquiry. This concern comes 
from the collaborative conflict displayed by von Trier and Leth that leads to Leth’s failure to 
provide a successful response to the second obstruction. In his failure, however, Leth leaves 
the familiar territory of is established patterns and beliefs and confronts strange external 
forces which serve to transform his own “styles of life.” What was once most proper to the 
image of the perfect human, an image that Leth had created, becomes foreign and strange. 
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In his discussion of the lapse of Heidegger’s ethical thought, Scott points out that although 
ethos is considered to be “one’s own,” or what is most familiar or proper to the individual, is 
not what is proper. Ethos is what is recalcitrant or inherently resistant to the proper places 
demanded by nomos (Question 144-5). To concern oneself with the question of ethics rather 
than ethics in general is to realize that ethics is already questionable in its relation to the 
field of ethos. Ethos is at home in its strangeness, in that it has no home as a proper place 
constantly enframed by nomos. To understand ethos as recalcitrant is to recognize that 
uncertainty of ethics, its constant recoiling movement.
The ethics of obstruction refers to an undecidability of how to respond to the 
obligation of response. There can be no resolution precisely because there is no proper 
response or corrective to the difficulty of the obligation; one’s most own is that which is 
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least proper to the individual. This is what Caputo means in Against Ethics when he asserts 
that “Undecidability does not detract from the urgency of decision; it simply underlines 
its difficulty” (4). Despite the difficulty of ethical inquiry, Caputo sees a tendency in ethics 
to “keep this or any other scandal, stumbling block to reason and intelligibility, at a safe 
remove. Ethics wants to keep its good name, to keep its house in order” (7). If ethical 
understanding would remove the obstructions to truth, as the Cartesian regime removed the 
transformative requirement to access truth, then ethics is itself the ultimate obstruction to 
the concept of multimodal composition. 
The obstructions that follow the second will respond to the fixed image of the 
perfect human and Leth’s failed attempt to express its ethical difficulty in The Perfect 
Human: Bombay. Leth’s stumbling block, his fall, his ethical failure, succeeds as von Trier 
embraces the scandal as the conditions for punishment. In the next chapter I will examine 
von Trier’s unique approach to Leth’s punishment by withdrawing, rather than engaging, 
from the limiting factors of obstruction and offering Leth the opportunity to create what he 
calls a “free-style” film. The reduced role of obstruction emphasizes more, as Caputo argued, 
the difficulty of responding to its urgency.
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Chapter Three
The Freedom of Obstruction
101
Breaking the Rules: A Free Style
The third obstruction on The Five Obstructions is imposed on Jørgen Leth by his 
collaborator Lars von Trier as a punishment for his refusal to obey the rules in the Bombay 
film. Leth is castigated for ignoring von Trier’s insistence to shoot the second film in 
what Leth would consider the most miserable place in the world without showing it and 
following his ethical drive to visually include the poverty of Bombay’s red light district. 
The punishment, interestingly, is a choice: either return to Bombay and fix the problem 
(which he refuses) or make a “free-style” film. Leth struggles with the open possibilities 
suddenly free of obstruction from von Trier. In the wake of his failure in India and faced with 
an unguided revision of The Perfect Human, Leth feels the weight of freedom becoming a 
creative burden and is never completely free from his own prescriptive expectations. 
In this chapter I will look at the responsibility of freedom in conjunction with 
revision and the suspension of the obstruction model as a penalty for Leth’s ethical 
violation. I will argue that the “free-style” revision is never free from a dictation of style 
and that a withdrawal from a list of rules can productively disrupt a static transference 
of obstructions and responses by exposing the pedagogical relationship to necessary 
violations of the collaborative contract.  This discussion will inevitably lead to the design 
of an obstructions model that can facilitate new understandings between students and 
instructors about their roles in pedagogical relationships. 
Defocusist: “The Story Is the Villain”
- It was not the film I asked for.
- I’ll be damned! Let’s hear 
why not.
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After his old mentor successfully navigates the obstructions of the first film, The 
Perfect Human: Cuba, von Trier is somewhat disappointed in the outcome and confesses, 
“One always feels furious when it turns out there are solutions.” When he accuses Leth 
of violating the terms of the obstruction in the second film von Trier leaps at the chance 
to penalize Leth’s careless judgment. Because it does not follow the demands of the 
obstruction, The Perfect Human: Bombay must be revised into a valid response. “I’m sorry, 
Jørgen, but I am going to have to speak harshly,” he informs Leth, “It was not the film I asked 
for.” When Leth explains that he interpreted the rules “loosely” von Trier serves up his 
verdict that the director will have to return and reshoot the film in Mumbai. 
What happens next demonstrates the ethical mediality of the collaborative context 
from which the obstruction assignments arise, or that the frame of reference for the second 
film can now change as von Trier must respond to Leth’s resistance. Von Trier offers Leth 
the chance to return to the “scene” of the most miserable place in the world and recreate the 
film, this time strictly following the rules of the game. Leth, however, steadfastly refuses to 
revisit the scene of his crime. In response to the subsequent impasse between the two, von 
Trier decides to issue his punishment to Leth in the form of a choice: return and reshoot, or 
make a different film without any rules. The request is translated as a “free style” film, which 
One of  the rules I 
asked for was that 
we shouldn’t see 
those people.
Yes, but I interpreted 
that loosely.
The whole idea 
was that we mustn’t 
see them.I thought it was a 
highly successful 
balancing act.
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is, nevertheless, a misnomer of sorts; the finished film has the most stylized composition 
thus far. 
The result of the free-style condition is that in The Perfect Human: Brussels Leth 
is allowed to return to his habitus, or to the aesthetic and technical strategies that he has 
mastered and with which he feels the most comfortable. Relieved of the need to stick to the 
obstruction, the third film loses the struggle of revision between Leth, von Trier, and the 
obstructions. The paradox of “free-style” is that the focus of the project, the ultimate framing 
of the obstructions, the investigation of “the perfect human,” is buried underneath excessive 
stylization. The freedom of style actually promotes an excess of style that de-focuses the 
figure of the perfect human as the original object of study. The ethical challenge of the 
second film presented both von Trier and Leth the opportunity of revising their goals for 
the project. Von Trier withdrew the demands of the obstructions to allow Leth a choice, and 
Leth had to express “the perfect human” without external framing from von Trier. 
The “free style” penalty that von Trier imposes on Leth in the third film could be 
It’s a marvelous film.
 I love it.
But I don’t think it 
followed the rules.
Obviously this is a sophistic game.
- I put up a screen 
and screened off  
this bit of  real life.
- I do understand. 
And this film is 
most likely much 
better . . .  
That’s what you 
mustn’t do. You 
always try to be 
too good.
This is therapy, 
not a film 
competition with 
yourself.
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thought ethically as a frame that focuses the mise-en-scène. Free-style as an absence of 
obstructions is given no focus except the style itself. Von Trier had already envisioned the 
idea of “defocus” as an anti-narrative concept which he expressed with his participation in the Dogme 95 collective. In a passage he wrote as part of his objectives for the experiment of 
The Five Obstructions, von Trier explains his vision of the defocusist as a call for peripheral 
vision for those who would resist the demands of narrative:
The story is the villain. The theme presented at the 
expense of all decency. But also the case in which 
a point’s importance is presumably submitted 
for the audience to evaluate, assisted by 
viewpoints and facts counterbalanced by 
their antitheses. 
The worship of pattern, the one and 
only, at the expense of the subject 
matter from which it comes. How do 
we rediscover it, and how do we impart or describe 
it? The ultimate challenge of the future—to see 
without looking: to defocus! In a world where the media kneel before the 
altar of sharpness, draining life out of life in the process, the DEFOCUSIST 
will be the communicators of our era—more, nothing less! (Danish Film 
Institute 31)
Even here von Trier composes his view of “defocus” in terms of “the ultimate challenge,” 
as a vision without vision. If the obstruction of the third film is to be denied the safety of a 
focused assignment, then the focus (what von Trier refers to as the “subject matter”) is what 
frames the scene. Freedom from style becomes constrained to style.
105
It is important to keep in mind that the directive to make a “free-style” film was a 
penalty, not a reward, for Leth’s ethical indulgences of the second film. In the context of 
obstruction responses, creative freedom encourages the composer to become a defocusist 
because the rules that would limit the scope of a project and provide a frame of reference 
for the subject matter is suddenly absent. In the absence of an imposed frame the composer 
must confront unfamiliar territory without the benefit of a clear (focused) subject. 
Faced with this absence the tendency of ethos is to return to habitus, or to that which is 
most familiar, to fill the void. This ethical dimension to the struggle with obstructions is 
problematic because ethos itself is a recoiling term. 
It’d be deadly to do the 
same thing again.Make the same film again, 
but with a background
  -You’ve put me in a spot.                                   -I don’t want to. I can’t.            
- What should the punishment be?
- I can’t say. I prefer you to make the decisions.
- So make a film with no rules from me!
Yes, and your punishment is to make 
a free-style film.
- I don’t like it. I’d rather have some-
thing to hang onto.
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In Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, film scholar David Bordwell formulates 
the urge toward the familiar as the terms of discourse when he writes, “when interpreting 
films, critics follow a set of craft-like reasoning routines which do not depend on any 
abstract theory” (26). The focused object is the justification for the hermeneutic impulse 
that attempts to deny “the question of ethics” by binding representation to sets of 
prescribed codes. Bordwell asks, “Must a theory prove its validity through interpretations 
of particular [images]?” (26). The “Post-Theory” that Bordwell invokes is not a rejection of 
theoretical discourses, but a revision of what it means to compose and discuss cinematic 
images apart from fulfilling a place within pre-determined hermeneutic frameworks. 
Bordwell’s project attempts to “defocus” the discourses of cinematic images to reposition 
the frames of reference and see the images rather than just their interpretations. 
I would argue, however, that Bordwell challenges the frames of academic discourses 
only to refocus the image into his own fields of inquiry, including aesthetic and historical 
categories. It is difficult to defend a position of post-theory without instituting a theoretical 
structure. The ethical urge to focus, to return to a proper form, is drawn from the uncertain 
status of the mise-en-scène as a discourse that can be defined. Every mise-en-scène (or 
horizon of composition) contains a multitude of media and modes for which not all can 
be accounted. All media are multimedia and all modes are multimodal. To compose as a 
transversal process that cuts across media and modalities is to continually place and replace 
images within sets of unstable frames of reference. 
Composition work is much like “the work of condensation” that Sigmund Freud 
described in The Interpretation of Dreams as part of the expression of dream content. 
Condensation is the phenomenon in which the image information of a dream evades 
complete interpretation because the sparseness of these elements betrays their infinite 
complexity, or in Freud’s word, “indeterminable” (212).  The “indefinite quota” of image 
signification is a result of the excess (radical access) of images. Freud explains: “one might 
suppose that condensation proceeds by way of exclusion, for the dream is . . . an exceedingly 
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incomplete and fragmentary reproduction” (214). Interpretations of these images can 
only be based on what he calls a “mediating common factor,” namely, a middle element 
that acts as the semiotic bridge in a composite figure. This mediating factor negotiates the 
excessiveness of the image—the ob/scenity of parergon is that images must be restrained 
against the excessive force of the scene. Mise-en-scène includes within itself the conditions 
of the “ob/scene” or an excess of signification that stands against a scene or image as a 
completely static representational formation.
The defocused image, peripheral vision, disrupts this static structure of 
representation. This disruption of representational discourses happens on the level of visual 
composition, or the mise-en-scène, where the work of condensation emerges from the frame 
of the scene. This disruption is what I will call the “ob/scene” as the potential rhetorical 
styles and forms from without the scene that can inform a revision of the composition. The 
ob/scene always haunts the mise-en-scène in that, as Jean-Luc Nancy suggested in the case 
of representation, its absence implies its presence.1 The significance in visual composition is 
always excessive, rather than simply representative. It is excess, or obscenity, that constantly 
threatens to overtake meaning with other modes of expression. The ob/scene could also 
be conceived in terms of Jean Baudrillard’s fourth phase of the image in which the image 
“is no longer in the order of appearance at all, but of simulation” (12). The hyper-real, 
however, tends toward the totality of the “desert of the real.” The ob/scene is not of the 
order of the singular, the sacrament, but of the multiplication of sacraments. The banquet 
scene of The Perfect Human performs a sacrament of images and meanings with no quota of 
condensation. The excessive quality of the banquet, not only in terms of its opulent content 
but also in its parallel to the obscenity of perfection, was also the reason it was so important 
to von Trier that it be reenacted against a background of excessive misery.
Baudrillard himself is critical about the notion of the obscene which he posits 
as an “endless, unbridled proliferation of the social, of the political, of information, of 
the economic, of the aesthetic, not to mention, of course, the sexual” (“The End of the 
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Millennium” 451). Neil Leach reads Baudrillard here as commenting on this act of seeing as 
surface vision or mere representation: “the process of reading an object as a mere image, 
that object is emptied of much of its original meaning. The image is all there is” (5). For 
Leach it is the act of surface seeing—aestheticizing—that bloats and depoliticizes the image. 
In short, obscenity is an excess equated with obesity and bloatedness. The ob/scene image 
plays on what Roland Barthes called the obtuse sense that is related to excess but resists 
articulation or a complete account. The ob/scene is the sensation of non-sense.
Perfection/Recoil
Socrates, practice music.
(Friedrich Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy 93)
In the second chapter we saw 
through the eyes of our esteemed ethical 
guides Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault 
the difficulty in establishing the ideals of a 
“perfect human” or a discourse of correct 
compositional models. This is not to simply state that there can be no perfect model to living 
a good or ethical life; there can be no perfection. It seems to me that this assessment has 
become somewhat of a naive platitude; neither Lacan nor Foucault allows us this comforting 
nihilist approach. Instead they approach ethics as the opportunity afforded by the failure 
or finitude of human beings. It is not an occasion to escape the question of identity or ethos, 
but, as John Rajchman notes, it is an opportunity to face the difficulty of “how to be ‘at home’ 
in a world where our identity is not given” (144).
Rajchman indicates that the shift from comfort to difficulty (from the perfect to the 
human) that Lacan and Foucault recognize is a matter of exchange that would suggest that 
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ethics operates on the level of various economies (10). But we must remember that he is 
defending eros as a shifting field of desires rather than ethics as a stable set of principles, 
and so the question is not about simple exchange values (1:1 ratios). For Foucault it is about the intolerable, or at what point are “we are still willing to tolerate the violence we do to 
ourselves [in order to constitute ourselves]” (12). So something is lost in our refusal to face 
the difficulty of subjectivity. For Lacan this loss drives the need or desire (das ding) that is 
not part of the system of needs. In Rajchman’s mind this is what makes the unconscious 
ethical: it is not structured as a language, but rather an event that lies beyond the grasp 
of discourse (21). In both instances ethics has little to do with universal signifiers and 
everything to do with the limits and possibilities manifested through obstructions. 
 Deploying images in various modes of composition somehow challenge their own 
significance or ethos; they indeed get in the way of their own understanding. In our current 
nomenclature we could say that images operate as their own obstructions. Any discussion 
of ethics cannot completely avoid the negative, and even an ethic grounded in the hope for 
the perfection of the human figure must confront human failings. In The Rhetoric of Religion 
Kenneth Burke explains the need for the possibility of failure in ethics when he links action 
to character “which involves choice” and that although “sheer ‘motion’ is non-ethical, ‘action’ 
implies the ethical (the human personality)” (41).  For Burke the ethical arises out of choice, 
and for humans these amount to the role of perfection in defining what it is to be human, 
arising out of language. 
Human beings, under the influence of signs, hold a stake in the telos of 
representations. Burke traces the teleology of “perfection” back to entelechy in Aristotle 
in which “each being aims at the perfection natural to its kind” so that there is an impulse 
toward human perfection, and this perfection is pure in itself; it has no need of additional 
beings (Language 17). The movement here is clearly from the human to the perfect; there 
is no sense, however, for what exactly is involved in this perfection. Purity of substance? 
A completion of movement? Of being? The impulse for perfection is far easier to identify 
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than the actual state of perfection, if indeed it exists. Instead, Burke secures the symbolic 
possibilities of perfection within our systems of representation, and this means that the 
term can be used ironically, as in his oft-quoted phrase that man is “rotten with perfection” (Language 18). This means that there can be a “perfect fool” or a “perfect villain” or even 
a “perfect enemy” (18). The movement that von Trier so desperately demands from the 
movement of perfection back to the human is his perfectly focused impulse to break Leth’s 
misplaced trust in his own images. 
What has been taking shape around the first two obstructions is the opening up 
of the irony of the perfect image. Leth will accept each obstruction and always respond in 
some particular way that will fulfill the demands of the rules without exception. Leth has 
perfect control of his medium; he is the perfect filmmaker. At the same time we have seen 
nothing in the making of each obstruction but Leth’s human-ness, his weaknesses, and his 
desire to gain complete control of his projects. Take for example Leth’s thoughts on having 
to cut each shot to no more than 12 frames in the first obstruction: “No edit more than 12 
frames long. . . . Damn it, it’s totally destructive. What the hell does he expect me to do? He’s 
ruining it from the start. It’ll be a spastic film.” Of course, he does not divulge his feelings 
to von Trier at the screening of The Perfect Human: Cuba. Instead he agrees with von Trier 
that the inclusion of this particular rule was a “gift,” implying that the obstruction that he 
had claimed would “ruin” the film from the very beginning facilitated the film’s successful 
revision. The perfect obstruction finds success in the struggle of the collaborative context. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche writes, “We talk so abstractly about poetry because 
all of us are usually bad poets” (64). I will rephrase this in light of the current conversation 
and affirm that it is because we discuss poetry in such abstract terms that we are indeed 
perfect poets in this ironic sense. Nietzsche traces the figures of Apollo and Dionysus as 
a way to illustrate the impropriety of defining principles through a perfect bifurcation 
of the creative impulse. There is an Apollonian tendency in the drive for perfection, the 
idealization of human representations. Burke sees this perfection directly attached to 
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language manifested in the “mere desire to name something by its ‘proper’ name, or to 
speak a language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically ‘perfectionist’” (Rhetoric of Religion 
16).  The Dionysian image, however, would not be concerned with language, its expression 
would be music, and thus it has an uneasy relationship with perfection. The image of Apollo, 
the “shining one” or “deity of light” as described by Nietzsche, is the beautiful illusion: the 
dream experience. 
If Nietzsche presents Apollo as the figure of dreaming illusions, then Dionysus 
represents the intoxicated excess of the sublime. Nietzsche explains how the genuine poet 
demonstrate a vivid-ness—an urge, an irrepressible desire “to speak out of other bodies 
and souls” (Birth of Tragedy 64) that was a manifestation of Dionysian perversity. Nietzsche 
associates Dionysus with the image of the artistic Socrates who, visited with the dream to 
practice his music, realizes the limits of the intelligible (93). Even Socrates, on his deathbed, 
must make the transversal move across the human horizon. 
It seems, at times, that Nietzsche extols the benefits of the Dionysian intoxication 
as a way to counteract the overexposure of the perfection of the Apollonian dream. He 
defends his position by explaining that in the Apollonian tendency, “despite all its beauty 
and moderation, [its] entire existence rested on a hidden substratum of suffering and of 
knowledge, revealed to him by the Dionysian. And behold: Apollo could not live without 
Dionysus! The ‘titanic’ and the ‘barbaric’ were in the last analysis as necessary as the 
Apollonian” (46). In his introduction to the essay, translator Walter Kauffman points out 
that the link between the two is the brutality of creative force, “that the achievements of the 
Greeks . . . cannot be understood adequately so long as we do not realize what potentially 
destructive forces had to be harnessed to make them possible” (10). The argument here is 
that, rather than having to withstand the violence of excess and unintelligibility, these forces 
are deployed by the freedom of creative thought and action. Whether it be the negation 
of exclusion and definition or the perversity of sense and sensation, both are bound to 
performing the recoiling movement from the human to the perfect and back again. 
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The Ob/Scene (a primal scene?)2
 
 So if Nietzsche has the benefit of the artistic Socrates then we need our own figure 
for the restrictive composing freedom of obstructions, one that I have been arguing for the 
extent of this project, which performs the same ethical recoiling movement of the image 
and which recognizes the excesses of perversity and intelligibility within the same image. 
What we are “aiming” for3 is a way to include both tendencies. It is within this spirit of 
the ob/scene that I mentioned von Trier’s manifesto call for the “defocusist” who would 
“see without looking,” ignoring patterns and narratives to reclaim what has been lost to 
mise-en-scène. It is significant that, rather than romanticizing the benefits of improved 
technology or access to technology, von Trier falls back on an old cinematic device to usher 
in the communicators of the future, who will wield the focus lens as a weapon for the image 
against the tyranny of looking. This is the ob-scenity of Leth’s punishment for his sins of the 
second film; essentially, he must create a defocused image in the directive for a “free style” 
film. It is not the defocused image, however, that offers the directive of creative freedom. The 
directive comes from the figure of obstruction that demands the new film response to be 
perfectly liberated from von Trier’s demands. 
What I mean by obstruction has conceptually formed directly out of The Five 
Obstructions, but as we have seen even within this film the obstruction model has taken 
on various configurations; its presence shifting from illustrative to authoritative, but 
always uncertain. This uncertainty takes on an identity of contingency in the form of the 
obstructions or challenges which anchor the film. Obstructions come from the figural in that 
they are interruptive forces of uncertainty and demand, out of uncertainty, a response. To 
differentiate between Lyotard’s discursive and figural, D. N. Rodowick explains in Reading 
the Figural that the latter “operates in another dimension, that of unconscious desire, and 
returns to discourse as an infernal repetition, the force of transgression” (12). Obstructions 
constantly return discourse to the distortion and perversion of the figural through what 
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Lyotard called an “other scene.” Within the project of revision, obstructions function as 
a constant force of desire or purpose that disregard the typical conventions of a static 
scene and call for immediate responses. Lyotard’s “other scene” is ob/scene, emphasizing 
its standing as operating from the outside the scene or image, and also as a force of 
irrepressible perversity and dissonance.
 While the word obstruct suggests standing in the way of the object, the Latin prefix 
“ob” refers to something against or toward. I am thinking here of the idea of a midwife as 
obstetrician, not in a specifically medical sense but from the Latin “to stand by”—standing 
in anticipation of the crowning infant.4 This is not 
the image of violent opposition, but of uncertainty, of 
hesitation before the moment of separation. Mother 
and child are one and there is no inside or outside; the 
midwife stands poised on the margins of the frame of the 
birthing body as the scene of impending severance. She 
is the obstruction in the moment of ecstasis not because 
she is the originator of the spectacle, but as the witness 
to scene. In this way obstruction retains the generative 
significance of the idea of against and toward, while 
retaining somewhat the ethical notion of difficulty and 
conflict within a recoiling movement.  
The perversity of obstetrics in standing by is 
the impossible performance of maintaining both intimacy and distance from the scene. The 
witness is already an excessive figure in the primal scene, but it is from this position that 
the dissonance of the scene originates. The crowning moment of anticipation before infant 
and mother become divided bodies is obscene in that it hovers between the expected and 
the unexpected. Maurice Blanchot describes a primal scene in Writing of the Disaster when 
a child raises his jaded eyes from the vision of his everyday space “toward the ordinary sky, 
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with clouds, grey light—pallid daylight without depth” (72). In the instant of the distorted 
vision the boy sees/seizes:
the sky, the same sky, suddenly open, absolutely black and absolutely empty, 
revealing (as though the pane had broken) such an absence that all has 
since always and forevermore been lost therein—so lost that therein is 
affirmed and dissolved the vertiginous knowledge that nothing is that there 
is, and first of all nothing beyond. The unexpected aspect of this scene (its 
interminable feature) is the feeling of happiness that submerges the child, 
the ravaging joy to which he can bear witness only by tears, an endless flood 
of tears. He is thought to suffer a childish sorrow; attempts are made to 
console him. He says nothing. He will live henceforth in the secret. He will 
weep no more.   (72)
Raising an eye toward the expected and encountering the unexpected occurs from 
an excessive looking from a standing outside of looking: the ob/scene. In Blanchot’s scene 
the boy is irrelevant to the presence of the sky and the clouds; he is necessarily irrelevant 
for the sublime to it have its affect. What does affect the scene is its unexpectedness in both 
its challenge to discourse (he says nothing) and to sense (tears of joy). The process of image 
composition is ob/scene when it must perform the authority of both distance and intimacy 
from within the context of an object from a position outside of the (primal?) scene, and, 
whether considered textual or visual, must face the unexpected challenge to discourse and 
sense. 
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A PRIMAL SCENE 
(in two parts)
FADE IN:
EXT. FRONT LAWN SUBURBAN HOME – LATE EVENING
The boy, SETH, is about 4 years old. He is pointing toward the 
sky, the same sky, at an airplane as it slowly cuts a line across 
the boundless space. The rapid movement of his arm obstructs his 
view of the flight path (as though the pane had been broken) and 
he wonders if he shall ever find that plane again — that it is not 
his arm that has moved the heavens. 
His brother JOSH, 6 years old, is talking to his DAD who is 
holding a video camera.
JOSH
I like to climb trees. I 
like to climb on the  
basketball court. Hello my 
name is Josh— bye-bye.
JOSH moves out of the way to allow his brother a turn to answer. 
As SETH answers his vision is broken.
SETH 
Hiya! This is . . . my 
name is Josh.
Laughter interrupts the spell of the scene. The plane is gone.
Hiya! My name is . . . hahahaha!
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The Fictions We Write
The distortion of the defocusist does not only result from the unexpected use of 
a strictly cinematic function. Besides, to defocus one aspect of a scene only pulls focus to 
another aspect. If an image is blurry you will notice that flaw. The longer an image, a shot, 
or a scene continues unfocused the more likely it will reveal the colors, shapes, and patterns 
within the frame. The frame may even begin to take shape. One could argue that avant-
garde and experimental films like Stan Brackage’s Dog Star Man (1962) were thinking in 
terms of defocusing narrative aspects to create abstract images. The difference between the 
experimental images of Brackage and von Trier’s defocusist is that von Trier does not want 
to replace narrative with a notion of pure image. Instead he makes the story the villain and 
insists on engaging it as an ethical pursuit. 
The defocusist does not break free of story because he is still anchored to his own 
self-sustaining fictions. Jacques Lacan thought of identity and trauma in terms of composing 
fictions that sustain the illusion of speaking true of ourselves.5 The truth is that our “truth” is 
lost to us, just as ethos is identified as a kind of living experience that can only be grasped by 
external observation. We install fictions that give the trauma of the lost experience a double 
function: 1) to continue the repression of the lost object of desire in order to sustain desire, 
and 2) to give the object an excessive presence through proliferating stories and images. The 
truth hurts too much. There can be no such thing as a pure defocusist or even a “freestyle” 
film as the frame is still anchored by the fiction of freedom, or the unobstructed access to 
the perfect image. There are both centrifugal and centripetal forces at play in composing 
narratives. Internally, the centrifugal force of trauma pushes out under constant repression, 
as in the drive to respond, rather than disregard, an obstruction. The centripetal forces insist 
that the subject serve as the external representation of the internal fiction, illustrated by the 
effort of The Five Obstructions to reveal “the perfect human” as an external visual expression 
of a hidden virtue. 
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The inertia produced at the nexus of these fictional/factual forces is a direct 
achievement of developments in image making technologies, the same general technologies 
that Paul Virilio has called “the vision machine.” I will leave the term singular, as Virilio does, 
to emphasize the common vision between various visual technologies in various fields of 
study. Virilio offers a sobering warning that the artificial visions offered by these digital 
technologies create a “relative fusion/confusion of the factual (or operational, if you prefer) 
and the virtual; the ascendency of the ‘reality effect’ over a reality principle already largely 
contested elsewhere, particularly in physics” (60). What I take Virilio to be suggesting is that 
the rise of digital technologies has contaminated the pure divide between fact and fiction 
making reality out to be an effect rather than a principle. 
Virilio not only makes the point that cinematic images offered a new way to imagine 
the intersection between fact and fiction, but that the conditions for the development of 
the cinema initiated biological shifts in our understandings of visual media. In the next 
paragraph of the essay he returns to the birth of cinematic history as the moment when we 
could have learned our lesson about modern image technologies. He asks,
How could we have failed to grasp that the discovery of retinal 
retention that made the development of Marey’s chronophotography and the 
cinematography of the Lumiére brothers possible, also propelled us into the 
totally different province of the mental retention of images?
How can we accept the factual nature of the frame and reject the 
objective reality of the cinema-goer’s virtual image, that visual retention, 
which is not produced solely by the retina, as we once thought, but by the 
way our nervous system records ocular perceptions? (61)
Virilio goes back to Marey and the Lumiéres as a place to identify this major technological 
shift, tracing a line from image to audience. These particular images were a product of a 
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new capacity of the body as archival technology to “record” the image, rather than a factual 
presence that enters by the eye. Virilio considers cinematic images a kind of writing, or 
memory technology, in the figure of the image machine that ultimately led to a confusion 
between the factual and the virtual.
 But if filmmaking or image-making in general is a kind of writing, how is it that the 
invention of the cinematic apparatus can be such a crucial moment of physiological and 
technological change? Have not the stories of Marey and the Lumiéres become themselves 
archived fictions that provide a fiction of origin? Instead these stories stand beside each 
other as external forces that weigh down on a social retinal retention, write across the visual 
memory of the body, and demand a response. In the case of cinematic arts, the new images 
and their technologies have likewise demanded a new way for the human body to perceive 
and understand these experiences.
Still, why describe an experience so firmly entrenched in the conditions of 
visual archive, especially in terms of the current obstruction of freedom, which lacks the 
parameters of memory that the others have engaged (particular scenes or locations that 
recall the original film)? In a sense, Leth is now left to the excesses of his own desires, and 
this is much different than having the analyst in the same room guiding the questions for the 
analysis. In a similar paradox, Lacan is famous for having said that the unconscious, the site 
of desire and excess, was “structured like a language” (Seminar XX 48). He may have argued 
this a little too persuasively as the semioticians have demonstrated how everything can 
indeed be structured like a language. We are left wondering as to why Lacan insisted on the 
image of language for something that seems to refuse structure altogether. 
In an essay titled “The Other Lacan” Jacques Alain-Miller reconsiders Lacan’s 
statement about the unconscious structured as a language of the analytic experience 
between analyst and analysand. According to Miller, this “other Lacan” believes in a 
precise routine of analysis which runs around in a circle: “The circle is called the fantasy” 
(Miller). According to Miller the old Lacanian cliché about comparing the unconscious to 
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language ignores the force of fantasy that drives desire, a force that includes “the function 
of repetition in fantasy, the inertia which fantasy provides to the desire, its stifling effects 
on desire’s metonymy, the sense of no progress, the tedium of redundancy which it gives to 
the experience” (Miller).  The vision machine could be said to work through fantasy rather 
than memory; the eyes fasten the moving images down to sensorial fragments that can 
be absorbed through desire into the fantasy. The reason that Leth literally recoils at the 
prospect of making a film free of guided obstruction is that he must now rely on fantasy 
rather than memory. He faces the very factual possibility that he could fail to continue the 
fantasy of his project. And as we can learn from the unconscious, fiction has always been a 
part of the fantasy of the factual. 
CUT TO:
SETH turns to the camera to continue to answer the interviewer’s 
question.
SETH
Ok, I’m Seth. This is 
Seth’s diving board.
SETH liked to dive. The water mirrored the sky and broke into 
pieces when he jumped. The unexpected aspect of this scene (its 
interminable feature) is the feeling of happiness as he sinks 
below the surface. The sky does not break so easily. 
fly on a plane Fade.
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From Replicator to Witness
Foucault notes in Hermeneutics of the Subject that up until the time of Descartes 
the concept of “care of yourself” had been practiced anciently as an access to truth only 
within the parameters of a spiritual transformation of the subject. Foucault recognized 
the “Cartesian moment” as an event in thought when the transformative properties of 
encountering truth (epimeleia heautou) were disqualified by an intellectualized direct 
access to truth for the subject through knowledge (gnōthi seauton). The “Cartesian moment” 
discredited the transformative truth of “care of the self” and instead “made the ‘know 
yourself’ into a fundamental means of access to truth” (14). Foucault concludes that while in 
a spiritual understanding the subject as is lacks truth, but can become transformed by truth; 
in the modern age, however, “the truth cannot save the subject” (19). Care of the self can 
no longer grants the future promise of a complete subject in the modern age. The subject is 
now formed through the infinite accumulation of progress.
The “Cartesian moment” functions as a “reality effect” for ethics: no longer is the 
subject concerned with the fictions of spirituality, but can now be the witness to his own 
status as subject. There is a move here from the mediating transformations and simulations 
SETH
I like to fly.
To fly . . .
He can only bear witness to the joy of the scene through tears, 
an slow-moving path of tears. JOSH moves in and whispers 
something inaudible into his ear. He speaks.
SETH
. . . fly on a plane.
He will weep no more.
FADE OUT.
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of spirituality to the more documentarian ideology of replication. 
The concept of a “reality effect” has been part of film discourse since the early 
days of the Lumiéres and their Cinématographe. Later moving image technologies, such 
as video, were heralded as accessible instruments against the monopolizing power of the 
Hollywood narrative. Video quality seemed especially capable for rendering the reality of 
an image, as in its use as surveillance tools, but especially for use in documentary projects. In The Electronic Disturbance, the Creative Art Ensemble (CAE) demonstrates a concern 
surrounding the “hegemony of documentary” for video as a possible medium of resistance.  
In a chapter entitled “Video and Resistance: Against Documentaries” the authors claim 
that the central role of documentaries “moves the question of video technology away from 
its function as simulator, and back to a retrograde consideration of the technology as a 
replicator (witness)” (35).  As cinematic images moved away from strictly silver nitrate 
based projections the possibilities for moving images still seemed to carry on film’s mimetic 
vision of truth in representation. 
According to the CAE, video appeared to serve an activist role by responding to the 
illusion of narrative (replication) with the objectivity of documentary (witness), which “Split 
the task of observation into as many categories and subcategories as possible to prevent 
observational integrity from being distracted by the proliferation of factual possibility” (36). 
The move from replicator to witness obscures the role of style and aesthetic in the creation 
of the factual. The truth of documentary has been since Marey’s horse experiments the 
camera’s primary function as the replacement for the flawed human eye. Leth inherits the 
weight of this function in the absence of obstruction. The freedom that he is afforded in the 
third obstruction makes this the most difficult for Leth because he cannot rely on his ability 
to replicate the rules. He must now take on the responsibility of the impossible witness: 
compose a factual account of the fictional idea of “the perfect human.” 
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The Parallax Image
 
 With the addition of fantasy to the ever present reality drive the movement between 
ideology of the replicator and the simulator loses a distinctive dialectic quality. The choice 
for factual possibility is not between the reality of documentary or of representation and the 
illusion of narrative or compositional image, but in closing the gap between a symbolically 
mediated reality and a reality for which there is no account, the distortion of sense, or, as 
Barthes called it, the obtuse. The obtuse, if we recall, is sensed and not regulated to the 
seen (scene), and escapes the logic of perception as a signification without representation. In The Ticklish Subject Slavoj Žižek goes to great lengths to express a similar obtuseness 
in the “spectral” and “elusive” Lacanian Real that precedes the ontologically constituted 
reality. In this equation fantasy “is the endeavor to close this gap by (mis)perceiving the pre-
ontological Real as simply another, ‘more fundamental’, level of reality—fantasy projects on 
to the pre-ontological Real the form of constituted reality” (57). What Žižek discovers is that 
although we can sense the Real, there is not a way to make sense of the Real except through 
the distorting influence of fantasy (what he calls “the murmur of the Real”). 
Fantasy functions as the relay between the fictions of replicator and witness as a 
manifestation of the desire to close the gap of representation and the human. Žižek 
identifies this within dialectical-materialist language as the “minimal gap” 6 or the “delay 
which forever separates an event ‘in itself ’ from its symbolic inscription/registration” 
(57). The minimal gap is an imperceptible interruption that introduces the alterity of the 
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Real into the consistency of reality. By imperceptible I mean impossible in the way that it 
cannot occur within its official registration; Maurice Blanchot says of the disaster that it is 
“unexperienced” and that it “escapes the very possibility of experience—it is the limit of 
writing. This must be repeated: the disaster de-scribes” (7). The disaster de-scribes, the 
artist de-signs, by working at the limits of registration and discourse. 
Images are composed within a minimal gap, formed in the (mis)perception of the 
fantasy that would seek to eliminate the hesitation of reality and the distortion of the Real. 
The figure that Žižek  uses to explore these limits is the “parallax view”; in one sense Žižek  
uses the parallax view to re-describe a “minimal difference” as the gap exists within vision 
that cannot be overcome or resolved in any sense of the real (or the Real for as the excluded 
space of perception) (Parallax 18). Early in the first chapter he clearly lays the book out 
as a response to The Ticklish Subject by asking “what is tickling the ticklish subject?” and 
answers “the object—however, which object?” The undefined tickling object plays at the 
limits of perception and, rather than in terms of a gap, Žižek describes the parallax view 
as the “guise of a stain.” To be more precise, and as a departure from the elusiveness of the 
Real, the parallax view is a short circuit of reality in which “the reality that I see is never 
‘whole’—not because a large part of it eludes me, but because it contains a stain, a blind 
spot, which indicates my inclusion in it” (17). 
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In The Five Obstructions there is no perspective that can adjudicate between 
Leth’s and von Trier’s understanding of obstruction; there remains an insurmountable 
gap that Žižek  posits as an irreducibly generative site, neither the one nor the many. As 
we have seen, to obstruct suggests a standing in the way, or an inhibiting of the resolution 
of perspective. Obstructions engage an aesthetic of alterity, but they do not necessarily 
function through alterity. On the contrary, obstructions approach the ob/scene, which, far 
from representing that which lies outside of representation, is territorialized by that which 
is seen. The un-seen, the off-screen, the distortion or disruption that must be excluded from 
the scene by the distribution of practices that defined the conditions for the possibility 
of cinema: the scene is seen insofar as it stands against the unseen as unscreened. The 
unscreened stain can only ever have implied the presence of the subject as its revelation 
could only be ob/scene or excessive. 
 
Nothingness and Meaning
The issue that the third obstruction must confront in the wake of Leth’s violation 
is the punishment of freedom. Von Trier literally castigates Leth with absolute creative 
freedom and the absence of any prescribed set of rules. He calls it a “free-style” film, 
which is anything but free from style; Leth is first at a loss for how to go about shooting a 
new film without the guidance from the obstructions. Von Trier is openly frustrated with 
Leth’s decision not to reshoot the second film and declares that he “has no option” but to 
demand Leth return to India and reshoot the film. When he hears of his punishment Leth 
exclaims: “It’s a place I can’t go back to.” Faced with this impasse von Trier relinquishes 
control of the obstruction. The subsequent third part of the film follows Leth as he confronts 
his own film without the restrictive security offered by the obstructions. Obstructions 
offered him the limits of his vision; he was free to play within the safety of their shadow. 
Without the obstructions Leth suddenly becomes the face of the ascetic ideal, marked by 
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the fascination with the pain of loss and the constant search in vain for meaning (a logos, a 
hermeneutic account rather than an ethos, or a recoiling account). The desire to close the 
gap between perceived reality and the Real is also a desire for the meaning offered by this 
fantasy, a notion that the simple act of suffering the impossibility of nothing offered man the 
possibility of something. 
Nietzsche demonstrates clear disdain for the ascetic ideal that encourages “a 
certain impoverishment of life” introduced by the drive for meaning (Genealogy 590). 
This is the context for Nietzsche’s famous phrase about man’s “will to nothingness” as an 
“aversion to life,” but that “man would rather will nothingness than not will” (599). This is 
an interesting turn of the negative by Nietzsche: in willing nothingness man imbues himself 
with the power of negation, exclusion, and lack, turning his back not on its opposite (what 
would be the opposite of nothingness? Somethingness?) but on excess. Victor Vitanza refers 
to the  excess that human beings must constrain as the “nonpositive affirmation,” which, 
And we have to pull our best shot 
out of  thebag to return his serve.
He serves hard again. A deadly serve.
It’s very much a dialogue, playing 
back and forth across the net.
He serves hard and we return as hard as nails.
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in his words, “denegates negation by reincluding,” and is the possibility for a “sublime 
ethos” (Negation 63-4).7 This is reminiscent of what Blanchot said of the unexperience of 
disaster and its de-scription occurring at the limits of writing. The advantage of nonpositive 
affirmation rather than simply the excess of affirmation is that there remains the possibility 
of a positive function of negation, something that Vitanza finds in Nietzsche and Foucault 
and in which there is “ a negation (or denegation) of negation itself.” The “double negative” 
of nonpositive affirmation leads to an “affirmative deconstruction,” a situation in which 
even Deleuze alleges that negation “becomes the power of affirming . . . and passes into the 
service of an excess of life” (qtd. Vitanza 275). By turning a blind eye to the (k)not will, the 
possibilities of something which is not will but something else (obtuseness, sense-less, the 
excess of life), the perfect human accepts his will as the ultimate (ironic perfection) limit. 
 The refusal to give Leth obstructions is a strategy of nonpositive affirmation that 
takes the lessons of the first two obstructions, of image and ethics, and presents Leth with 
the chance to break those lessons. Von Trier punishes Leth for his violation by violating the 
law himself and responding with a non-response and not providing Leth his instructions. 
What Leth finds is that he is neither completely free of the bounds of the original film, nor 
the context of the documentary project. The illusion that von Trier proposes of complete 
creative freedom is in fact a more restrictive kind of obstruction that requires Leth to 
negate what he has helped to construct. For Leth the obstructions offered him a way, as 
Nietzsche says of the ascetic ideal, to interpret his perfect film; it would not be “sense-less.” 
In the absence of obstructions Leth “suffer[s] from the problem of his meaning” (Genealogy 
598). This strange mix of suffering and context makes the creative freedom a “problem of 
meaning” that is ethically restrictive and imparts a dimension of pain to the image. The pain 
and desire associated with the problem of creative freedom binds Leth and von Trier to a 
masochistic contract that functions within a (perfectly) restricted aesthetic. In other words, 
there is no free style; there is a cost exchange of pain and suffering that Leth is willing to 
accept in order to continue the game. 
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The Forced Choice of Freedom
So it is not completely true that von Trier does not give Leth an obstruction; he 
creates a new context in which to make the third film and gives Leth the false choice 
of creative freedom. Taking a lead from Ernesto Laclau and Judith Butler regarding the 
recoiling of decision as both the origin and result of decisions, Žižek sees the freedom of 
choice as grounded in a fundamental exclusion: “something must be excluded in order for 
us to become beings which make decisions” (Ticklish 19). This would mean that choice is 
never made without a particular context, and no context exists without having been first 
delimited from a series of possible contexts. Creative freedom along the lines that von Trier 
gives to Leth is free only within the context of the obstructions; this is manifested in the 
fact that Leth is “free” from the initiation of rules for a free-style film, but the film must be 
made in the context of The Five Obstructions. The narrative of The Perfect Human: Brussels 
still follows the general structure of The Perfect Human and Leth deliberately chooses an 
aesthetic unlike the other two films. This third film returns to the slow moving pace of the 
original while maintaining the self-reflective character of both Cuba and Bombay.
Following Harpham’s claim that all notions of ethics exist by the exclusion of other 
ethical principles, the conception and response of the third film demonstrates creative 
choices can only be made within pre-determined contextual structures that create the 
conditions for choice. In The Ticklish Subject Žižek forwards Lacan’s idea of the “forced 
choice” to dissect the paradox of free choice and the lack of a “pure” context. 
Does not the primordial ‘exclusion’ which grounds decision (i.e. choice) 
indicate that the choice is, at a radically fundamental level, forced—that I 
have a (free) choice only on condition that I make the proper choice—so 
that, at this level, one encounters a paradoxical choice which overlaps with 
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its meta-choice: I am told what I must choose freely. . . . Far from being a sign 
of ‘pathological (or politically “totalitarian”) distortion’, this level of forced 
choice is precisely what the psychotic position lacks: the psychotic subject 
acts as it he has a truly free choice ‘all the way along.’ (19)
Although he tries to consciously avoid the political allusions of his words, Žižek nonetheless 
implicates the ethics of choice with political stakes, and charges the psychotic subject as 
the harbinger of the apolitical position that lacks this forced choice. The performance of 
the psychotic acting free “all along the way” is also indicated by the lack of position, which 
is both political and contextualized by the forced choice. Von Trier clearly forces this meta-
choice onto Leth by requiring him to choose and offering freedom as long as he makes the 
“proper” choice, which would be for Leth to fail. The truly free choice for Leth, and the only 
one that would avoid his failure, would be to refuse to act and not shoot the Brussels film at 
all; but again the conditions for Leth’s refusal would have been determined by the structure 
of the obstructions model. It could also possibly result in the end of the collaboration 
between von Trier and Leth, which would also end the experiment and render the other two 
films meaningless. Leth would rather shoot nothing (the film free from style) than (k)not 
film.
The context of each obstruction is uniquely developed through the conversations 
and responses of Leth and von Trier to each other. While choice is dictated by context, 
context in terms of the obstructions occurs as a collaborative event that can only be 
registered through a corresponding revision of the rules within each individual film. The 
ethics of the experiment require von Trier to remain unsatisfied with the results, as when 
he sits down with an awkward laughter to view the first film and snickers “One is always 
furious when there are solutions.” The development of the obstructions is interdependent 
with the continued failure to complete the purposes of the project rather than by any 
success either one could claim. To satisfy the requirements of the obstruction would be 
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to stabilize the recoiling movement of each obstruction and revision, end the game, and 
demand the institution of one specific ethos or style of life. 
Leth and von Trier’s collaborative ethos is one based on the structure of struggle or 
suffering that resists completion or resolution in the tradition of the ascetic ideal. Better 
said, the two figures represent neighbors in the most literal sense of Freud’s notion of the 
Nebenmensch which Lacan articulates as the divided and alien equation of “beside yet alike, 
separation and identity” (Ethics 61). Lacan understood that there is an association of desire 
between the Nebenmensch and das Ding (the object of desire) in that the alien nature of 
the neighbor is its presence as absolute Other (again, the ironic perfection) that can only 
represent complete lost-ness. The joy of the game is to continue to respond to the Other 
indefinitely, with the understanding that the presence of the Other in the collaboration, von 
Trier as the reverse projection of Leth, sustains more than just the game: “It is in this state 
of wishing for it and waiting for it that, in the name of the pleasure principle, the optimum 
tension will be sought” (63). The pleasure of the project is to sustain the tension of the 
relationship, with that tension visually emerging from each film. 
Lacan’s complex revision of psychoanalysis through his seminars can be assessed 
as a driving desire to be found by his Other (Freud) by developing, as we have seen in 
Rajchman’s perception, his analysis as a “desire to know” (49). This is a way to understand 
master/student relations as exchanges and responses to the desire of the other: this 
purpose or eros can lead to an ethical event. For Lacan these events are ethical because they 
can lead us away from idealism and toward the Other to acknowledge difference (24). It is 
not so much that we comb through the details of a structure like psychoanalysis as a strictly 
hermeneutic project, but that we can see this thought as a continuous suspension of the 
completion of his revision to sustain the pleasure of pursuit. In Enjoy Your Symptom! Žižek 
defends Lacan’s project of repetition by allowing for revision as an ethical possibility of the 
restriction of the forced choice: “the Lacanian definition of the authentic ethical act: an act 
which reaches the utter limit of the primordial forced choice and repeats it in the reverse 
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sense. Such an act presents the only moment when we are effectively ‘free’” (88-89). The 
constant turning of the psychoanalytic project expresses an opposition to its completion 
by investing its desire in the infinite deferral of the forced choice, but it also represents 
a dedication to repetition and revision demonstrated in The Five Obstructions by the 
innovations of each new obstruction. 
Masochism and the Restricted Image
The concern over the absence of objects within the presence of the image seems 
to be an indication of excess within the image, or as something that is left over from the 
image and remains unrepresented or excluded. For film scholars like Christian Metz and 
Laura Mulvey, Lacan’s mirror stage presented a way to both account for absence and for 
the excess of pleasure involved in seeing images. In The Imaginary Signifier Metz identifies 
the paradox of viewing pleasure when he states that “film is like a mirror,” however, “there 
is one thing and one thing only that is never reflected in it: the spectator’s own body” (45). 
To maintain the pleasure derived from the mirror effect, spectators must (mis)recognize 
themselves with the cinematic image. The repetition of mis-recognition restricts eros to 
a notion of desire for the image and prohibits the creative function of revision. This is the 
scopophilia that Mulvey intends to “destroy” in her early work.8 And while the regime of the 
mirror essay has been critiqued by many since Metz and Mulvey, the specter of scopophilia 
continues to haunt the desire to account for the pleasure of the image.
 The deployment of psychoanalytic terms has become a primary model of cinematic 
hermeneutics in order to identify how films and other moving images create certain kinds 
of subjects. In The Difficulty of Difference D.N. Rodowick argues that despite these very 
claims “films, like other cultural artifacts, do not produce subjects but symbolic positions 
of subjectivity, and those positions are virtual, not actual” (134). Part of the inability for 
cinematic arts to offer more than a symbolic position of subjectivity is their own status 
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as composed artifacts. In other words, a film strip is not only a series of frames projected 
at 24 frames per second, but a series of cuts that constitute shots themselves broken into 
smaller fragments in the gaps between frames. In a passage that returns to the origins of 
cinematic arts, Mary Ann Doane isolates the introduction of the cut to the development of 
film editing, not the construction of the camera as image making device, as the crucial event 
of cinematic invention: “frame, of course, constitutes a spatial limit, but it is intriguing to 
note that histories and theories of early cinema continually pinpoint the temporal limit of the cut, the interruption of the linear movement of the film strip, as the crucial moment in 
the elaboration of film language” (31). Rather than the image in itself, which is the territory 
of still photography, there is a certain pleasure derived from the temporality of the images. 
The paradox of semiotic film theory was that while the scopophilic drive of Lacanian film 
analysis fetishized the image as absent object of desire, the image occupied a more or less 
stable position. Cinematic films were structured by repetition, a circling back of past and 
future into a present image. The kind of repetition that these theories engage could not 
elaborate on the revision that resulted from the distortion of fantasy and perspective.
The fantasy of The Five Obstructions is that there can be a “perfect human,” and that 
either von Trier can achieve his goal of humbling his mentor or that Leth can successfully 
respond to the obstructions. The model of composition that obstructions and revision 
express is not one of a collaborative synthesis, but a parallax view comprised of challenging 
perspectives that can never be completely integrated. Rather than reducing the interaction 
between demand and response, teacher and student, or even screen and spectator, this 
model imposes a masochistic contract in which the participants must disavow the promises 
of their individual desire in order to sustain the integrity of the game. Drawing from a 
critique of Masoch’s Venus in Furs, Gilles Deleuze recognizes a recoiling movement that he 
refers to as a “double suspension” in masochistic texts that interweaves desire and delay. A 
masochistic aesthetic would thus play with the parallax view by extending the delay of the 
minimal gap and finding pleasure, rather than disturbance, in the incapacity to ascertain its 
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resolution: 
On the one hand the subject is aware of reality but suspends this 
awareness; on the other the subject clings to his ideal. There is a desire for 
scientific observation, and subsequently a state of mystical contemplation. 
The masochistic process of disavowal is so extensive that it affects sexual 
pleasure itself; pleasure is postponed for as long as possible and is thus 
disavowed. The masochist is therefore able to deny the reality of pleasure at 
the very point of experiencing it, in order to identify with the ‘new sexless 
man.’ (33)
In delaying resolution indefinitely the Real disrupts the limits of perception and opens 
the door to reconsider the ideal, or what it means to be “the perfect human,” or even the 
possibilities of writing in creating in multimodal senses. We can read masochistic dialogue 
exchanges within Venus in Furs as hinging on the written imposition of these seemingly 
infinite moments of hesitation and disavowal:       She pushed me away and rose to her feet.
Wanda!” I replied with emotion, tears filling my eyes. “You do not know how  
much I love you.”
   She pouted disdainfully.
“You are mistaken,” I continued, “you are making yourself out to be more evil  
than you really are; you are far too good, far too noble by nature. . . .”
“What do you know about my nature?” she interrupted violently. “You will get  
to know me as I really am.”
   “Wanda!”
   “Make up your mind, will you submit unconditionally?”
   “And what if I refuse?”
   “Then --” (201)
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What we can discern is that the pauses and gaps are crucial to the continuation of the 
contract; they frame the content of the dialogue as the force of the exchange. The ellipses 
and small gestures are not just interruptions, but a significant part of the suspension of 
content and disavowal of pleasure. This is how Deleuze can claim that in reading the tension 
set by the suspension of pleasure, “it is the moments of suspense that are the climactic 
moments” (33). For the masochist contract, the final dash is an image, not as absence of 
pleasure, but of the promise of completion (the promise of subject-tion), which can never be 
fulfilled and must always fail in order to continue the fantasy. 
Indeed Leth continues his own suffering by freely choosing to continue to pursue 
von Trier’s request for the third film. I have already mentioned the minimal gap or delay 
as essential to the fantasy of the perfect human, and it is the temporal delay that provokes 
the disjointed or ruptured experience of cinematic images. In the second volume of his 
cinema books titled Time-Image Deleuze wrote of the unique temporality of the cinematic 
image itself to always be an image of the present, “necessarily of the present”; however, 
he continues, “there is no present which is not haunted by a past and a future, by a past 
which is not reducible to a former present, by a future which does not consist of a present 
to come. . . . It is characteristic of cinema to seize this past and this future that coexist with 
the present image” (37). Nevertheless, in a film the “present image” cannot exist but for a 
moment amidst the constantly changing cinematic frame. While Barthes is “held” by the 
still image, arrested in its movement, Deleuze sees a unique experience that comes from the 
constantly changing “present image.” In either case the authors both demonstrate a desire 
to extend the presence of the image, to seize the instance of pleasure that the image evokes, 
and to suffer the pain of that lost instance. 
A Collaborative Site of Invention
The freedom with which Leth is endowed does nothing to free him of the context 
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of obstructions. He accepts the conditions of the obstruction because he cannot but 
shoot the film; he is obligated by his ethos. It is a forced choice in the ethical sense that he 
realizes that the perfect human has yet to be made and yet follows the call with the painful 
understanding that it is an impossible project and he is doomed to failure as it keeps 
slipping from his grasp. Yes, obstructions do structure the context of the restricted image, 
and that structure does inscribe the figure of the imperfect subject that must “traverse the 
fantasy” of pleasure and pain.9 The structure of obstruction, however, is always a response 
to the Other, and so obstruction is always recoiling around a collaborative site of invention, 
rather than a transmission model.
 This masochistic exchange also illustrates the literal tickling of the subject (as 
submitting oneself) by the object (the objecting/disturbing entity). In Žižek’s parallax 
model it is the object that tickles the subject, the reflection of the blind spot that is the very 
terms of the subject’s presence (Parallax 17). It is an exchange, a contract, for which mere 
representation does not account and which sets the terms for the discussion of a nexus of 
politics, ethics and aesthetics that is also an anti-aesthetics or obtuse sense of aesthetics 
stripped of its Platonic function. 
standing against the scene . . .
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The context of the free-style obstruction of The Perfect Human: Brussels is 
determined by Leth’s exceptional violation of the rules in The Perfect Human: Bombay and 
represents von Trier’s reaction to the transgression. Von Trier’s presence as the architect 
of the obstructions and his relationship to Leth as a student of sorts of his work gives Leth 
a particular set of possible stylistic choices that already negates the excess of absolute 
freedom. What the first two films set up, and what the third film now points to, is the 
nonpositive affirmation of a compositional pedagogy that acknowledges and attempts to 
denegate the negation of rules restricted creative efforts. The recoiling paradox of rule- 
restricted work is embodied through The Five Obstructions  by the model of obstructions 
invented collaboratively through the dialogue between both Leth and von Trier and 
negotiated individually through uniquely developing contexts.
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Chapter Four
Abject Pedagogy
137
What Is (to Be) Learned?
 
 Up until this point each chapter of this project has focused on a particular issue 
that is directly addressed within the terms of each obstruction from The Five Obstructions. 
I have discussed image and obstruction, visual composition and the question of ethics, and 
the conditions of creative freedom in relation to collaboration. These are all specific issues 
of a generalized multimodal composition revealed by the unique ethical approach of the 
obstructions model initiated by The Five Obstructions. This approach is not dictated by 
any anticipated outcome; the interrogation of “the perfect human” as a discursive subject 
will remain inconclusive, and the goals of both Jørgen Leth nor Lars von Trier will linger 
unsatisfied. In light of the question of ethics and the central role of ethos in determining 
how each will respond to the successive obstructions, the failures of both Leth and von 
Trier ultimately become their success embodied by the film itself, The Five Obstructions. 
Rhetorically, Leth’s film The Perfect Human represents the exigency of the project, the tutor 
text that determines the form of the subsequent revisions. By responding to the film under 
the demands of obstructions, and by calling into question the fundamental premise of the 
original (the ordinary existence of “the perfect human,” the tutor text has not only lost its 
originary status, but has also become subsumed beneath the even larger project of The Five 
Obstructions. The Perfect Human is only one version among many possible revisions.
The lesson of the third obstruction is that “the perfect human” maintains a 
kind of freedom by refusing to make the choice between possible revisions. This is the 
undetermined figure that Michel Serres called the “blank man” or the “universal man.” He 
invokes the image of Adam and Eve departing Eden: “This is their fault, a fault is a lack, 
they lack everything. And we still lack any determination. Then they left, so we leave the 
page blank” (48). The perfect film would be one of indeterminate framing, blank for all 
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intents and purposes. It is a film in which there is a transparent dis-enclosure in place of the mise-en-scéne in the same manner as Leth’s constructed frame in The Perfect Human: 
Bombay inviting a constant visual flow between the scene and the ob/scene. And like the 
constructed frame of the second obstruction the blank frame allows the emergence of the 
poverty and misery of the external and excluded; in short, the blank page is an abject page. 
While Adam and Eve confront their faults by leaving the limits of Eden, von Trier and Leth 
must confront the abjectness of their creations under the terms of obstruction. In both cases 
fault or abjectness is realized as a pedagogical challenge. Simply put: What, if anything, is 
learned through the use of obstructions and how are obstructions to be taught or presented 
to students?”
There is no easy answer to this question. Obstructions occupy positions of difficulty, 
rather than facilitation, in a pedagogical relationship. To insist on a pedagogy is to assert a 
synthesis or convergence of identity, which is always the threat of embracing a particular 
theory of multimodality; as soon there is something produced called “multimedia” the 
multiple aspect is lost. This kind of pedagogical encounter presupposes an object (of 
desire?) with the goal being to transfer the object to the waiting vessel. Success is measured 
by the capacity to fill the student, displace the lack, and erase the fault. The two must 
become a single flesh. There is purposeful sexual allusion to the work of pedagogy in the 
multimodal composition. 
Obstructions work on the level of diversion and division, which is also a logic of 
the cut or hesitation (pausing motion) that produces only new responses. To continue 
our present imagery, we might say that obstructions promote a kind of sexual difference, 
not in terms of any arbitrary physical trait, but in the absolute similarity of desire. Lacan 
Fleeing Eden
Perfect Cuba Bombay Brussels Cartoon
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infamously articulated this pedagogical difficulty in his Seminar XX when he declared 
that “there is no such thing” as the sexual relationship (9). 1 Slavoj Žižek translates this 
difficulty as the obstruction of difference: “Sexual difference is not a firm set of ‘static’ 
symbolic oppositions and inclusions/exclusions . . . but the name of a deadlock, a trauma, 
an open question” (“The Real of Sexual Difference” 61).  There is no resolution because of 
the incapacity on the part of both partners to realize a conceptual ideal and so “any ‘actual’ 
sexual relationship is always tainted by failure” (71). In other words, although the specificity 
of objectives changes for each individual, the radical similarity of purpose generates a 
dis-enclosure for that difference that keeps open the possibility of change for all parties 
involved. Perhaps we may even have the makings of a political unrest that leads to a new 
“distribution of the sensible.”2 
The Pedagogical Event as Body
The first chapter asserted that the task of this project was to investigate image as 
a kind of compositional tendency to cut transversally across modes of expression. This is 
a way to imagine various analogies of the body which have stood in for a transversal or 
multidirectional compositional body.3 Cinematic arts have retained the film image of the 
skin even while the ontological presence as a celluloid object has diminished in the past 
decade or so. The chapter on ethics opened by quoting Barthes’ desire to study the image as 
one would open a wound: to explore image is not simply a matter of rhetorical processes, 
but a tearing of the flesh, a reopening of a fissure of significance, a mark of physical and 
temporal difference. The masochistic contract of obstructions between von Trier and Leth 
engages the ethical questioning of “the perfect human” through discursive suffering from 
their respective dis-ease. The failure to achieve their individual purposes recoils back on the 
success of the overall collaborative project. 
I compared the ob/scene to the position of the midwife standing against or before 
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the emerging infant at the moment of birth. She is not only witness to the separation of 
the body of infant/mother, but is part of the body or composition of the event, or becomes 
such through her silent intervention. In The Address of the Eye Vivian Sobchack makes a 
related comparison when she observes the “film’s body” as the systems of instruments and 
procedures that compose an individual film or cinematic experience:
We discover the film’s body as ‘inhuman’ much as we discover 
our own: when it troubles us or when we look at its parts 
upon a dissecting table. Otherwise, the film’s body exists for us 
as do our own bodies: as animate and intentional, as actually 
engaged in existential functions, as living in a sensible world 
taken up in the intentional activity of consciousness and 
constituted as meaningful experience. (220)
At least for a while, the body of the infant cannot be separated from that of the mother. 
The midwife’s presence is excessive and her position toward the infant’s separation from 
her mother is marginal. And yet, the birth event makes room for the attendance of the ob/
scene as part of the “sensible world” and which facilitates a “meaningful experience.” The 
birth event, like a cinematic experience, forms a body that recoils around varying modes of 
understanding its place in the world as a matter of ethos. 
 The pedagogical event of The Five Obstructions occurs between von Trier and 
Leth as an interrogation of ethos, or the uncertainty of the proper roles that each assumes 
during the film. Leth had entered the project as von Trier’s mentor, a revered predecessor 
and teacher to his beloved career path. Von Trier had initiated the project in the role of 
pupil desiring a chance to work alongside the master. The master/student roles, however, 
do not hold within the figures of obstruction. These roles have theoretical groundings as 
a configuration of G.W.F Hegel’s master/slave dialectic which is primarily a conflict before 
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unity can emerge.4 Immediately von Trier positions himself as the teacher who offers the 
obstruction as an assignment to Leth, now the student. Having completed the first film, 
however, Leth’s success challenges von Trier to reconsider his position to the project. The 
mentor/student relationship recoils around the exchanges of obstruction and response 
by putting the stability of the roles into question. Although von Trier gives himself the 
responsibility of pronouncing the list of obstructions, he must rely on Leth’s suggestions 
to help form a suitable challenge. And each of Leth’s new films function as an assessment 
on von Trier’s ability to move the film forward; there is no final act of assessment, but 
continual assessment throughout the game. Obstructions not only engender a capacity to 
invent new ways to respond to the tasks of writing, but it also rejects pedagogical models of 
transference that would reinforce a hierarchal authority of knowledge. 
 Through the remainder of this chapter I want to demonstrate how obstructions 
perform a pedagogy of failure rather than transmission. In Finitude’s Score Avital Ronell 
contrasts the transmission model of pedagogy to pedagogy as a site of open struggle. 
She explores this struggle through Sigmund Freud’s analytic discourse in terms of a 
“suppository” intervention, or a pedagogical encounter that resists the demands of 
pedagogy. Ronell is concerned with the body as a site of knowledge exchange, and in The 
Five Obstructions von Trier and Leth become the sites of transformative role exchanges 
between master/student. Like Lacan’s claim about sexual difference, failure is based on 
the deadlock between parties that leaves open the question of success. Failure or fault as a 
default mode of living (style of life) is related to questions of human finitude and its place as 
the ultimate obstruction for images of “the perfect human.” 
 
The Threat of Parergon and the “Retrospective Man” 
 
 In Book X of the Republic Plato makes his case for excluding the artists and poets 
from his ideal State on the basis of the image. Plato’s general attitude toward the imitative 
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nature of the arts is that images are only fragments of the pure forms of truth or knowledge. 
He assesses that the imitator that wields these fragments “is a long way off the truth, and 
can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image” 
(1901a). Plato’s great opposition to art and rhetoric is in the fractured reproduction and its 
flawed appearance; visual presence is the flawed reminder of what cannot be touched by 
human hands. Although he does not say it directly, the connection between the imitative arts 
and human hands disqualifies the technē of artists and poets as knowledge that can provide 
a foundation for a community. 
 In more recent times, Walter Benjamin identified a similar position arising amidst 
the machines of artistic replication. Mechanical reproduction substitutes fragmented 
imitation for virtual simulation, and by so doing dissolves the “aura” of the original instance: 
“By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence” 
(221). But Benjamin does not follow Plato in dismissing the entire idea of reproduction as 
fundamentally flawed. He bifurcates the process of imitation as having both a “destructive” 
and “cathartic” effect, adding, “in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or 
listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced” (220). A 
plurality of copies may have the disadvantage of undermining originary value, but it also 
allows for a supplemental value, a new value that is not centralized and is dispersed and 
increased by communities of meaning.5 
 Images are a problem for writing in the same way as rhetoric was a problem for 
philosophy; they permit a plurality of supplemental values, parergon, to the originary 
practice or object. This is not to say that print cultures do not allow for the emergence of 
supplemental meanings. This would be to simply confuse literacy as an originary mode of 
communication. Writing, however, carries the burden of defining communities and their 
places within populations through the measuring stick of literacy.6 The notion of media 
literacy would be to train media to follow the rules of literacy. Multimodal writing poses 
a challenge to print cultures because it responds to the disciplined notion of literacy with 
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excess, or a plurality of imitations that question the dominant force of literacy. Engaging 
a transversal approach to writing introduces too many variables to the familiar space of 
composition; obstructions do not just make use of visuality, but also literacy, and orality to 
construct an ethical frame of reference that does not belong to any particular mode. Jacques Derrida said of parergon that it “means the exceptional, the strange, the extraordinary” (Truth 58). If that is true, then the kind of writing that emerges from obstructions is sublime, 
abject in both form and method. Just as poets and artists were not welcome in Plato’s 
organization of his Republic, likewise images are abject quantities in a culture of literacy 
because they 
introduce the threat of parergon.    
 Leth 
conceived his 
original film, 
The Perfect 
Human, as 
a minimalist 
ethnographic film. He reduced all aspects of production design to nominal elements: a bare 
white set with basic furniture for certain scenes and two actors who become the examined 
subjects within the sterile environment. Each scene was carefully composed as a series 
of tableaus that feature essential aspects of the life of a human being. Lev Manovich has 
commented on cinema’s relationship to art, suggesting that the move toward the computer 
processes of digital video has now made cinema “a particular case of animation which uses 
live action footage as one of its many elements” (“What Is Digital Film” 410). Computer 
editing and special effects give filmmaking the malleability of animation. As cinematic arts 
make more use of digital formats it becomes more akin to painting than to photography.  
I’m going to make a very, very, 
very, simple rule for the next film.
I can’t imagine it’ll be 
anything but crap
I’d be thrilled if  it was crap. 
But there is one single condition.
It’s got to be a cartoon.
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 It is clear that Leth would rather photograph than paint. His displeasure at the 
request to make an animated film demonstrates his frustration at the loss of control 
resulting from his unfamiliarity of the medium. He is quite vocal in announcing he wants 
nothing to do with an animated film and he makes a bold move to take advantage of the 
requirement not to film any new scenes: he hires an outside specialist to animate pieces 
of the past three obstruction films. The Perfect Human, Cartoon is the only one so far that 
repurposes footage from the other films, and Leth’s motive is to avoid the obstruction. The 
stark computer generated stylization of the rotoscope animation demonstrates in a literal 
way the transformation of film to painting that Manovich indicated; but it also signals Leth’s 
increasing indifference to the goals of the obstructions. Recycling what worked in the past 
is one way to ensure a degree of relevance to the obstruction, while attempting to turn the 
tables of power by deciding not to fully participate in the production of the film. 
 In the conclusion to the first section of his book Expanded Cinema, Gene Youngblood 
makes a passionate plea to overcome what he sees in cinematic arts as the redundancy 
and mediocrity of what he calls the “retrospective man,” a figure that finds comfort in only 
looking backward. As an image of the cinema, the retrospective man “discovers the truth 
about himself too late to make use of it” (66). The tragedy of the repetitiveness of the 
modern cinema is, according to Youngblood, the fact that it is blind to the future possibilities 
of what has become an echo chamber of commercial entertainment. He implores those that 
The great advantage of  doing it as 
a cartoon is that you’ll be faced 
with loads of  decisions.
The aesthetics and all that.
It can only turn out to be crap.
- I hate cartoons.
- I hate cartoons, too.
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would compose with cinematic images to step out of the repetition of the retrospective man 
and look forward toward a “new cinema” or one which “takes us to another world entirely. 
John Cage: ‘Where beauty ends is where the artist begins’” (72-73). This other world, 
beyond the notion of beauty, resides uncertainly amidst the sublime, or that which has yet to 
be determined. 
 Youngblood’s new cinema is an abject cinema, or a decomposing and still-yet-to-
be-determined site of obstructions waiting, always waiting, to become a cinema. It cannot 
be simply an experimental cinema because that would be an empty gesture, unethical, 
it could not respond nor encourage response: “The notion of experimental art . . . is 
meaningless. All art is experimental or it isn’t art. Art is research, whereas entertainment 
is a game or conflict” (65). Here the author is still suspicious of the entertainment industry, 
but he suddenly places entertainment in an abject position. While all art is allowed its 
experimentality, only the repetition of the retrospective man is specifically labeled as a 
“game” and its mode of expression as “conflict.” The promise of this new cinema finds its 
realization in The Five Obstructions when Leth stresses that the obstruction “has to be a 
cartoon of the kind we don’t like.” This means no “clever artistic devices” that would make 
the requirements more palatable to the director. He responds by reactivating old footage, 
resonating with the general recoiling movement of the project. “We’ll write a new text into 
it,” Leth asserts to the camera, “a new context, and breathe freshness into it.”  
  If Leth is a “retrospective man” it is because, at the moment of this film, he desires 
not to respond and not to continue the game under the current circumstances. In effect, 
I can’t be bothered to 
invent the technology or 
learn about it.
Nor will I spend time at a 
stupid drawing board or 
whatever.
No damned way.
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Leth pushes against the obstruction as an ethical response to the demands of pedagogy 
because he must respond and his only response can be to continue the conflict. He ingests 
the obstruction only to expel it as a film of recycled waste (not in terms of its quality, but its 
position as abject). The pedagogical encounter does not produce something new, but traces 
a “new cinema” or a “new composition” by the pedagogical conflict that cannot be resolved. 
The experiment of The Five Obstructions is not to make a new film, but to see how each of 
the participants will respond to the Other. This ingesting and expelling is the pedagogical 
encounter of obstructions provoked by an ambivalence or uncertainty of how to respond. 
Leth responds with feigned indifference at the notion of an animated film. This response, 
however, is as an ethical response to obstruction. It is aimed at more than just the category 
of animated films, but to the future that the retrospective man cannot tolerate.  
Abject Pedagogy or “I Hate Cartoons.”  
 
 When von Trier approaches Leth about making the fourth film in the form of an 
animation his response borders on disgust: “But I hate cartoons,” he objects, and von Trier 
responds “I hate cartoons, too.” For Leth (and apparently von Trier) the animated film is 
abject in that it is the form itself that repulses him; Leth says, “I’ve never seen a cartoon that 
I liked.” The usually hands-on Leth himself keeps his distance for most of the production of The Perfect Human: Cartoon and hires a rotoscope animator to do most of the work. For 
Leth the animated film is an abject form that presents a measure of anxiety that we have not 
yet seen with any of the obstructions. In Powers of Horror, Julia Kristeva calls the abject the 
“jettisoned object” and places the basis of abjection in the “[revelation] that all its objects 
are based merely on the inaugural loss that laid the foundations of its own being” (5). Leth’s 
reluctance to engage this obstruction is connected to his own expectations of what cinema 
should be and the realization of its failure, which parallels von Trier’s desire for Leth to 
realize his own limitations through the difficulty of obstructions.
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In a section of her book titled “Hans Is Afraid of the Unnameable” Kristeva responds to 
Freud, who is responding to Little Hans, who in turn responds to the fear of horses, which is 
responding to . . . the Unnamable:
What is striking in the case of Hans, as little as he might be, what Freud does 
not cease to be astonished by, is his stupendous verbal skill: he assimilates 
and reproduces language with impressive eagerness and talent. So eager 
is he to name everything that he runs into the unnamable—street sounds, 
that ceaseless trade activity 
involving horses in front of 
the house, the intensity with 
which his father, a recent 
convert to psychoanalysis, is 
interested in his body, his love 
for small girls, the stories and 
fantasies that he (the father) 
sexualizes to the utmost; the 
somewhat elusive, somewhat 
frail presence of his mother. 
All of this, which has already 
considerable sense for Hans 
without having found its significance, is doubtless distributed, as Freud says, 
between narcissistic conversation drive and sexual drive. It all becomes 
necessarily crystallized in the epistemophilic experience of Hans who wants 
to know himself and to know everything; to know, in particular, what seems 
to be lacking in his mother or could be lacking in himself. (34)
In the pedagogical encounter of obstructions, the challenge requires a response; the 
“And now,” said 
Max, “let the wild rumpus -
- start!”7
148
challenge is itself to continue to respond to “know everything” as a way to “know . . . what 
seems to be lacking” in the reverse image of the Other. The student desires to confront her 
teacher with her own weaknesses, while the teacher desires to prove her wrong. Amid the 
noise and imagery of the ob/scene, as well as the continuous demands from obstructions, 
the pedagogical relationship can no longer account for a teacher/student dichotomy. In the 
process of responding ethically to each challenge, they have lost the capacity to name their 
relationship as such; however, they continue to respond anyway. This is not to say that there 
is no relationship, but that the obstructions present a sense of a relationship before it has 
found its significance.
Leth admits that this strategy to reactivate his old footage could potentially backfire 
because von Trier may be looking to undercut any idea of invention: “[Von Trier] might 
prefer not to have any freshness, inspiration, ideas, or poetry. He’d like it to be sloppy or 
stupid.” When Leth declares that “I hate cartoons” what he wants to say, what he cannot 
express, to von Trier is “I hate you,” inasmuch as von Trier is the object substitute for Leth’s 
disgust at the obstruction. Lars von Trier, Jørgen Leth; Jørgen Leth, Lars von Trier: each 
functions as the abject image for the other.8 The pedagogical relationship that develops 
between Leth and von Trier is one that is constantly reversing the roles of master/student. 
Von Trier entered the game having studied Leth as both director and individual and claiming 
boldly in the film that he “knows considerably more about [Leth] than he does.” Leth entered 
as the old veteran of the Danish film industry. Each obstruction turned these roles on 
themselves as Leth was forced to respond to von Trier’s rules, and von Trier was presented 
with the challenge to respond to each new film with new obstructions. By this time any 
stable notions of master/student roles have collapsed into a recoiling of ethos. They are no 
longer only responding to challenges laid before them by the other, but are now responding to the other as the embodiment of obstruction. 
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Reverse Psychology 
 Obstructions are pedagogical because they directly address the tensions between 
students and mentors; they institute a site of knowledge exchanges between roles by 
questioning the place of traditional classroom dichotomies between teacher/student. This 
is not meant to undercut the position of the teacher as the initiator of the process, but to 
integrate the contributions of the student who challenges that authority at every turn. 
Every completed assignment presents a new opportunity for the instructor to respond 
and continue the game. This does not necessarily lead to the achievement of particular 
objectives, or produce some integrated knowledge. In fact, it is quite the opposite. What 
is (to be) learned is that the pedagogical encounter itself recoils on itself as a question 
of ethics. The site for such recoiling is the ob/scene, including what has not been framed 
by the structure of the student/master relationship. Obstructions create the conditions 
for an abject pedagogy that reveals the phobias of both master and student and reverses 
the authority on which those distinctions are based without doing away with the roles 
altogether. 
 The hierarchy of the master/student distinction is based on a transmission model 
of pedagogy. Transmission proposes the student as an empty vessel waiting to be filled by 
the master who possesses knowledge and bestows this knowledge on the grateful student. 
This is a strictly one way street that provides a simple way to ensure the continuation of 
particular modes of training while repressing others. In an essay uncertainly titled “The 
Sujet Suppositaire: Freud, And/Or, the Obsessional Neurotic Style (Maybe)” Avital Ronell 
asks a similar question in terms of subject formation: “Can a knowing subject constitute 
itself, or even be receptive to the seed of knowledge, where the effects of juridical shutdown 
reorganize the very conditions of an authentic pedagogy?” (104). Ronell draws from Freud’s 
extensive analyses of the case of the “Rat Man” as an instance of an abject pedagogy, or an 
ethical “intervention”  in analysts terms, which is to recognize or eliminate a counterpart 
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as a subject.9 Her claim is that through the ambiguity of sign systems in analysis “Freud has 
made us inquire into the modes according to which the pupil, or analysand, receives the so-
called intervention. What constitutes an intervention?” (104). 
For Jacques Lacan the intervention would be language, more specifically speech, 
as in Freud’s “talking cure.”10 In the case of composition or writing it is obstructions that 
give occasion for the intervention to continue the recognition of subjects. Friedrich Kittler 
made a direct connection between the composition of cinematic images and the process of 
“the talking cure.” Freud’s talking cure, he argues, “replaces images with words,” so that the 
analyst creates a narrative logic from the composite logic of the unconscious (Gramophone 
142). The challenge for the analyst is to look at the image sequences of patients as an “inner 
film,” a code for understanding what cannot be verbally expressed by the repressive body. 
According to Kittler, the tension between doctor and patient in any capacity is that there 
is inevitably violence done to the inner film 
of the patient as the doctor can only treat 
symptoms as the visual sign of originary 
trauma: “Literally, psychoanalysis means 
chopping up an internal film” (143).  The film 
will be cut very differently depending on the 
director, and the owner of the film will resist 
its being cut at all. 
 The concern of transmission 
pedagogy is that, between teacher and student, the “truth” of teaching is based on 
employing the student as a test of difference. Ronell purposefully makes use of the sexual 
metaphors that accompany notions of planting seeds of knowledge as she describes the 
transmission model: “As empty receptacle, virginal space, and originary innocence, the 
student has come to receive the desire of the teacher. The teacher fills this subject with the 
pedagogical deposit whose nature resembles that of a phallic desire” (104). Transmission 
The internal film
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promotes phallic desire because it simulates an insemination model, but it is also grounded 
in a mirror vision of the student as empty and lacking and must be formed in the image of 
the master. Ronell calls this “Oedipedagogy,” in which the teacher is in the ambiguous place 
of the interspecial and, sometimes, self-effacing Sphinx, who transmits to the Other who 
responds as “sujet suppose” and receives the sexual marks as a condition of knowledge: the 
answer to the Sphinx’s challenge is “anthropos” (109). There is a certain fixing of the gender 
within the answer, which is guaranteed by the method of transmission. Oedipus’s reward for 
answering the Sphinx correctly is also his fall. 
Composition Fatale
In contrast to the insemination or mirror-image model, Ronell posits the primal 
scene as a model for a different pedagogical relationship that emerges out of intervention. 
Freud’s analysis of the primal scene of one of his more famous patients, Paul Lorenz, 
also known as the “Rat Man,” does not take place in virginal space but in abject torture, 
specifically a military torture Lorenz had recounted to Freud in which rats gnawed into the 
body of the victim through the anus (Perelberg, Freud 179). This scene became the crux of 
Lorenz’s obsessional neurosis, but it also became the general motif of the analysis. Phallic 
desire is replaced by abject pleasure that is more ambiguously embraced as both horror 
and curiosity. Although the analytic relationship is pedagogical in the establishment of 
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roles (analyst/analysand, with the authority of knowledge on the side of analyst), during 
the course of analysis these roles begin to blur, reversing the logic of transmission by giving 
the power of language to the analysand. The logic of psychoanalysis permits the patient on 
the couch to direct the conversation, while the analyst responds by listening to what the 
patient has to say as well as what is left unsaid. Freud intervenes in the Rat Man’s symptoms 
through analysis. 
What the patient does not say, what escapes the discourse of the patient, is part of 
the logic of symptoms that the analyst promises to reveal by intervening on the systems 
of the unconscious that obscure the code. Systems such as repression and sublimation 
bury originary trauma beneath layers of composite memories and physical symptoms. The 
originary trauma escapes the language of the patient because it cannot be spoken; it is 
outside description, ob/scene. Intervention, however, seeks to speak the unspoken, recollect 
what has been lost, and reveal the originary trauma. In the relationship between analyst 
and analysand each becomes the inverse image of the other, the analyst pursuing what 
is constantly concealed by the language of the patient, and the patient’s own continuous 
response resisting without knowing the advances of the analyst to resolve the problem. 
In Ronell’s view this places the analyst in the position of detective who is able to 
grasp for clues behind the scene of the law. The detective can work beyond the rule of law 
because, unlike police work, they are indifferent “to the performative telos of an arrest” 
(112). What Ronell leaves unsaid is that the ob/scene work of detectives which exceeds the 
grasp of the law is still subject to the master narrative of the case which puts up roadblocks 
at every turn to keep the crime under wraps. The ubiquitous femme fatale of film noir serves 
little narrative purpose but to perform the role of obstruction to the trespassing anti-hero, 
the urban setting as disorienting labyrinth, and even the lengthening shadows distort the 
detective’s ability to string together a coherent narrative. There are no facts to be found 
for the detective, only guesswork, and supposing the outcome by series of clues. What is 
to be learned is a matter of rhetorical supposition, based on the available clues or means. 
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An ethical approach to multimodal pedagogy is abject in the same way that detective work 
is abject to police work: it exceeds the rule of law, but does not spiral into chaos. Instead, 
this pedagogy is grounded in the ungrounding of supposition or a stasis point based on the 
available clues. Obstructions rhetorically frame the narrative of pedagogy by imposing rules 
and encouraging guesswork rather than promising an arrest of the subject. 
Intervention of the Suppository Subject 
The work of supposing in pedagogy does not remove the role of desire between analyst/
analysand or master/student, or however the equation will be written. The master may still 
want to stubbornly pass on his knowledge to the student, while the student will maintain 
a need to escape the safety of the master’s gaze. The analyst pursues the patient to find the 
cure, and the patient must sustain the conversation to continue the masochistic pleasure of 
the association. Nevertheless, supposing allows these desires to be permissible responses 
to obstructions of the respective counterpart. In fact, it is the intervention on the part of 
the Other that stimulates the continuation of the pleasure of the interaction. Freud notes 
in his conversation with Lorenz that the patient took a somewhat unconscious pleasure, 
only visible to the analyst, when explaining the details of rat torture (Perelberg, Freud 
179). Conversely, it must be considered that the disturbing intricacies of the Rat Man’s case 
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became a source of obsessive fascination for Freud.
The title of Ronell’s essay refers to the mode of pleasure found in this pedagogical 
relationship as an “obsessional neurotic style” that follows closely with the masochistic 
contract of the subject that must “traverse the fantasy” of pleasure and pain already 
discussed. But it is also the subject that intervenes on the pleasure and pain of the Other, 
and so traverses the fantasy of the Other. This is the sujet suppositaire, or supposing subject 
that is also the obstruction, as a form of impetus for response. 
As the Rat Man’s symptoms include constipation connected to his issues of bodily 
torture, Ronell extends Freud’s intervention from supposing to “suppository” as the 
stimulus for the release of unconscious knowledge and sensations. Freud performs the 
function of suppository by intervening in Lorenz’s symptoms and guessing at their cause by 
following the trail of clues his patient leaves behind. The logic of the suppository is that the 
supposing induces a reaction to overcome the unconscious obstruction. The suppository 
itself doubles as an obstruction to the cure as a symptom that resists a cure and demands 
a new response from the patient. Ronell describes Freud’s role as a release to the block of 
the unconscious: “What gets things stirring is Freud’s insertion, at the paralyzed moment 
of the analysis, of the suppository discourse” (122). One of the Rat Man’s paranoid thoughts 
was that his parents (the focus of most of his symptoms) could read his thoughts, and it is 
this neurosis that Freud re-enacts when he continues his guesswork. Freud is left guessing 
(supposing) through strings of puns.
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In The Five Obstructions von Trier 
applies the suppository stimulus to Leth to get 
things “stirring” to lay bare his old mentor’s 
flaws and incite self-reflection. Leth’s response, 
however, is to resist the intentions of his student 
and reverse the challenge. Like the case of 
the Rat Man, teacher and student participate 
by intervening on the desire of the other. Von 
Trier inserts his suppository which, in turn, 
starts the chain reaction. Unlike Freud’s case, 
however, Leth resists and even challenges his 
student’s own suppositions of what should be 
the aim of the project. Von Trier stands in for 
the ambiguous space of the Sphinx subjecting 
Leth to vague restrictions resulting from Leth’s 
films, which continually fall short of von Trier’s 
expectations. The student’s assessments of 
each new composition exceed the intervention; 
Leth’s responses are always the wrong ones, the 
unintended leaving von Trier unsatisfied. But it is 
this unfulfilled desire that drives von Trier to now 
respond to Leth’s challenge. It is in the exchange 
of desire that supposing/suppository is at its 
most intense. Von Trier expects literal cinematic 
diarrhea, while Leth stubbornly hangs on to his 
excretory flows.  
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Here we have anything but an equitable exchange of knowledge, but a confrontation of ethos. For von Trier the obstructions are pregnant with meaning and possibilities, while 
the enunciation or expression of such will always fall short of the intended outcome. Žižek 
translates this inevitable failure of the human being to live up to desire in abject terms: 
“the birth of meaning is always an abortion” (Ticklish 58). This could mean that there is 
a moment before every utterance which carries with it a multiplicity of significance and 
is repressed for the sake of communication (although, meanings are never completely 
lost, they just become subsumed under neurosis). The crude side of this statement is that 
meaning aborts unmeaning; the birth event intervenes on the infant’s in utero life and 
ushers in the inception of originary trauma the infant can never express. The scene of 
writing is an attempt to recover this disaster which is always lost to us. 
Speaking of recovering the disaster, Maurice Blanchot notes, “It is upon losing what 
we have to say that we speak” (21). Blanchot’s concern is the finitude of language and the 
expression of what cannot be said: “We speak suggesting that something not being said is 
speaking” (21). He is of course playing with the various meanings of “being” and “speaking,” 
with the “not” conspicuously intervening between the words “something” and “being.” If 
in Žižek’s equation life interrupts unlife, terminates the possibility of anything but life, 
Blanchot sees “something” as the “not being said” coming into being when it “is speaking.” 
The birth event, the originary trauma, insists on recurrence through the scene of writing. 
But not just writing, writing as the intervention of the past, or the composition of the ethos 
of the supposing and suppository subject (the sujet suppositaire). Leth gave birth to von 
Trier, at least in terms of his influence on the style and ethos of the younger director. As 
a good analyst, von Trier returns the favor and intervenes on Leth’s filmmaking life, the 
perfect human having already been “said,” to offer his teacher the chance to recover his lost 
trauma. The gift of The Five Obstructions is that Leth’s work is now recovered and given new 
life amidst an unfamiliar public, The Perfect Human rescued from the repression of a cultural 
unconscious.
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The Ultimate Obstruction 
 The final obstruction in the film will require little in terms of action from Leth. 
Von Trier takes over production duties and makes his own version of The Perfect Human 
requiring Leth to only read a scripted narration that von Trier writes for the film, and 
then, as a final test, he asks Leth to attach his name to the film as director. This is a radical 
reversibility of the pedagogical relationship at the scene of writing. The assignment is to 
not act but wait, to hesitate and admit to the uncertainty of authorship and the recoiling of 
ethics (as discussed in earlier chapters) that questions the authority of ethos to determine 
action. The pedagogical ethos is split between teacher and student, beside itself supposing/
composing a response to continue speaking as a mode of being, or composing as a mode 
of living. Responding to obstructions requires a great deal of courage; to respond to the intervention of ethos is another option of praxis, as Žižek writes that it is neither the 
destruction of revolution nor the inaction of conservative thought, but a third way which is 
to choose neither, and to wait (Enjoy xvi). 
Waiting is ob/scene; it is not the waiting of inaction, which fits easily into the 
transmission model (not wanting to learn is a valid response to an assignment, but it is 
a response of negation). Waiting as praxis requires patience and reflection to allow the 
suppository to take effect, and this willingness to wait is a characteristic of the mediality 
of using obstructions as a way to compose. In Crack Wars Ronell extends an image of drug 
addiction as a mode of being that takes effect between beings. She describes an “ethics 
of decision” as a need to make a decision within the experience of hesitation: “Some 
hesitations are rigorous. They own up to the fact that no decision is strictly possible without 
the experience of the undecidable. To the extent that one may no longer be guided—by 
Truth, by light or logos—decisions have to be made” (58). Yes, decisions have to be made, 
and obstructions are not exempt; in fact they demand a decision. But they also demonstrate 
that in each new composition, each new obstruction from von Trier and accompanying film 
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from Leth, these decisions become more and more difficult to make as we get further from 
the truth, or the truth of the matter (sujet suppositaire).11
Here is a note of caution about trying to champion obstructions as a methodology 
for teaching in a classroom. Brian Massumi spends a lot of time in his book Parables for the 
Virtual discussing the pitfalls of cultural studies that relies on charting these suppository 
movements (as biological and detective work) in order to identify a logic of learning. 
He argues that although a multi-positional grid concept allows for varying positions of 
subjectivity, these subject positions still rely on positionality, or fixed sites of subject 
position (2). The sites may allow for overlapping, but they remain fixed and subject to 
ideological coding; he asks, 
Where has the potential for change gone? How does a body perform its 
way out of a definitional framework that is not only responsible for its very 
‘construction,’ but seems to prescript every signifying and countersignifying 
move as a selection from a repertoire of possible permutations on a limited 
set of predetermined terms? How can the grid itself change? (3)  
Massumi claims that these pre-defined positions on the grid ignore movement between 
spaces, not the spaces themselves but the movement—the protean transformation between 
figures. But it is this last question that describes the site of writing in terms of obstructions.
This is a question for Barthes and the undetermined third sense, as well as 
Agamben’s notion of mediality as neither means nor ends. Massumi’s concern with affect 
or “sens-ation” of course echoes Barthes’ own third sens(e). In Agamben’s The Coming 
Community mediality gets extended into discussions of ethics with his “whatever beings,” 
or the unthought composition as the composition of the ob/scene (1). These are three 
authors very much concerned with what happens in the midst of supposing, inserting the 
suppository drug for bodily effect. Massumi understands the grid as a real-but-abstract 
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concept from Deleuze, in which a grid may have abstract properties, but its effects are real 
(4). This all has to do with the idea of being, but not just as a hermeneutics or definition of being (Heidegger) but as potential (potenza) that exist before the possibilities are set 
within the grid of methodology, which is very much an ethical concern. The “minimal gap” or 
“delay” is Žižek’s way of writing the disaster through the waiting or interruption between an 
event “pregnant with meaning” and its symbolic, methodological representation. 
How does this connect to the idea of “the perfect human” as a pedagogical concept? 
All of these authors are discussing the transforming human being in the movement of 
meaning, as opposed to the being of static subjectivity—the perfect human not as telos or 
temporal construction but as bios or body of sensation and affect. To understand the ethical 
situation of the human as always in a movement that would make notions of perfection 
impossible places the emphasis on the possibility for change not structured by negation. 
We need a knowledge and practice of composition that would respond to the ob/scene of 
writing not only in reactionary or revolutionary ways, but by waiting.12  
Also today I 
experienced 
something -
- that I hope to 
understand
- in a few days.
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Chapter Five
Figural/Games
161
Accepting the Challenge
The connection between the fourth obstruction, The Perfect Human: Cartoon, and the 
fifth and final obstruction, The Perfect Human: Avedøre, Denmark, is the issue of pedagogy 
and writing. This returns to the concerns that began in the introduction about multimodal 
writing and what it means to compose not just in terms of text, but 
in images, sound, gestures, performances, and any other media 
that has been designated to particular technē. After an overview 
of how obstructions engage both conflict and play in terms of the 
figural games of assignment, I will compose several assignments 
that will perform the pedagogical maneuvers of obstructions. 
This will then bring the discussion of obstructions to a tentative 
conclusion that reimagines the project as a whole in the way that The Perfect Human: Avedøre reimagines not only The Perfect 
Human but The Five Obstructions as sites of ethical composition. 
This obstruction is unique in that it requires very little 
of Leth as far as actual film production. Von Trier takes the 
directorial reins and asks Leth to only read the narration that he 
writes for the film. The caveat is that he must sign his name to 
the film as director no matter the result of the film. He acquiesces 
and von Trier uses unseen documentary footage from the film to 
present Leth as the subject of the project all along (the perfect 
human, so to speak). Not only are the roles reversed, but von 
Trier attempts to erase that reversibility by crediting Leth as 
the director of the film. This final chapter will trace the steps of 
the final obstruction through a series of assignments and will, 
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ultimately, inevitably, lead to another final assignment to make yet another revision of The 
Perfect Human. The idea to make a sixth obstruction is not unique, but it is an assignment 
that must be met not only because it demands this as part of an engagement with 
multimodal writing, but also because it invites those that participate by watching the films 
to also participate by taking up the challenge. I will accept this challenge.
The Czar’s Hair
This project set out from the start to critique notions of multimodal writing as 
an extension of print based writing and that approaching images as literate devices does 
nothing to address the different modes that compositions come into being. If there is 
no reading images it is because they were never meant to be read but to be seen. The 
distinction, however, between reading and seeing is one of production and genre rather 
than of medium. Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen assert that the rich and vibrant 
illustrations that appear early in a child’s life through books are quickly transformed into 
the maps and diagrams of academic life, “away from ‘expression’ and toward technicality” 
(16). Expression does not vanish completely, but is sublimated into the need for “reading” 
to produce an economic benefit. Reading and writing drifts away from expressions of 
play to the production of specialized labor. Kress and Leeuwen suggest that the play of 
visuality reemerges when reading silently without vocalization is the sign of the “fully 
literate person” who can “treat writing as a visual medium” (17). But this neither proves 
that writing is visual, nor that images are textual; it does, however, demonstrate that any 
operational definition for either text or images will inevitably recoil back onto itself (as 
proper semioticians, Kress and Leeuwen’s book is productively titled Reading Images). 
 The pedagogy developed in the previous chapter intervenes on the scene of writing 
at this recoil, the gap between reading and seeing, and responds with a third option 
which I referred to earlier as waiting. The notion of a third choice brings the analysis of 
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obstructions back to the ethical difficulty of Barthes’ third sense and the way that images 
do indeed possess a kind of literate informational and symbolic meaning. And yet, as 
Barthes says, there remains something that is not part of the language system, something 
hidden from both reading and seeing; meaning is not relegated to any one system, but 
“remains suspended between the image and its description, or between definition and 
approximation” (“The Third [Sense]” 61).  The difference between obtuse meaning and the 
informational and symbolic levels is that it substitutes the economy of semiotic production 
(the exchanges of signs and signifieds) for the play of the ob/scene.
Barthes begins to explore the obtuse meaning through the film still from Eisenstein’s 
Ivan the Terrible by simply describing the visual elements of the scene. The obtuse, however, 
escapes these descriptions because, as he writes, “[the obtuse] has something to do with 
disguise” (58). In this case, disguise refers to the visual composition of character which 
emerges as parergon, or the additions made to informational and symbolic meanings; 
the character is always in disguise. In this condition, Derrida was right to question where 
parergon begins and ends for the scene. Eisenstein wraps the czar in a disguise “twice over,” 
as both actor and character, “without one disguise destroying another” (58). To make some 
sense of the obtuse, Barthes identifies one aspect of the movie czar’s disguise as containing 
the intervening affect: “The whole of the obtuse meaning (its disruptive force) is staked 
on the excessive mass of the hair” (58). Not only is this scene characterized by the play of 
disguise, but the force of the obtuse is overdetermined in every possible visual element: 
hidden/ present, back/forth.
fort da
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The czar’s hair intervenes in the representational value of the image, functioning as 
part of the actor’s costume, to disguise identity, while calling attention to itself as ob/scene 
composition and something more than what the frame can hold. Wavering between absence 
(lack) and absense (excess) the image turns the tables on the frame by playing with the 
relationship of sign/signified. When Freud discovered his grandson playing his own version of fort/da it came as a surprise to the doctor that the child would ignore the productive 
knowledge that the toy’s intended use provided. The child turned the tables on the 
hermeneutics of psychoanalysis by switching the use value of his toy and Freud reveals his 
bewilderment as he describes the game: “The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string 
tied around it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him, for instance, 
and play at its being a carriage” (Beyond the Pleasure Principle 9). Freud disguises his own 
confusion of the game by citing the child’s deviation from what he sees as a more culturally 
productive use for the toy. It is only later that Freud imposes an interpretive matrix for 
the play event, but for the moment the narrative posits the image of a grandfather whose 
understanding is suspended while waiting on the absent toy to reemerge from its hidden 
location. The teaching of pedagogy gives way to the play of figure.
Of course, pedagogy never really vanishes. It always dangles on the end of the string 
ready to be yanked back into view. There is always something to be learned in the play of 
the figure, something that the intrepid professor can transform into productive knowledge 
for the student’s use value. Games can be fun, but dangerous; always ask your doctor before 
using. There is no game, however, without ethical difficulty, an obstruction which has made 
the game necessary, a reminder of Gene Youngblood’s belief about the difference between 
art and games in his idea of an “expanded cinema”: “Art is research, whereas entertainment 
is a game or conflict” (Expanded Cinema, 65). According to Freud, his grandson turned the 
trauma of the absent mother into a game of “fort.” 
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Assignment 1: Assignation, Seduction
What is given when a teacher gives a student an assignment? There are aspects of play and 
research found within the assignment. An assignment is a game and a contract; participation 
is about obligation and care. There is a seductive quality to the assignment, it initiates 
challenges, requires loyalty, and calls for completion. The game of the assignment is to 
articulate goals while offering the opportunity for unintended outcomes. 
This assignment asks the student not to meet the expectations of the assignment, 
but to become seduced by the play of assignation. Write the script for a short scene between 
two people; choose a setting, a time, a stage. Pass this script to another, and select a new 
script to record yourself. What is the back story for this strange new scene? What do you 
hate about it; what do you love? How does it call to you? What new obstructions arise that 
your own creation did not require? 
The law of seduction takes the form of an uninterrupted ritual exchange 
where seducer and seduced constantly raise the stakes in a game that never 
ends. And cannot end since the dividing line that defines the victory of the 
       We will formulate 
    a few obstructions. It’s completely insane.
1 2
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one and the defeat of the other, is illegible. And because there is no limit to 
the challenge to love more than one is loved, or to be always more seduced—
if not death. (Baudrillard, “On Seduction” 22)
Teachers face an ethical conflict similar to Freud’s grandson when they must decide 
how it is that students will learn. They place a retroactive play value on assignments to 
resolve the tension of best practices, but the original ethical conflict arises once again 
when assignments must suddenly be evaluated. Patricia Donahue offers an example of the 
obstruction of pedagogy when she explains how she uses Barthes’ essay “The Third [Sense]” 
as a model for teaching students how writing can produce different kinds of knowledge. 
After explaining how Barthes plays with meaning and encouraging her students to do so 
through various assignments, she justifies her method by pulling the pedagogical string 
back: “We can translate this method into the classroom idiom, into pedagogy, and use it 
to design assignments and to comment upon student writing as real writing, as a complex 
recoding of a social story” (Donahue 75). This is a hard sell; Barthes’ essay resists exactly 
this kind of methodological design. He writes not knowing what it is he is writing about, 
but follows the clues and ultimately can only suppose what they can possibly mean. The 
translation that Donahue approaches, but cannot finally grasp, is one of rhetorical analysis, 
how Barthes writes about writing or imagines about images. Assignments would have to 
be thought in terms of ethical difficulty, not translation or design principles, to allow the 
pedagogical string to disappear once again. 
An assignment acquires the character of a contractual obligation between teacher 
and student as a result of assessment as the intended outcome; the expected result is not 
only productive knowledge but production itself, the student’s placement into the mold 
of labor specialization. But the assignment also has the hidden character of assignation, 
or the secret arrangement between intimate partners that has been socially or culturally 
regulated as forbidden, and has the implication of a seduction of sorts. Thought of in terms 
of assignation, assignments are not just extensions of methods or the functions of design, 
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but sites of obstruction and reciprocity, multivalent spaces of learning that consider art (as 
research, technē) and play (as games and conflict) as part of an “expanded” composition. 
Assignments happen in a location and between human beings that care for one another, a 
caring that is disguised and framed out by the context of the scene of writing.
If assignment contains the seductive features of the assignation, then it is important 
to consider what it is about the assignment that is seductive as distinct from purely sexual 
uses of the term. Seduction is useful also as a contrast to production as a pedagogical 
outcome of assignments. Seduction plays the fort/da game of the ob/scene in the face of 
the bloated obscenity of systems of production and consumption. Jean Baudrillard makes 
this case for seduction as a counter-narrative to the modern obsession with production. He 
argues that seduction is the opposite of interpretation; while the latter sets out to disclose 
meaning in order for truth to emerge (discourse), the former is more interested in hiding 
meaning behind the superficiality of appearances. For Baudrillard, “Seduction is that which 
extracts meaning from discourse and detracts from its truth” (“On Seduction” 152). The 
act of “leading astray” is more than just fulfilling the promises, but a holding back of those 
promises in opposition to clarity and transparency.
Baudrillard maintains that the production of discourses cannot help but be 
implicated in the tension: “Every discourse is complicit in this abduction of meaning, in this 
seductive maneuver of interpretation; if one discourse did not do this, then others would 
take its place” (153). But the reason that these narratives of discourse are not crushed 
under the weight of their own hidden meaning is that seduction also implies a certain play 
of signification. Rather than a battle, Baudrillard sees it as a game: 
All appearances conspire to combat meaning, to uproot meaning, whether 
intentional or not, and to convert it into a game, according to some other 
rules of the game, arbitrary ones this time, to some other elusive ritual, 
more adventurous and more seductive than the mastery of meaning. . . . 
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And if [discourse] must overcome something, it is not the fantasies and 
hallucinations, which are full of meaning and counter-meaning, but rather 
the brilliant surface of nonsense and all the play that it makes possible. (153)
Baudrillard’s seduction is a game implicit in an object, causing it to turn away from its own 
production based use-value. This allows the conversion of objects of production to turn 
away from an original meaning and, through the seduction of appearances, engage in the 
play of modes and media. Assignments can transform from their role as training practices 
to a game of strangeness and intrepidation. Baudrillard presents seduction as a rhetoric of 
hidden meaning, simultaneously indulging and drawing back from the viewer’s desire for 
full disclosure.Are The Five Obstructions and the five new films which makes up the larger film this 
film and series of films examples of pulling the pedagogical string back and forth? Do they 
acknowledge a game of knowledge production while performing a ritual seduction? If there 
is an ethic of obstructions, do obstructions also provide a way for this notion of ethics to 
emerge from its hiding place? Can there possibly be a successful obstruction? If so, what 
would it look like? Answer: it would look like this: [pause]. In other words, it would be an 
image of critical writing that exceeds the expressions of both reading and seeing, and whose 
stakes remain within the discursive realms of aesthetics and writing. In the film(s) The Five 
Obstructions each new assignment between von Trier and Leth is an assignation, an intimate 
recognition that not only demands but deserves a response. In terms of assignation, ethos 
is a designation of attitude or composition of assigning an obstruction toward the Other 
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receiving the gesture, and vice versa. If assignation happens in a location, or at a site of 
writing, then composition is a general term for determining the various configurations of 
the complex interactions that occur at the level of ethics. 
There is no need to critique Donahue’s use of Barthes’ essay as a pedagogical model. 
Her essay is a rewriting of Barthes, and it accepts the assignment that Barthes offers the 
reader. Donahue repeats this assignation, and offers us as readers another configuration, 
another disguise, for the scene of writing that invites us as intimate guests to respond. 
In “Abandoned to Writing,” Victor Vitanza is also responding to Barthes (but, of course, 
countless others) when he connects the difficulty of ethos and disguise to the scene of 
writing an abandoned location of assignation (ob/scene): “There is something about 
‘writing’ that not only ‘we’ hide from ourselves but also that writing itself hides from us. 
Though hidden, ‘it’ cannot be found. If supposedly found, ‘it’ is easily lost again. Actually and 
Virtually, ‘it’ is not hidden! Nor is it ever found.” No wonder there is so much controversy 
about the place of multimodal writing; we have yet to discover what writing is. I mean this 
literally, of course!
 The example from Donahue demonstrates how the need to justify pedagogical 
tactics can lead to missing the forest for the trees. Different methodologies will interpret the 
pedagogical clues in ways that structure the answers for particular systems of consumption. 
It is where methods end that ethics intervene and pedagogy must begin: how ought a 
teacher to teach when a method has failed. This is how the perfect teacher falls.
 Robert B. Ray makes this same objection on ethical grounds in his book The Avant-
Garde Finds Andy Hardy. Ray makes the point that scholars who endlessly repeat the 
procedures of semiotic, ideological, psychoanalytic, etc. approaches keep making the same 
kinds of arguments, or a kind of revision that lacks the ethical context of the collaborative 
context. In Ray’s estimation, academics who engage in such research become adept at 
wielding particular vocabularies or canons of work, but they “have ignored [the] lesson” 
of those who first invented them (6). This is assignment without assignation. In this case, 
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theory becomes theology, implementing sets of proper questions and procedures that will 
result in known quantities and reliable outcomes. Ray suggests that to overcome formulaic 
pedagogy we need to ask the improper questions while allowing for moments of surprise 
(8). He structures his book around assignments and proposes the benefits of avant-garde 
approaches to writing. Whether or not all scholarly teaching could take advantage of the 
surrealist techniques Ray describes is open to debate, and it is important to note even an 
avant-garde method is still a method with the capacity to structure knowledge in specific 
ways. 
 Ray, however, understands that any frame will both structure and police a scene. The 
making of compositions, written or otherwise, is not dependent on any one methodological 
system, or mode of being, but there are power relationships that assure compliance. 
Ranciére described this as a political issue in terms of “the distribution of the sensible,” 
which requires the particular materials and practices for the form to be acknowledged by 
the community. To escape this regime one must invent something new within community 
standards, something that cannot yet be articulated within the confines of a certain regime 
of knowledge. In Ray’s view, Barthes’ attempt to escape the regime involves a rhetorical 
process of extraction and fragmentation: “In both, the individual segment, image or detail is 
isolated from the narrative that would circumscribe it” (36). The third sense is not framed 
by any particular regime; it does not properly belong to the scene.
The obstruction of the scene compels Barthes to extract and fragment significance 
from the scene, and he does this by freezing the image. Pausing the scene extracts the image 
from the temporal flow of the cinematic movement and allows him to fragment the scene 
into different parts that conflict with the informational and symbolic levels of meaning. 
What these levels do not account for is Barthes’ emotional and enthusiastic reactions to 
Eisenstein’s film, as well as his declaration that he is “not sure if the reading of this third 
meaning is justified” (53). Justifiability is a proper pedagogical question. Pausing the film 
is not proper practice, but it does respond to Barthes’ assignation with the scene. What is it 
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that makes him literally pause in his tracks? This is critical writing that is both multimodal 
(it must engage many modes of production, despite being relegated to print) and makes 
use of revision (creates a new scene, an ob/scene). In short, the assignation of the image 
contains an obstruction that offers an assignment; Barthes’ assignment is to rewrite the 
film not as orthodoxy but as experiment or game. The rest of the chapter will continue the 
pedagogical game with The Five Obstructions and tease out a few more assignments that will 
investigate what it is about this film that makes us pause in our tracks.
Assignment 2: The Perfect Remake
The obstructions in The Five Obstructions require Leth to remake his film in multiple modes 
and under varying conditions. He responds to von Trier with very different results from the 
original The Perfect Human. Instead of offering a list of limitations that will fundamentally 
change the approach and style of the original film, this assignment asks the student to create 
an exact reproduction of the original The Perfect Human. All shots, colors, angles, costumes, 
sets, speech, actions, film stock, and running length must be strictly followed. The only 
deviation allowed is the casting of different actors. This is not only for convenience sake, 
but absolutely mandatory. The change in actors provides the point of intervention for the 
 The obstructions 
will come from you.
  I couldn’t say  
 what they would be.
3 4
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perfect remake and will emphasize the small differences and gaps between the original and 
its remake.
In Notes on Gesture Giorgio Agamben sees cinema as leading images “back to 
the homeland of gesture” (55). The movement that Deleuze also theorizes in his cinema 
volumes remobilizes the “posed-ness” that had paralyzed images by the end of the 
nineteenth century, right before the vaunted birth of motion pictures. With its emphasis on 
disclosing gesture, as Agamben notes, cinema belongs not just to the realm of aesthetics, 
but to ethics and politics as well. Gesture, movement, infuses cinematic arts with ethical and 
political possibilities not inherent to the static image alone. 
At first glance this seems to be at odds with Barthes’s conception of the third sense 
he perceives within still frame images of films. What must be considered, however, is how 
this action of freezing the movement itself is essential to the revelation of the “prick” of the 
obtuse in film images. Barthes himself notes the tenuous presence of the obtuse as it quickly 
vanishes between two contiguous frames of Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin [1925] (“The 
Third [Sense]” 57). What has changed in the transition between the frames? The tectonic 
foundation for relations between the viewing subject and the static object on the screen 
has shifted. For the viewing subject, movement must be meaningful; choice and action must 
communicate an ethical value. Freezing the movement does not halt movement altogether, 
but suspends it in such a way that reveals the mediality of gesture. The image fascinates 
the subject, fastens the viewer to the screen, subjugates the subject to another sense, and 
interrupts being. 
We have already noted that Agamben sees gesture as a “third type of action” distinct 
from “acting” (agere) and “making” (facere). These are productive actions that he borrows 
from Marcus Terentius Varro, who derives them from Aristotle. Gesture is suspended 
between the ends and means of production as an action of mediality from which “the 
being-in-a-medium of human beings” emerges (“Notes” 57). Rather than produce meaning, 
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cinematic images sense meaning as they enact the libidinal tics and gags that are suppressed 
by narrative flow; early screen figures like Charlie Chaplin and Buster Keaton turned images 
into pure gag or pure gesture. Tom Gunning traces the excitement and surprise of early 
film back to the pleasure of the thrill ride. He derives his famous expression “the cinema 
of attractions” from the fairground, placing these new images not with the aesthetics of 
traditional arts but with the sensory acceleration of thrill rides, noting that the development 
of cinema occurs alongside the rise of amusement parks like Coney Island (Gunning 65-66). 
The excitement of thrill rides becomes a scene for the revision of sensation as the desire to 
ride recoils around both attraction and fear. The fear of turning control of one’s self over to a 
machine is the fear of the loss of subjectivity, and it is assuaged by the repetition of the scene 
and the anticipation of a quick exit.
Early in his book The Parallax View Žižek performs a similar recoiling of subject and 
object in order to interrogate the libidinal investments involved in subject (mis)identity. In 
his explanation subject and object difference must be considered as a difference in verbs: 
subject is passive (subjected) and related to Nietzsche’s idea of amor fati, accepting freely 
that which is necessary; object is “that which objects” or disturbs and intervenes on the 
subject (Parallax View 17). Žižek provides an interesting approach to compositional revision 
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that accepts this subject/object recoil as an obstruction. If the representational quality of 
images is based on a subject/object relationship, then images become symptoms, ciphers 
for repressed meaning, or the outward sign of originary trauma that must be resolved. This 
could be termed a symptomatic practice of composition.  Žižek supplements the symptom 
with the sinthome, which he borrows from Lacan as a concept for that which possesses no 
determinant meaning: “it just gives body . . .  [to] excessive enjoyment” (Enjoy Your Symptom! 
226). In the sinthome Žižek provides a bridge from gesture to pleasure (jouissance) and 
revises the struggle of Freud’s Eros and Thanatos as the sensation of a thrill ride, recoiling 
around attraction and fear. As sinthome, gesture or the mediality of images produces 
nothing but a third sense, or, as Žižek says, the tic is nothing in that it is the “fullness of 
libidinal investment” (227). This investment is ethical because it shares the recoiling movement of ethos between the desire and fear of losing control.
Here we get two words for this kind of ethical investment: jouis-sense and enjoy-
meant, significance as sensation not in terms of sense (reason) but as pleasure (ethics). 
Ethical pleasure can be considered a sinthome because, according to Žižek, it does not 
require any particular reading or translation: “in contrast to symptom which is a cipher of 
some repressed meaning, sinthome has no determinant meaning; it just gives body, in its 
repetitive pattern, to some elementary matrix of jouissance, of excessive enjoyment” (Enjoy 
Your Symptom! 226). It is an empty cipher of excessive meanings which he also relays into 
the gesture as an excessive sign of all possible signs.1 The weight of the ob/scene continues 
to be felt within the frame of the mise-en-scéne even through the hegemony of symptomatic 
readings. These excluded possibilities “give body” to the composition and maintain a kind of 
medial presence outside the scene.
Unfortunately, Žižek does not recognize the game that the sinthome plays with 
symptoms, and thus he misses the part that obstructions play in revealing the constructed 
character of compositions. He sees invention itself as a negative gesture that limits and 
determines choices, rather than the positive act of offering a new order. Žižek escapes 
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into negation at the very moment of dis-enclosure. This negative view of invention gives 
obstructions a purely regulating role within composition; but what is missing from this view 
is the act of response as a counter-gesture and that invention with restriction happens in a 
context of collaboration. Part of Žižek’s reluctance to embrace obstructions is that he objects 
to remakes in general and specifically bemoans Gus van Sant’s 1998 remake of Alfred 
Hitchcock’s venerable Psycho (1960). Supposedly van Sant had maintained the integrity of 
each shot from the original; however, Žižek calls it a “failed masterpiece” in that he did not 
fully realize his idea, ultimately making both narrative and formal changes to the original. 
This turns van Sant’s effort into just another remake or homage to a master, and as a master 
Hitchcock is reverted back into a symptom as the sign for repressed meaning that must be 
released through the remake. The remake becomes a means to an end and subverts its own 
gestural qualities. 
Without realizing, Žižek is approving of the challenges, or obstructions, that van Sant 
had established and believes that the problem with the film is that the director did not go far 
enough to accomplish the challenge of a remake. Žižek’s solution is to strive for the radically 
same film, complete formal identity that would show its cracks and fissures all the more 
through nuanced differences such as lighting, color, acting. This radically same film would 
become an absolute other film, a totally different film because of the “the uncanny effect of 
the double,” and it is “on account of this very sameness we would all the more powerfully 
experience that we are dealing with a totally different film” (235). The radically similar film 
approaches “Hitchcock” not as a symptom or container for whatever it is that the director 
The Five Obstructions The Perfect Human: Avedøre
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desires, but as a sinthome or response to the obstruction that is the impossible challenge 
of the radically similar film. By staging exactly the same scenes without interpretation, the 
gaps in identity suddenly surface as uncanny and infinitely different. 
The second obstruction to overcoming negative invention is to explore the ob/
scene by staging those excluded scenes which weigh down on the original. Žižek suggests 
that staging other scenes that were never shot would also speak to this kind of sublime 
invention. For example, what happens when Žižek watches a truncated version of Vertigo 
(1958)? The happy ending of the film is delayed, suspended infinitely, the gesture of 
the final fade is paralyzed, and the libidinal investments are intensified (237). Suddenly 
the composition is not complete and the truncated images project the discontents of a 
fragmentation; any given scene (of composition, of reality) always implies another.
These obstructions have already been (dis)figured by von Trier and Leth in The Five 
Obstructions. In fact, von Trier pushes Žižek a step further by having the filmmaker himself 
create his own remakes to reveal scenes that had always been implied by the original. The 
game of obstructions works to reclaim the sinthome, as the notion of the “perfect human” 
becomes less and less a goal of which the film was originally intended. The final obstruction 
contains a parting gesture which discloses, under the very limitations that Žižek described, 
the sublime reality of human perfection. It is important to remember that the film literally 
ends on a deictic gesture that accompanies an image: “This is how the perfect human falls.” 
Assignment 3: Interruption 
In the essay “The Third [Sense],” Barthes discusses his notion of the “obtuse meaning” that 
he experiences, or gains a sense of, through his viewings of different films, but particularly 
Sergei Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible. To investigate this obtuseness within certain films, 
Barthes observes still frames that make him pause, distorting his narrative understanding 
of the film. The movement that characterizes cinematic media is interrupted, suspended 
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in time, and the rhetorical energy of his argument flows out of the frozen image. The 
interruption of the scene is an obstruction to narrative understanding, but it allows for 
other discussions to emerge. Barthes even claims that slight changes in the chosen frame 
will shift the meaning so that the obtuse sense is covered over again so that the contingency 
of the scene is lost.
This assignment asks the student to perform the impossible task of the third sense. 
The student is to record and edit a short narrative sequence so that video stills can be 
extracted. Pause the sequence multiple times until one frame jumps out at you as having 
some strange sense that it does not belong to the scene. Keep the image frozen in place and 
stare at it until it begins to change and slip out from beneath the original narrative context. 
It may begin to speak, even scream for the scene to continue. Persistence will be rewarded, 
the image will fall silent—it will no longer speak as part of the scene, but from the unseen, 
out-of-field, or ob/scene. 
Now allow the scene to continue. The image is gone. This assignment is impossible.
 
 When von Trier proposes to Leth the requirements of the final obstruction he 
admits to Leth that he will be using the footage shot during the other obstructions and that 
“Hopefully we captured something human as we talked.” Leth accepts the conditions of the 
 The task is, in 
every sense, impossible.
  But here we  
 are responding to it.
5 6
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film without discussion, eager to allow von Trier the burden of creation. The entire project 
in the eyes of von Trier has been to “capture something human” in Leth and his work, and 
there is a sense that he has thus far failed. This final obstruction is a last ditch effort to force 
the issue of the perfect human. If there is something human in Leth, then von Trier is hell 
bent on revealing it, if not by the constraints of the obstructions, then by the obligation to 
speak the words that von Trier will write for him. After claiming that he knows more about 
Jørgen Leth than even Leth himself, he admits that he had envisioned the whole experiment 
of obstructions as a “Help Jørgen Leth Project,” and then goes so far as to tell Leth not to be 
nervous about his voice over narration because “All your guilt I have taken upon me. You are 
guiltless. You are like a little child. You don’t have to do a thing.” While driving to complete 
his obligation to the film, Leth calls the script a “fiction. . . . A letter to him from me.” 
 Von Trier and Leth create a fiction for the final obstruction, one that relies on the 
religious imagery that von Trier explores so regularly of human failings and redemption, 
guilt and sacrifice. Ultimately, the final obstruction for Leth is as von Trier describes it, “You 
don’t have to do a thing.” There is nothing to be done, nothing for him to do. He is suspended 
by the obstruction, his role as director deferred to another, and he is obligated to read a 
fiction that seems to know him better than the truth. The script is intolerable in the way 
that Foucault described the connection between fiction and ethos.2 For Leth it is intolerable 
that von Trier has interrupted the project by forcing him to suspend his desires and read the 
words of an/other. 
The flow of responses that has been up to this point the mark of the obstructions 
is suddenly suspended for the sake of a “fiction.” This is how Leth and von Trier follow 
Barthes’ lead in “pausing” the image of the film without actually stopping the film. Barthes’ 
decision to freeze the image was to explore a sense of the obtuse that quickly appears and 
vanishes in cinematic movement. For Leth and von Trier, the fictions introduced by the voice 
over narration and Leth’s misplaced credit as director interrupt the flow of obstructions by 
demonstrating the intolerability that the project in general was, from the outset, a fiction, 
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and that the  film itself suffers from a crisis of ethos and the question of ethics.
Early in her book The Emergence of Cinematic Time Mary-Ann Doane differentiates 
between “rationalization” and “contingency” as temporal terms for the unraveling of the 
cinematic experience. For Doane, rationalization denotes the smooth progression of time 
as the fictional representation of real time. Contingency, on the other hand, is the revelation 
of interruption and chance as a resistant structure of a composition. While rationalization 
relies on a logic of literacy to “read” the scene and apply the appropriate understanding, 
contingency is marked by event (Ereignis), or a misunderstanding that threatens 
representational whole (11). For Doane there is a political imperative as rationalization 
is necessary to the perpetuation of capitalism, but even more important is that temporal 
contingency interrupts this apparent sense of the unalterable progression of time. 
Cinematic images, still or in movement, provide contingencies through indexicality 
or potential for meaning. Doane explains that the indices of the cinema are not a slave to 
the sign and that contingency “explains the overwhelming multiplicity and diversity of 
detail which contributes to the sense that a film must be experienced rather than described, 
that it is fundamentally alien to interpretation or translation” (25). One way that cinema 
exposes contingencies is through what she calls “dead time” or the moments in films that 
appear to lack narrative motivation or that just hang silently between plot points. “Dead 
time” is temporal excess that is sacrificed as waste or surplus that is inextricably linked with 
representing the event; rationalization creates meaning by reducing the waste of dead time 
(160). But cinema can, through its indexicality or potential for multiple meanings, become a 
record of time “unanchored” from the propensity for rationalized temporality (162).
Contingency also explains why Barthes felt it necessary to view Eisenstein’s film as 
a still image composition rather than as a scene or sequence, or even an entire film. Robert 
Ray sees the pause as a visual apparatus that can detach the image from the narrative: “if 
the movies’ relentless unrolling prevents your noticing anything except the narratively 
underlined details, the only response is to stop the film” (103). Pausing not only suspends 
180
narrative action, but Ray submits that it introduces the viewer to the film en media res, in 
the midst of the film as an event already in progress, emphasizing its place as a fragment of 
a composed scene. Dead time would refer quite literally to a decomposed or decomposing 
scene that begins to show the cracks and fissures in the fiction of the unified reading of the 
film event. If contingency reveals the multiple meanings present in cinematic compositions, 
then it is the interruption of obstructions that finally gives Leth and von Trier the 
opportunity to step back and see the ethical aspect of their project—that neither of them 
has controlled the obstructions from the beginning. Every film has far exceeded the original 
premise of discovering the perfect human.
Interruption does not just suspend time, but it is also a difference that introduces 
change. In her book Death 24X a Second Laura Mulvey also engages Barthes and the still 
image as a reach into Lacan’s field of the Real as an interruption or distortion of the fiction 
of the congruently 
composed film. Mulvey 
points to the problematic 
nature of the cinematic 
image as both moving and 
still image(s). The desire 
for the fiction of real time 
is connected to Freud’s 
death drive, is the death drive or reality principle, because, as Mulvey indicates, a movie 
watched in the “correct” way (without pausing) “is elusive” because the nostalgic technology 
and conditions of the cinema make it difficult to interrupt the scene: “The insubstantial 
and irretrievable passing of the celluloid film image is in direct contrast to the way that the 
photograph’s stillness allows for the presence of time to emerge within the image” (66). 
For Mulvey it is the speed of the image as a series of static shots and the ability to pause the 
succession, to halt the movement, beyond narrative necessity that interrupts the death drive 
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of the nostalgic technology of the cinema. Pausing allows details to be revealed that may 
have only been before registered as unconscious specters. 
Pausing has always been essential to the editing process, but has now become a 
feature of modern cinematic experiences outside of the theater. The interruption of a scene 
allowed by the technics of modern “film” watching introduce unintended anomalies into film 
composition. This occurs as different modes of creation and viewing: for example, how von 
Trier and Leth explore these same sorts of interruptions as obstructions, but then interrupt 
their own obstructions in the reversal of the final obstruction. Experimental filmmakers 
have always tapped into this interrupting impulse, shedding the death drive for the 
possibilities of desire and pleasure. In a way The Five Obstructions is an experimental film, 
as its emphasis is not on producing and watching, but first watching and then responding as 
creative processes of thinking, making, and doing. 
Assignment 4: “How is this scene possible?”
There is the potential for violence in every image—every scene of writing presents the 
possibility for shock or surprise. The shock of an image is not quantitative; it cannot be 
measured, and it affects individuals in different ways. What is shocking to one person 
may not be so much to another. This assignment asks the student to explore individual 
comfort zones in terms of the confusion of shock. The student will investigate a subject 
matter that stirs this sense of the recoil, not only as violence but as a feeling of incredibility 
and uncontrollability. Decide on a general scene that causes this disturbance as a sense 
of estrangement and perhaps shame at being completely powerless to understand the 
meaning of the scene. This assignment asks the student to find a composition that forces a 
pause, literally and figuratively interrupting the movement of the scene. In short, the image 
will force the ethical question of “How is this scene possible?”
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Kate Millet has a lot to write about invention and multimodal composition. In her 
book The Politics of Cruelty, she argues that “Technological means are incapable of serving 
the demands put upon them by ideology” (58). This means that multimodal composition 
is in some respect an obstruction to writing—that media have a difficult time responding 
to the burden of ideological requests. Her example is how the small capacity of the gas 
chambers in concentration camps made ideological mass murder difficult. As a response 
to this “problem” of efficiency those in charge of this method had to employ a great deal 
of invention. What are the ethics of obstruction in this situation? What are the stakes in 
continuing to leave the question of ethics in its recoiling movement? Can an image be 
interruptive and ethically questionable, as well as offensive to our sensitivities? Is it time to 
draw lines?
 These are all important questions that have been raised throughout this project and 
that Millet is most concerned with in her book. She is also writing about images, specifically 
images of torture and violence, and she is questioning in a very personal way the meaning 
of these visual spectacles. In a way, the brutality experienced in a scene of torture is only 
heightened by the presence of other banal and everyday objects, sights and sounds. But 
Millet does believe that there are “certain objects by their very frailty and triviality seem to 
 But isn’t there 
a kind of violence in this 
task?
  Yes, there is 
always that risk involved 
in a response.
7 8
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resist this metamorphosis” (37). She mentions a green enamel coffee cup that a prisoner 
of the Lubyanka in Moscow was given by the guards with an image of a little spectacle 
wearing cat reading a book and watching a bird. In noticing the odd décor of such a location 
of violence, the prisoner laughed from the irony, but also from the small bit of life that the 
cup had afforded him (37). Later she imagines “the worn steps of the Lubyanka,” perpetually 
crossed by both guard and prisoner, constant stepping that transforms those stairs into the 
evocative architecture of cruelty (39). These are images whose meanings become distorted 
and virtually incomprehensible due to the conditions of their appearance. 
When these images do appear they perform the same violent interruption 
committed by the act of cruelty. As Millet describes, the scale of these everyday images 
become monstrous and pregnant with meaning not sustainable by language (61). Violent 
imagery takes the obtuse sense to its radical limits where the recoiling movement becomes 
one of shock and horror. But it is a recoil that is disinterested, as the technological apparatus 
that captures violent acts renders a distance from the scene which the viewer cannot 
completely close. In any case, whether it is a green enamel cup or the photograph of a 
torture victim, the image serves simultaneously as the embodiment of the event and a 
mediating representation. The extent of the experience can never be fully realized and the 
depth of emotion felt can never be fully grasped.
The disinterestedness of the spectator is not from lack of caring, but from the 
inability to fully comprehend the scene. This confusion of context is what Millet describes as 
“shock” and she admits to her own inability to fully grasp some of the scenes she witnesses. 
She reserves her most difficult feelings for images of sexual violence, or for those images 
that seem to mix sexuality with brutality. She voices her reactions to these as “the shock I 
am trying to fathom” and a “blinding experience of shame,” wondering as to the meaning of 
these images (159). Later she will shift the question away from meaning and toward being: 
“How is this scene possible?” (164). She abandons her search for meaning and questions 
generally how the scene could have come to exist. Millet could have directed her question to 
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those involved in the torture, asking how it came to be that they could perform such acts on 
other human beings. But she also could have meant the question in terms of the technology 
of composition. How is it that a scene such as this was made possible? What ethical lapse 
led to the creation of scenes of brutal torture? Just as the capacity to pause a film offered 
the capacity to expose one frame for an unlimited duration, this same technology keeps the 
image of torture alive indeterminately. 
The images with which Millet most struggles are three photographs from the end of 
Georges Bataille’s Tears of Eros that depict a man subjected to the Chinese torture ling chi, 
translated as “death by a hundred cuts.” Bataille perceives within these images of extreme 
cruelty an intense ecstasy that surpasses even eroticism. It is this juxtaposition of eroticism 
and brutality, sexual excitement and the horror of torture, which forces Millett to pause her 
writing to make peace with her inability to grasp Bataille’s obsession with these images. 
These brutal images, she argues, can only communicate cruelty as images of pain and 
suffering (166). Bataille would not disagree except to say that cruelty is no reason to ignore 
the ecstatic anguish communicated through the photographs. Of this scene of violence he 
writes, “This photograph had a decisive role in my life. I have never stopped being obsessed 
by this image of pain, at once ecstatic(?) and intolerable” (Tears of Eros 206). The intensity 
of the image is left open to the question of the intolerable; what is lost or sacrificed within 
this scene of violence? Do we gain anything through its existence? 
The photographic apparatus makes it possible to delay death and suspend the 
victim’s suffering infinitely. What is intolerable is the inability to resolve the contradictory 
terms of the images: “What I suddenly saw, and what imprisoned me in anguish—but which 
at the same time delivered me from it—was the identity of these perfect contraries, divine 
ecstasy and its opposite, extreme horror. And this is my inevitable conclusion to a history of 
eroticism” (206-7). His conclusion is that there is no resolution because it has been deferred 
in the image. Bataille extends the “obtuse sense” of the still frame to its radical limits, and 
for Millett, as well as Bataille, these limits are the interruption of the experience of the 
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image, shock for Millett and ecstasy(?) for Bataille. Together the authors declare “How is this 
scene possible!”
There are no images of torture or extreme violence in The Five Obstructions, 
although there is the presence of extreme poverty which is a kind of cruelty. The ethics of 
obstruction and revision, however, must at some point question the place of these kinds 
of images in the scene of writing. What we learn from both Millett and Bataille is that the 
experience of these kinds of images causes its own kind of interruption which paralyzes 
the act of writing, at least temporarily. The images in Tears of Eros disrupt and challenge 
Millett’s mode of thinking about the cruel, and she must stop and work through her 
ambivalent feelings. Even Bataille admits to the disruptive power of visual violence noting 
that looking at one photograph “was so awful my heart skipped a beat.” It was not just his 
heart that was paralyzed. 
I must have stopped writing. As I do sometimes, I went to sit by the open 
window. No sooner was I seated then I fell into some kind of trance. Unlike 
the other night when I doubted it painfully, this time the fact this kind 
of state is more intense than erotic pleasure was clear to me. I don’t see 
anything—which is not a thing to be touched or seen. That makes you sad 
and heavy from not dying. (Guilty 32)
The fact that Bataille concludes his narration with a deictic indicator (That) confuses the 
subject and addressee of the final phrase. What exactly makes him sad and heavy? Who 
is being made to feel this way? These are rhetorical questions, of course. But are they? He 
confesses that he does not see “anything,” he sees nothing, which is not a thing that can be 
touched or seen. And this nothing can only be indicated with the gesture of “That,” which 
becomes ambiguous to the reader who cannot stand witness to the gesture. Yes, Millett and 
Bataille have stopped writing, and in the place of writing Bataille offers an image, a gesture 
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of writing. 
There is no need to draw lines, at least universally moral lines in the guise of ethics. 
But there is a need to continue writing, perhaps in a different mode, in order to break the 
infinite suspension of pain. The question “How is this scene possible?” also contains a deictic 
gesture that suggests that, by the capacity to question the scene opens the possibility to 
return and respond.
Assignment 5: Falling
Jørgen Leth spends a lot of time in the film during the second obstruction practicing his fall. 
He has a difficult time controlling the movement so that it does not look choreographed. 
This footage reappears at the conclusion to The Perfect Human: Avedøre which is a film 
all about Leth’s attempts to resist von Trier’s obstructions. The final assignment will be a 
gesture, a movement suspended between control and uncontrollability, understanding and 
shock, constraint and freedom, and the frame and the ob/scene. Practice falling. Do it again. 
And again.  Turn around and fall to another side. Try it at different heights. Make up a story 
about your falling. Don’t hurt yourself. Keep falling until you get it perfect.
     How does the 
perfect human being fall?
      This is how the             
        perfect human falls.
9 10
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“How does the perfect human fall?” This is the question that ends The Five 
Obstructions. The whole idea of “the perfect human” has been, from the inception of the 
project, the focal point of each obstruction. It is not a simply a question of tragedy, though it 
could mean that, nor does it look toward some event of redemption, although it is not out of 
the question. Falling has direction and movement; performing the fall is the perfect gesture, 
so to speak, as the perfect simulation of the controlling/uncontrollable libidinal act. The 
final obstruction is a composition of falling in two ways: Leth loses the capacity to direct his 
own film, and yet must sign his name to it as the director and then he must speak the words 
von Trier writes for him as the voice-over narration. Under the terms of both conditions 
Leth is restrained from creative input and his voice is effectively silenced. Falling becomes 
his only means of expression and it is tied to the perfect human through writing, speaking, 
image, and, finally, gesture. 
Silence is important to falling in this final obstruction because it suppresses 
Leth’s ability to respond to von Trier. Response has been the hallmark of the collaborative 
context of the obstructions all through the film. Instead of responding to the obstruction 
with another film, Leth must respond through his body on the screen and his voice in the 
narration. While practicing his narration, Leth recites one of his lines: “Jørgen gets the rush 
of Sartre and Hemingway’s historical wings, to waft away the discomfort and insecurity 
because he hasn’t the guts to take wing for himself!” Von Trier laughs and interjects, “You 
put the stress on ‘take wing’ instead of ‘himself.’ You are doing everything you can to evade 
the text. It’s ‘take wing for himself.’ That’s the point.” Leth can only respond by escaping the 
limitations set up by the text, as von Trier tries desperately to reel him back into the frame 
he has placed. In Counter-Statement, Kenneth Burke cites the use of silence and banal statements 
in Karel Čapek’s science-fiction play R.U.R (Rossum’s Universal Robots). Lacking the verbal 
ability to express the inexpressible, the humanized Robot in the play, upon seeing his first 
sunrise, declares simply “Oh, see the sunrise” (38). It is at this moment that form and 
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content implode into a verbal stasis represented by the event of an iconic phrase. We are 
told to look at the sunrise, and it is this deictic gesture of referring to something outside the 
realm of the expressible that the Robot speaks what cannot be said.  The energy under the 
verbal surface cannot be uttered in any efficient or logical way, and yet it overwhelms the 
scene with desire, figure, discourse—image. 
The voice-over narration comes from beyond the frame, is superimposed over 
the scene from outside. But the narration and Leth’s voice becomes an integral part of the 
composition, a way for Leth to “evade the text.” In the old adage of silent film critique “there 
never was a silent film” because there were always music and sounds accompanying the 
images. Melinda Szaloky takes this one step further by arguing that even if there were a film 
that lacked a musical accompaniment, the images themselves were never meant for a silent 
world and that “the hidden acoustic dimension of silent cinema should be sought in the 
spectator’s head” (110). There are pieces of the composition which do not originate from 
within the scene, and in this case from within the film. For the first time the obstruction is 
not meant for Leth alone, but for the “spectator’s head” who has been participating in the 
composition of the film from the beginning. This obstruction is ultimately addressed to 
those who would continue the project from the outside of the film. 
Falling is a gesture, but it is also a vocalized phrase. In The Five Obstructions falling 
is accompanied by the phrase “This is how the perfect human falls.” This phrase uttered 
without the image of Leth falling to the ground is much more of a confusing statement: 
how does the perfect human fall, and where is this human being that we can watch him 
fall? But this is not just a case of the image clarifying the spoken phrase. Indeed, it is an 
answer to a proposed question in the narration, and it is Leth himself who is asking/
answering the question about his own image of falling. Jean-François Lyotard writes of 
deictic gestures such as “this” in The Differend as belonging to a “universe” that indicates 
how the phrase should be translated (33).3 The position of these gestures to other phrases 
determines meaning, but the deictic indicator also relates the phrase to a space through a 
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spoken gesture: the phrase literally takes place. The particular universe or composition that 
surrounds the deictic gesture will suggest meaning, but will also leave open the question of 
the indicating subject. Geoffrey Bennington translates Lyotard’s understanding of deictics 
as “place of a certain collapse of the distinction between langue and parole on the one hand, 
and on the other, of the distinction between signified and referent” (63). Question: Who is 
falling? Answer: The perfect human. Does this indicate that Leth is the perfect human? Or 
does this gesture back toward von Trier? Is this perfection marked by success or failure, or 
“rotten with perfection” as Burke says? Does either success or failure make an appearance—
fort/da? The ethics of revision that permeate the film could not sustain an answer to any of 
these questions. Instead, the answer is expressed as a gesture, leaving open the possibility 
for viewer-participants to place themselves in the position of the perfect human as an image 
that is subject to infinite revision.
The final shot of The Five Obstructions is Leth in his hotel room practicing for a scene 
in which he must reproduce a fall to the ground. Leth reads the voice over that von Trier 
wrote for the film: 
“How does the perfect human fall? 
This is how the perfect human falls.” 
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Conclusion
In fact even the gesture of writing, which alone permits one to envisage 
slightly less conventional human relations, a little less crafty than those 
of so-called intimate friendships—even this gesture of writing does not 
leave me with an appreciable hope. I doubt that it is possible to reach the 
few people to whom this letter is no doubt intended, over the heads of 
my present comrades. For—my resolution is all the more intransigent in 
that it is absurd to defend—it would have been necessary to deal not with 
individuals like those I already know, but only with men (and above all with 
masses) who are comparatively decomposed, amorphous, and even violently 
expelled from every form. But it is likely that such men do not exist (and the 
masses certainly do not exist). (Georges Bataille, “The Use Value of D.A.F. de 
Sade [An Open Letter to My Current Comrades]” 91)
We can now clarify a second and quite different sense of this ‘re-.’ Essentially 
linked with writing in this sense, the ‘re-’ in no way signifies a return to the 
beginning but rather what Freud called a ‘working through,’ Durcharbeitung, 
i.e. a working attachment to a thought of what is constitutively hidden from 
us in the event and the meaning of the event, hidden not merely by past 
predjudice, but also by those dimensions of the future marked by the pro-
ject, the pro-grammed, pro-spectives, and even by the pro-position and the 
pro-posal to psychoanalyze. (Lyotard, “Re-Writing Modernity” 5)
This project has been a performance, a gesture of writing, which imagines the 
presence of some virtual collaboration between author and audience. It has been a re-
writing or “working through” of the assignment of The Five Obstructions. This document is a 
continuation of the assignment of the obstructions as an open letter of sorts to the work of 
both Lars von Trier and Jørgen Leth. By writing an open letter to those he called comrades, 
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Bataille’s gesture is to write as if there was such a thing as an audience, instead of the 
individuals with whom we have multifaceted relationships, even, sometimes, at a distance. 
In effect, his open letter is a gesture of writing to no one. It maintains the fiction that writing 
is not itself a gesture, a movement of libidinal investments that subjects the writer to the 
shock and confusion that there is no originary writing, no writing that can properly be 
called “one’s own.”4 
Friedrich Kittler explained the transformations in human communication as a form 
of media conversion: “If writing proceeds from reading and reading proceeds from listening, 
then all writing is translation” (Discourse Networks 97). All writing is subject to translation 
because there is no originary writing, nor any other medium that does not do the work of 
translation or rewriting. Writing is the fiction of re-writing without an originary source. 
During the final obstruction it is easy to forget from what source film von Trier and Leth 
were supposedly working. At this point Leth’s original The Perfect Human fits nicely into the 
procession of obstructions as yet another version of “the perfect human,” or even an ex post 
facto translation of The Five Obstructions. Performances are always works of translation, 
works of culture-in-action that Antonin Artaud had described as “a new organ” or “second 
breath” that is subject to change and revision (8).
An obstruction in the context of multimodal composition is not writing but a gesture 
of writing, a movement of the writing instrument produced by the tectonic shifts across 
media affecting a social translation that is also a fundamental change in how we relate in a 
context of cultural collaboration. This is the thesis that Walter Ong forwards in Interfaces of 
the Word, declaring that “major developments, and very likely even all major developments, 
in culture and consciousness, are related, often in unexpected intimacy, to the evolution 
of the word from primary orality to its present state” (9-10). Johanna Drucker takes this 
idea a step further to claim that the present state is a visual state: “Visuality is a primary 
mode of understanding, but also of our production as social and cultural beings” (4). The 
challenge she writes is that we not only learn how to “read” visuality, but understand it 
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as epistemological in the way that Ong says it shapes how we relate to one another. She 
bemoans the lack of sufficient theorizing of visuality and the structures that produce it as a 
practice of knowing. 
The challenge, as I see it in regards to obstructions, is that visuality is difficult to 
pin down as a discursive mode. We could say that all visuality has an aspect of “vision,” but 
is vision something that can be “seen” so that it can be theorized? Lyotard submits that 
visuality is produced through vision and that “vision is not ‘seeing.’ Seeing is vision seen, 
witnessed. The third party sees seeing. Vision itself is not seen by any eye” (“Fiscourse 
Digure” 351). The difficulty of “seeing” vision is a reason why, despite the popularity of 
multimodal composition among current writing curricula, the ghost of textual discourse will 
continue to haunt the use of images in composition.
In his analysis of Velázquez’s “Las Meninas” Foucault makes the observation that 
one must see an incompatibility between vision and language that is the possibility of the 
discourse of representation rather than an obstruction, so to speak (The Order of Things 9). 
Discourse may lay bare the “illuminations” of the visual: “We must therefore pretend not 
to know who is to be reflected in the depths of that mirror, and interrogate that reflection 
in its own terms” (10). Vision does not preclude language when discussing images; there 
is, however, a certain incompatibility between the two that requires a rhetorical sleight of 
hand. I have approached obstructions in the same way that Lyotard referred to being able to 
see vision, or how Foucault looked at “Las Meninas,” pretending that I don’t see the image in 
order to be able to discuss that which resists discourse.
The final obstruction is, of course, not the final obstruction, nor was it ever intended 
to be. As Leth finishes his fall, the credits to The Five Obstructions roll and show both Leth 
and von Trier as directors of the film. The obstruction The Perfect Human: Avedøre in which 
Leth had to accept directing credit for something that was not his creation disrupts the 
importance of authorship to revision. The ethics of obstructions is not to come to consensus 
but to continue to work through new responses. This idea of revision is, of course, not one 
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that originates within von Trier or Leth as directors, or me as author of this project called 
a dissertation, nor does it end at the fall, or the roll of the credits, or even here on the page. 
Others have already picked up on the call to respond and have created their own revisions of 
“the perfect human.” At the moment there are several remakes that have been posted on the 
Internet including The Perfect Chicken, The Perfect Zombie, and The Perfect Human (A Science 
Fiction Tale), as well as one titled The Sixth Obstruction.5 Surely these will not be the last.
All of these videos, and many others like them, take the film The Perfect Human as 
their point of stasis in order to extend the composition of “the perfect human” in a multitude 
of versions. For example, The Perfect Chicken disrupts the sterile approach of the original 
film with the shock of a woman giving birth to a cooked chicken. Meanwhile The Sixth 
Obstruction attempts a more strict approach to using the same shots as Leth’s film, but 
includes colors and other distorted video stylizations to respond to the clean documentary 
approach of the first. There is nothing groundbreaking in any of these revisions, except that 
the little experiment that Leth and von Trier began over email back in November of 2000 
has continued to solicit responses from its audience, who now has the means and access to 
both produce these small revisions and distribute them over web-based technologies and 
social networks.
 This is the conclusion, in the most gestural way possible of announcing a conclusion 
to something that has no possibility of actually concluding. As though any work can 
conclude absolutely. The challenge of obstructions will continue, and this project is a 
realization of my own participation in that challenge. In addition to this mostly print 
document I will add a supplement to the frame with another video revision of The Perfect 
Human that cannot be present within the limits of these pages. The video will interrupt the 
scene of writing with a different mode of translation that will find its proper place beyond 
the margins of the page, working through this obstruction in the ob/scene. This is my 
gesture of writing to those with whom I can only silently envision a collaboration.    
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 Endnotes
Chapter One: Composing the Image
1 In Book IV of The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle distinguished between theoretical 
and practical knowledge by outlining epistêmê (scientific knowing), technê (making, 
skill), and phronēsis (doing, practical knowledge) (see 1139b31-35, 1140a9-10). The Five 
Obstructions engages knowing, doing, and making as modes of compositional discourse. The 
film has already been “made” as a created object; however, it also demonstrates the process 
of making throughout. The project in this document is meant to extend the making process 
to a literate form (text) while also taking up the challenge of making by continuing the 
challenge of obstructions to different modes of composition.
2 In 1995 von Trier was part of the Danish film collective called Dogme that famously 
agreed to a “Vow of Chastity” or set of manifesto rules with the expressed purpose to “force 
the truth out of [their]characters and settings” (The Danish Directors, Hjort 9). Participants 
in the collective made films expressly following the directives of the vow or would face 
certain punishments. In an interview with Ib Bondebjerg, von Trier explained in his own 
contributions to the Dogme 95 movement he “tried to use [his] left hand a bit there, but 
the whole idea behind the rules is that we, in setting limits to freedom, enhanced freedom 
within circumscribed limits” (Danish, Hjort 220). Von Trier’s participation in the Dogme 
95 collective had an obvious effect on his goals for The Five Obstructions. However, the 
procedures of the Dogme group followed a very religious discourse and followed a very 
different ethical trajectory than the obstructions experiment; the history of the group is 
beyond the scope of the present study. Mette Hjort has done extensive work on Danish 
film as a global market presence and her work on von Trier and the Dogme 95 collective is 
invaluable on the subject (cf. Bondebjerg and Hjort, The Danish Directors: dialogues on a 
contemporary national cinema).
3 Bazin says “The primacy of the image is both historically and technically accidental. 
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The nostalgia that some still feel for the silent screen does not go back far enough into 
the childhood of the seventh art. The real primitives of the cinema, existing only in the 
imaginations of a few men of the nineteenth century, are in complete imitation of nature. 
Every new development added to the cinema must, paradoxically, take it nearer and nearer 
to its origins. In short, cinema has not yet been invented!” (21)
4 The traditional English translation of the French word sens is “meaning” rather 
than “sense,” and replace any notion of the term sense with by meaning. A careful reading 
of the essay finds, however, that the meaning implies a much more defined accounting of 
what the obtuse represents, while Barthes’ intention, if he has one, is to reveal a sense of 
the image which has no account. I will continue with the more apt term sense in place of 
meaning when referring to this essay. 
5 Barthes explains, “I do not know what its signified is, at least I am unable to give it 
a name, but I can see clearly the traits, the signifying accidents of which this - consequently 
incomplete - sign is composed” (“Third” 53). Barthes now offers a list of descriptions rather 
than an explanation. This is the signifier (description) with no signified (meaning). 
6 Barthes recounts Bataille’s discovery of extraordinary terms: “Bataille, who 
eludes the idealist term by an unexpected materialism in which we find vice, devotion, play, 
impossible eroticism, etc; thus Bataille does not counter modesty with sexual freedom but… 
with laughter” (55).
7 Stiegler relates this disorientation to “an incapacity to achieve epochal redoubling.” 
What he means by “epochal redoubling” is a break in the technical system that “suspends 
the behavioral programming through which a society is united.” By disallowing this 
redoubling, technologies employed in the service of speed prevent resistance and 
alterations to the technical system (7). 
8 Agamben here discusses the doubleness of adjacency in the terms of ethics in 
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which the proper space can only go with the improper place, or “the free use of the proper” 
as he quotes Friedrich Hӧlderlin (cf. Agacben, The Coming Community 25).
9 On page 106 he writes that “the nothing is the origin of negation, not vice versa.”
10 Heidegger adds to the coin metaphor when he discusses ec-stasis as “intrinsically 
exposing” (126) and that “[t]he insistent turning toward what is readily available and the 
ek-sistent turning away from the mystery belong together” (133). Here we can discern 
Agamben’s recovery of ec-stasis in his own discussion of “easement” and adjacency in The 
Coming Community.
11 In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari foreground excess in the mechanic qualities 
of desire: “Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject 
that is missing in desire or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless 
there is repression. Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a 
machine of a machine. Desire is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine 
connected to it…As Marx notes, what exists in fact is not lack, but passion as a ‘natural and 
sensuous object’” (29). Ultimately, desire does possess organic “passions” that appeal to the 
physical senses.  
12 See Introduction to Libidinal Economy (xx) in which Lyotard admits to the perversity 
of his thought in his “evil book, the book of evilness that everyone writing and thinking is 
tempted to do.”
13 This is how Lyotard can declare that his book is not really a book: “The present 
writing would not be a book; for there is no book that is not the ideal of the immobilized 
organic body…. Not a book, only libidinal investments” (Libidinal 256).                 In a footnote Barthes sees the connection when he points out the “happy 
coincidence” that the tradition in the Middle Ages had hearing as the third sense. He admits 
that there is more listening involved in what he perceives than seeing (Image 53).
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Chapter Two: The Ethics of Obstructions 
 This is Aristotle’s famous definsition for rhetoric to begin the Rhetorica. George 
Kennedy translates it as follows: “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] 
case, to see the available means of persuasion” (36). There is a presumption that “the means 
of persuasion” would be determined by the specificity of the situation. He limits this to a 
visual sense (“an ability . . . to see”) which Kennedy explains is translated from theorēsai as 
“to be an observer of and to grasp the meaning or utility of” (37). Obstructions set aside this 
concept of rhetorical invention by restricting the available means before they can be “seen” 
and utilized. The ethical component of creative constraint lies in the uncertainty restricting 
access to a range of possibilities. What the project of the film emphasizes is the question of 
how does one choose between means and then how does one respond.
2 Agamben claims that cinema is in a unique ethical position because motion 
pictures preserve the movement of gesture, rather than fragmentary representation 
(“Notes” 56). Duration of movement “liberates” the image from production to expose its 
mediality, Agamben believes that the cinema carries image back to ethics because its center 
lie in gesture and not image, duration and not fragmentation.
3 This is to mean sense as a cultural logic that attempts to overcome senselessness 
with agency.  Friedrich Nietzsche ends The Genealogy of Morals by pointing to the 
metaphysical power of sense: “man was saved thereby, he possessed a meaning, he was 
henceforth no longer like a leaf in the wind, a plaything of nonsense—the ‘sense-less’—he 
could now will something…” Senselessness, or non-sense, is not a negation of sense or 
meaning, but an affirmation of sensation as a mode of knowledge. 
4 Charles Scott notes that this definition of ethics is indistinguishable from cultural 
notions of morality. He recognizes the tautology of this understanding of ethics: “[‘right’ 
principles] function within a given ethos will ordinarily be operative in evaluations of them 
within the ethos” (4).
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5 Burke also uses the term “occupational psychoses” to describe how “society’s ways 
of life affect its modes of thinking” (Permanence 3). In the example of Freud, his dedication 
to a medical model remains a trace for the process of psychoanalytic analysis.
6 Francois Truffaut’s “A Certain Tendency of the French Cinema” in Cahiers du cinema 
(1954) no. 31 January is one of the first and most cited texts on auteur theory. The figure of auteur has been one of components to defining an artistic and scholarly field for film 
studies.
7 Deleuze illustrates this in Cinema 1 through the film set which is always part of a 
larger set, and which prevents itself from becoming a completely closed system: “a closed 
system is never absolutely closed” (18).
8 The idea of the “new idiom” and the aforementioned “phrases in dispute” come 
from Lyotard who proposes, “at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps 
is to bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them” (Differend 13). He claims this 
is the job of the philosopher whose “responsibility before thought consists . . . in detecting 
differends and in finding the (impossible) idiom for phrasing them” (142). Lyotard is 
aligning the philosopher with the artist, or the “bricoleur” from Levi-Strauss, as a figure who 
plays with structures opposed it to the “engineer” and seeks a totality of structure. 
In “Structure Sign, and Play” Derrida notes that the play that the bricoleur values is 
only possible within the discourse of the structuration of the engineer. Derrida even says 
that the idea of the engineer was created by the bricoleur. “As soon as we cease to believe 
in such an engineer and in a discourse which breaks with the received historical discourse, 
and as soon as we admit that every finite discourse is bound by a certain bricolage and that 
the engineer and the scientist are also species of bricoleurs, then the very idea of bricolage 
is menaced and the difference in which it took on its meaning breaks down” (Writing and 
Difference 360-361). The figures of bricoleur and engineer need the challenge of the other 
to sustain their identities and discourses. The new idiom is made possible by the aporia of 
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differends. 
9 Just as Leth’s perfect human must fall as the closing image of The Five Obstructions. 
The failure must be complete under the weight of von Trier’s demands and Leth’s own 
desires for perfection. The film was always a project of failure.
10 According to Lacan, the equation of the Nebenmensch is that it is “beside yet alike, 
separation and identity” (Ethics 61). The opposition of the pleasure principle and reality 
principle functions through a desire/negation dialectic (without synthesis): this is the 
difference and repetition pattern also seen in Derrida’s engineer and bricoleur, and plays out 
through Leth and von Trier in the film.
1 Ranciére argues for three distinct regimes in “Western Tradition”: the “Ethical,” the 
“Representative,” and the “Aesthetic.” The Ethical is defined through the Platonic polemic 
against simulacra, “images are the object of a twofold question: the question of their origin 
. . . and the question of their end or purpose. . . . In this regime, it is a matter of knowing 
in what way images’ mode of being affects the ethos, the mode of being of individuals and 
communities. This question prevents ‘art’ from individualizing itself as such.” (Politics 20-
1); the Representative (or poetic) regime he defines, “within a classification of ways of 
doing and making, and it consequently defines proper ways of doing and making as well as 
means of assessing imitations [mimesis] . . . a fold that renders the arts visible” (22); and 
the Aesthetic regime asserts the singularity of “art” but destroys the criteria for isolating 
singularity (art as art objects), it is “based on distinguishing a sensible mode of being 
specific to artistic products” (23).
Chapter Three: The Freedom of Obstruction
 1 Nancy says in Ground of the Image that an image not only appears as presence 
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but “presents what is absent from presence pure and simple, its being as such or even its 
sense or truth” (37). Something seems to be hidden from the image or is excluded from the 
scene that frames the conditions of presence. By building his frame and showing the people behind it in The Perfect Human: Bombay he made an attempt to include this outside frame.
2 This phrase/question comes from Maurice Blanchot in The Writing of the Disaster 
(72). The primal scene provides an effective image for the crisis at the center of a mise-en-
scene between the restriction of the frame and the desire to include everything. The desire 
subsists once it is repressed and the image returns to its frame.
3 To include both tendencies would be to stretch the conditions of virtue, in the best 
possible Aristotelian sense!
4 From the Online Etymology Dictionary: “Ob- prefix meaning ‘toward, against, 
across, down,’ also used as an intensive, from L. ob ‘toward, against, in the way of, about, 
before’.” Here I am playing on the suggestion of ob- as a directional prefix, in any direction 
other than in the direction of representation. In the case of ob/scene the frame and the 
external scene that lies beyond the frame imposes a force on the mise-en-scene. Von Trier’s 
purpose in disallowing Leth to show the surrounding poverty in The Perfect Human: 
Bombay is to experiment with what impact the location will have on the film without its 
actual appearance on film. The misery of the location stands as a silent witness against the 
extravagance of the banquet scene. The ob/scene refers to the excess or indefinite external 
force of the unframed external force on the composition of the mise-en-scene. The Online 
Etymology Dictionary also explains “obstetrics” as referring to the midwife as the “one who 
stands opposite (the woman giving birth).” 
5 In Truth and Eros Rajchman analyzes Lacan’s use of fictions as a way to cover up 
the trauma of the hidden “truth.” (32-33) Truth here is the layering of fictions in order to 
suppress the trauma. Revision is a way to tear away those layers of fictions and expose the 
trauma as an illusion, or an illusion insofar as it can no longer be recognized outside of the 
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context of fictions.
6 The minimal gap is a concept Žižek sees playing out in Derrida’s notion of the gift. 
Žižek says of Derrida’s concept of gift: “as long as a gift is not recognized, it ‘is’ not fully a 
gift; the moment it is recognized it is no longer a pure gift, since it is already caught in the 
cycle of exchange” (The Ticklish Subject 58).
7 The strategy of “nonpositive affirmation” is from Foucault, but Vitanza also finds 
it in Deleuze and Guattari as simply “affirmation,” and in the case of Lyotard he argues 
“[nonpositive affirmation] could have been Marx’s affirmation if he (Lyotard/Marx) had not 
begun with the negative investment” (Negation 120)
8  In Mulvey’s essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” she theorizes a 
spectatorship of sexual difference focusing on the negative representation of women 
on in motion pictures. She defends her use of psychoanalysis by explaining “[it] is thus 
appropriated here as a political weapon, demonstrating the way the unconscious of 
patriarchal society has structured film form” (6). She describes how the gaze of the 
spectator at the screen is always phallocentric scopophilia. Although Mulvey leaves women 
little room for visual pleasure, her use of psychoanalysis demonstrates that movies are not 
just the products of political machinations, but psycho-political processes that happen on 
the level of the unconscious.
9 Žižek elaborates on Lacan’s notion of “traversing (going through) the fantasy” 
by noting that it does not mean getting rid of fantasies (distortions of reality), but that 
we identify with the work of our imagination “in all its inconsistency”: “pure void of 
subjectivity” confronted by “spectral ‘partial objects’’” (Ticklish Subject 51). “Traversing the 
fantasy” is another way to discuss the ethical work of obstructions that maintains a recoiling 
position of nonpositive affirmation.
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Chapter Four: Abject Pedagogy
1 “Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel.”
2 In The Future of the Image Ranciére announces the obscene as “the 
unrepresentable,” but then further as “the unthinkable, the untreatable, the irredeemable” 
(109). There is always a question of how to develop a politics without some kind of 
representation or meaning, some kind of subject that can resist power structures. Ranciére 
echoes the difficulty of the obscene to be represented, but then also as that which is 
“irredeemable” or as a fallen or not quite whole composition. This describes those that have 
not only been excluded from social communities but have been rejected or vomited out of 
a particular community (the “aura of holy horror”). This is the groundings for a general 
politics of composition.  
3 In Libidinal Economy Lyotard spoke of the “Ephemeral Skin” as the body politic. 
The body will become the site of politics through pedagogical encounters with obstructions. 
Body also refers to the pedagogical body that exchanges obstructions as well as ethos which 
recoils around the roles of teacher/student. 
4 Hegel approached the master/slave dialectic in Phenomenology of the Spirit as a 
relationship of recognition that happens both internally and externally. The point for this 
chapter is that there is an initial confrontation between two “abstract” entities that leads to 
a struggle and, eventually, a (more or less uncertain) resolution: “On approaching the other 
it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as another being; secondly, it has thereby sublated 
that other, for this primitive consciousness does not regard the other as essentially real 
but sees its own self in the other” (¶ 179, 111). It is this initial encounter of struggle that 
obstructions provoke.
5 Ranciére believes that Benjamin made a mistake thinking that mechanical 
reproduction assumes artistic process. Ranciére claims that practices of mechanical 
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technology must first fall into the aesthetic regime before they can even be labeled “art”: 
“they first need to be put into practice and recognized as something other than techniques 
of reproduction or transmission. . . . [I]t is actually this regime that made [mechanical 
reproduction] possible by its new way of thinking art and its subject matter” (Politics 
32). This artistic status is acquired through the concept of community: “the technological 
revolution comes after the aesthetic revolution. . . [T]he aesthetic revolution is first of all the 
honour acquired by the commonplace” (33).
6 Paulo Freire has discussed the problematic political implications of teaching 
literacy. In an essay titled “Literacy: Reading the Word and the World” Freire and Donald 
Macedo discuss “literacy” as part of a social agenda that subscribes to “a deficit theory of 
learning” that strives to redistribute knowledge across economic rifts: “At stake here is a 
view of literacy steeped in a notion of equity” (3). According to Freire, literacy training only 
provides a “catalog-like approach” to instituting privileged forms of knowledge and skills, 
without consideration to the needs of a plurality of communities.
7 Maurice Sendak, Where the Wild Things Are, (New York: Harper Collins 1991).
8 This final sentence is taken from a discussion in Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror 
about Freud’s analysis of little Hans’ fear of horses. Kristeva argues that “to be afraid of 
horses” is the “hieroglyph” or the object signifier for Hans who substitutes horses for all 
fear and anxiety. As a hieroglyph, the image becomes a text or mapping for what previously 
appeared inexpressible. The image, however, remains outside of text because, as Kristeva 
writes, as metaphor, the image is “taxed with representing want itself, “as opposed to the 
object of desire—objet petit a (35). Likewise, the abject image does not simply represent 
an object related phobia, but is one that “condenses all fears, from unnamable to nameable” (34). This will lead into the next discussion about abjection and pedagogy.
9 This chapter focuses on Freud’s Rat Man case as it is the primary source for Ronell’s 
analysis. This case alone, however, hardly scratches the surface to the psychoanalytic 
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resources of the suppository/supposing interaction of doctor and patient. Later, Freud 
would encounter a similar theme of neurosis and anal fixation in the case of Sergei 
Pankejeff, better known as the “Wolf Man” whose symptoms included difficulty in bowel 
movements (Cf. Freud, “From the history of an infantile neurosis.”) Peter Gay notes in 
an introduction to the Wolf Man case that Freud explained in a letter to Sándor Ferenczi 
that during his first session with the Wolf Man he had “confessed to me the following 
transferences: Jewish swindler, he would like to use me from behind and shit on my head” (Freud: A Reader 401). Freud’s analysis of the Wolf Man’s famous dream included references 
to a primal scene in which he witnessed his parents having sexual intercourse a tergo, 
adding to the image of reversal that the anus implies. 
Freud also had studied the famous case of Judge Daniel Paul Schreber who confessed 
to divine sexual penetration from what he referred to as “rays” representing God: “as soon 
as I am alone with God, if I may so express myself, I must continually . . . strive to give divine 
rays the impression of a woman in the height of sexual delight” (Schreber 249). Deleuze 
and Guattari pick up on this aspect of the Schreber case beginning their book Anti-Oedipus 
that Schreber had “sunbeams in his ass. A solar anus” (Anti-Oedipus 2). D&G are critical of 
Freud’s analysis of Schreber’s delusions as simplifying the richness of his honest confessions 
to Oedipal desires (64). All three of these cases are famous for the difficulty that they gave 
Freud as suppository encounters.
10 “The talking cure” was coined by Anna O., a patient of Josef Breuer, and friend 
to Dr. Freud. Breuer found some success with his patient by talking through some of her 
symptoms. Peter Gay recounts in Freud: A Life of Our Time that it was a pivotal moment for 
the development of psychoanalysis when Breuer introduced the case of Anna O. to Freud: 
“[The talking cure] proved cathartic as it awakened important memories and disposed of 
powerful emotions she had been unable to recall, or express, when she was her normal self. 
When Breuer took Freud into his confidence about Anna O., he did not neglect to tell him 
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about this process of catharsis” (65).
11 Truth appears here without scare quotes; it is meant in the platonic sense of ideal 
forms. Each new film indeed distances itself from the original The Perfect Human in various 
ways: as a remake of a remake of a remake, etc., as a temporal distance (the original gets lost 
in the past), and their styles become more and more distant from the intent of the original. 
There is a case to be made, however, that these “distances” actually serve to bring the film 
more into the public domain: each remake gives the original a new importance, it is never 
really lost as the new films resurrect it from the past, and each new style is a response to the 
original style.
12 This issue of waiting was suggested by Žižek in Enjoy Your Symptom! as an ethical 
third way of responding to a situation that does not require revolution (xvi). Waiting here 
means not just to wait around for a new solution, but to not choose either way which opens 
up the composition to new modes of responses.
Chapter Five: Figural/Games
1 Zizek recounts a story told by Joseph Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, about 
the final moments of her father on his death bed. After he suddenly opened his eyes and 
glanced around the room at those staring at his dying body, Stalin performs a gesture:
Then something incomprehensible and terrible happened that to this day I 
can’t forget and don’t understand. He suddenly lifted his left hand as though he were 
pointing to something up above and bringing down a curse on us all. The gesture 
was incomprehensible and full of menace, and no one could say to whom or what it 
might be directed. The next moment, after a final effort, the spirit wrenched itself 
free of the flesh. (Enjoy Your Symptom!, 227). 
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Zizek asks what this gesture could possibly mean. His answer is nothing, “yet this 
nothing was not an empty nothing, but the fullness of libidinal investment, a tic that gave 
body to a cipher of enjoyment” (227).
2 In chapter two “the question of ethics” was discussed in terms of subjectivity, and 
John Rajchman had identified the notion of the intolerable as an aspect of Foucault’s notion 
of ethics. Rajchman sees the intolerable as a key moment in Foucault’s work in which he 
turns his eye on the difficulty of his own work and asks “What does it cost for reason to tell 
the truth?” (Truth and Eros, 11). The intolerability of von Trier’s script is that there is no 
room for revision or creative input, it must be spoken as written, and then Leth must take 
credit as director. The costs are that Leth may not accept the meanings of the script, and his 
ethos is now tied to something that is not properly his own.
3 What is so special about deictic indicators is that they are meaningful within a 
universe of phrases, but that this meaning creates reality. In The Differend Lyotard writes, 
“Deictics relate the instances of the universe presented by the phrase in which they are 
placed back to a ‘current’ spatio-temporal origin so named ‘I-here-now.’ These deictics are 
designators of reality” (33). These words, and accordingly the phrases that contain them, 
enact a double rhetorical gesture by indicating to something beyond the phrase which in 
turn urges the listener to turn in a particular direction.
4 Cf. Scott, The Question of Ethics 144-5. 
5 The videos The Perfect Chicken, The Perfect Zombie, and The Perfect Human (A 
Science Fiction Tale) can all be accessed on YouTube with the first two both appearing on 
the Newport Doc Film TV Class 2012 sub-channel as an assignment for a Film and Video 
course at the University of Wales, Newport. The latter claims to be an assignment for a 
Documentary Film and Television course, as well as a response to another video titled 
The Perfect Chick Flick. There are actually a few videos on YouTube with the title The Sixth 
Obstruction, but the one that I accessed for this project was one that featured a short 
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conversation in the comments about whether or not this indeed constituted an obstruction:
I’m sorry to disagree, If it is supposed to be a remake with 
obstructions then where are they? Jorgen when made to remake his films in 
the documentary used the obstructions to his advantage where he possibly 
could yet the obstructions were clear. Especially 12 frame edits in the cuba 
version. I can’t see any obstructions in the making of this and an obstruction 
needs to be placed by a 3rd party because placing your own leads to going 
easy on yourself. This is just opinion it is a good remake (EnterSkywalker )
I have to agree with andydoro: there is a lack of an obstruction here. 
Or, at least, there is not one that is made clear to the audience. I do enjoy 
the camera work and imagery, but in order to create something truely Leth-
esque you ought to have someone create an obstruction for you as it will 
provide you with more creative stimulation. It looks like you made this one 
year ago. Don’t give up! Rework it! (jmccormick23) 
Bravo! It’s really an interesting take on the concept of the “sixth 
obstruction”. I have created my own version. The two conditions of my 
version (of which I may incorporate into the first scene) are that the man 
must have a sore neck and that the film must stand by itself (for those who 
are not familiar with The Five Obstructions). Would you be willing to view it 
and let me know what you think? (JimPerr) 
i agree with the second tag to your video, for anyone that hasn’t 
noticed that already it’s ‘bullshit,’ interesting tho, i a bullshit kinda way. 
(havfunky) 
what was the obstruction? no dialogue? why the violence? (andydoro) 
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